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 What or who is the modern subject? Are people sovereign, filled with passion, 
creativity, freedom and autonomy; or are we slaves, robots and automatons forever tied to the 
chains of civilization? It is very common to critique modernity. From the Frankfurt school to 
Foucault, many seem to have focused primarily on its negative characteristics including the 
promotion of narcissism and its contribution to alienation and depression. However, this work 
arose from my general ambivalence toward how society, and ideology, impacts notions of the 
self or, more importantly, self-consciousness and autonomy.  
In this work I tried to offer a framework that not only challenges the tenets of a way 
of conceptualising the human subject by means of extreme objectivity, which is aligned with 
notions of cognitivism and stems, I argue, from the worldview of Protestantism, but also its 
antithesis, extreme subjectivity that manifests itself in intense hubris that can present a very 
real danger to the very foundations of civilization. Thus, the work takes aim at both the 
consequence of extreme objectivity i.e. nihilism, inherent within some of the tenets of 
contemporary capitalism, and extreme subjectivity i.e. relativism.  
This work provides a historical analysis starting with the Protestant Reformation and 
ending with Contemporary Capitalism. By doing so, I was able to emphasise a new 
conceptualisation of the master-slave dialectic into a hierarchal structure beginning with the 
Absolute Master and ending with the Quinary Master vis-à-vis death to work.     
What I demonstrated, and reinforced, is the notion that human consciousness is a 
highly complex hybrid of interacting master-slave dynamics that is fuelled by fantasy, 
structured by the law, is seized upon by the government and the marketplace and finally put 
to work. However, the essential core of the subject is a radical void that simply punches a 
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hole through the processes of the unconscious, which is swallowed up by the desire of the 
other i.e. the desire of these given masters. 
Depression’s genesis I view as the subject yielding too much to the desire of a 
specific type of societal structure. This reached its peak with the Puritans in England during 
the 16th and 17th century that aimed to purge any type of transcendent experience, which is 
characteristic of fantasy and led to widespread misery. 
On the other hand, the period of Romanticism led to a colossal eruption of the 
imagination that attempted to bypass established conventions and flooded the world with 
colour. However, this anarchistic worldview presented an extremely dangerous threat to the 
very foundation of society and thus had to be brought to heel by an evolved state structure. 
The overall structure of the work is based on a gradual unfolding of a hierarchical 
system starting with the very foundations of the subject, through the complexities of 
ideological influence and ending with the subject under contemporary capitalism. The final 
two chapters aimed to contemporise the critiques from Romanticism toward the 
Enlightenment by attacking the tenets of cognitivism as being indicative of a system put 
forward by thinkers prevalent in the 18th century that abstracted the human condition and 
tried to objectify the psyche.  
The scope of the work is large and diverse and hopes to contribute to psychoanalytical 
and philosophical literature by providing a hierarchical system of the master-slave dialectic in 
the development of self-consciousness. The work also provides a critique of ideology by 
highlighting how a certain structure of society can contribute to neurosis by either prohibiting 
or liberating fantasy.  
I do not endorse the cliché and wholly hostile view toward capitalism, but support the 
notion that one should remain ambivalent. That is to say that the work highlights that the free 
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market is indeed innocent but only becomes problematic when it begins to work in collusion 
with a specific state system. In supporting the argument of Protestantism being closely tied to 
the development of capitalism, what should be viewed with great precaution is the very 
definition of what is deemed a beneficial characteristic. This meritocratic worldview is 
indeed essential to stave off overreach from politics, however, and as Rousseau addressed, 
the concept of meritocracy can promote a society of selfishness and pride as well as reinforce 
what I call the standard route via new forms of management, leading to a reduction of 
autonomy and enhancement of conformity.       
In attempting to generate this framework, I have utilised multiple philosophical 
paradigms including ancient Greek, Continental, Romantic, Idealist, Psychoanalysis and 
more to provide an eclectic approach to this inquiry. What the reader will take away from this 
project is a unique and new understanding of the individual, how the subject is impacted from 
engaging with different societal systems and a warning of what can happen if one submits too 
much to passion or reason.    
















“I am committing suicide because of my job at France Télécom. This is the only reason. 
Permanent urgency, overwork, absence of formation, total disorganisation of the enterprise. 
Management by terror. This has totally disorganised and perturbed me.” 
(Lebovits, 2010, p. 5) 
 
“For a politics of emancipation, the enemy that is to be feared most is not repression at the 
hands of the established order. It is the interiority of nihilism, and the unbounded cruelty that 
can come with its emptiness.” 
(Badiou, 2010, p. 32)  
It is easier to critique than to create. The critique of capitalism has become a 
contemporary and in vogue academic cliché. From the May 1968 riots in France, to the 
Occupy Wall Street protests seen around the world in 2011, criticising capitalism is almost 
prescribed to those that wish to construct a more ethical future utopia. However, capitalism 
has not only survived these attacks, but has become more ingrained. Any critique of 
capitalism is almost always met with a simple but devastating question, ‘What is your 
alternative’? For some, a return to communism seems like the only solution. 
The 20th Century can be argued as one consumed within the problem of nihilism and 
totalitarianism. The totalitarian regimes of National Socialism, Fascism and Communism 
were seen as responses to a meaningless and confusing world, whereby the state could act as 
a new monolith, one that could finally provide the alienated public with direction and 
purpose. However, a problem existed within these ideologies – their manifestos were too 
ridged and brittle and thus succumbed to what Fromm (2008 [1942]) argued as a ‘Freedom 
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to’ as opposed to ‘Freedom from’, or what Berlin (1969) defined as Positive liberty “…the 
‘positive’ conception of freedom as self-mastery, with its suggestion of a man divided against 
himself, has, in fact, and as a matter of history, of doctrine and of practice, lent itself more 
easily to this splitting or personality into two: the transcendent, dominant controller, and the 
empirical bundle of desire and passions to be disciplined and brought to heel” (Berlin, 1969, 
p. 25). 
Positive liberty is linked with the discourse of ideology inasmuch as the individual 
has to submit their personal spontaneous passions and desire to the conception of ‘freedom’ 
defined by the dominant power, usually consisting of a process of constant self-evaluation. A 
perfect example of this, which Berlin also used, was the French revolution (1789-1799), 
which was “…like all great revolutions […] at least in its Jacobin form, just such an eruption 
of the desire for ‘positive’ freedom of collective self-direction on the part of a large body of 
Frenchmen who felt liberated as a nation, even though the result was, for a good many of 
them, a severe restriction of individual freedoms” (Berlin, 1969, p. 26).  
Negative liberty or a ‘freedom from’ is a turning away, a retreat inward in an attempt 
to regain an original lost autonomy. It is a deep suspicion of external rules that are deemed to 
stem from the ruling power system. An attempt to regain subjective agency, to make oneself 
sovereign instead of succumbing to the sovereignty of an external force that “…made the 
individual more alone and isolated and imbued him with a feeling of insignificance and 
powerlessness” (Fromm, 2008 [1942], p. 93). However, the great irony is that any new 
definition of freedom gained from this retreat usually resulted in a new rigidity and thus a 
return to tyranny. The Enlightenment promoted the idea of attaining a new self-governance 
away from the regime of external authority by exclaiming the imperative to ‘think for 
oneself’, however, this maxim contributed to the reign of terror in France (1793-1794) that 
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aimed to purge society from “partisans of tyranny or federalism and enemies of liberty” 
(Censer & Hunt, 2004, p. 73) as outlined by the ‘Law of Suspects’ (1793). 
One only needs to read through Fromm’s work on the ‘Psychology of Nazism’ to gain 
an insight into the workings of positive liberty and how it presented a very seductive ideology 
to the German public by representing a “radical opportunism” (Fromm, 2008 [1942], p. 189) 
in response to the individual powerlessness and financial destitution experienced by the 
masses (Ibid, p. 187). However, as with the French revolution, this again descended into a 
reign of terror culminating in a purge of society, manifested by the holocaust.  
Communism was no different, and in many cases worse, when it came to 
implementing positive liberty. The masterpiece ‘The Gulag Archipelago’ (1974) by 
Solzhenitsyn outlined, in brutal detail, the purges within Soviet Russia (1918 – 1956) and its 
complete paranoid madness. The enemies of the state included almost anyone, including 
those that were suspected of shaking hands with someone who was suspected of being a 
dissenter: “For several decades political arrests were distinguished in our country precisely by 
the fact that people were arrested who were guilty of nothing and were therefore unprepared 
to put up any resistance whatsoever. There was a general feeling of being destined for 
destruction, a sense of having nowhere to escape from the GPU-NKVD […] And even in the 
fever of epidemic arrests, when people leaving for work said farewell to their families every 
day, because they could not be certain they would return at night, even then almost no one 
tried to run away and only in rare cases did people commit suicide” (Solzhenitsyn, 1974, p. 
11).  
Another more recent example of communism implementing a system of positive 
liberty was the Khmer Revolution in Cambodia (1975-1979). The regime was so extreme in 
attempting to set up a new utopia that they even disregarded all of history as being part of a 
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bourgeois elite ideology and therefore Cambodia needed to start again with Year Zero. 
Anybody deemed to be part of this old nobility were subsequently imprisoned or executed 
resulting in the killing fields. 
Positive liberty therefore usually results in total barbarism including the terror of 
France, the holocaust, the gulags and the killing fields. Critiquing capitalism therefore is 
usually met with extreme, but understandable, suspicion whereby Žižek observes that 
“Today, reference to the ‘totalitarian’ threat sustains a kind of unwritten Denkverbot 
(prohibition against thinking) […] the moment one shows the slightest inclination to engage 
in political projects that aim seriously to challenge the existing order, the answer is 
immediately: ‘Benevolent as it is, this will necessarily end in a new Gulag!’ The ‘return to 
ethics’ in today’s political philosophy shamefully exploits the horrors of Gulag or Holocaust 
as the ultimate bogey for blackmailing us into renouncing all serious radical engagement” 
(Žižek, 2011, p. 4).    
       According to Fromm’s work ‘The Fear of Freedom’ (1942), there are three 
outcomes in dealing with the ambiguity faced when individuals engage in a process of 
negative liberty or ‘freedom from’. The first, and most apparent, is a resurfacing of positive 
liberty resulting in authoritarianism, as seen with the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. 
The second is destructiveness, whereby “The destruction of the world is the last, almost 
desperate attempt to save myself from being crushed by it” (Fromm, 2008 [1942], p. 154).  
Destructiveness, for Fromm, is different than sadism insofar as the sadistic subject 
seeks a reestablishment of subjective control or power via hurting others, whereas 
destructiveness attempts to purely destroy, not control, the object. It could be viewed as a 
paradoxical politicising of Hobbes state of nature whereby “…they are in that condition 
which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man” (Hobbes, 1985 
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[1651], p. 185). A condition of “…continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of 
man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Ibid, 1985, p. 186). Essentially a pure form of 
anarchism, examples include those seen in fiction, for example personified in the character of 
the Joker in the Batman universe who desires only that the “world burns” and wishes to 
embody the process of chaos itself. Another case can be seen in the film Fight Club (1999), 
specifically the character of Tyler Durden, who begins a social project named ‘Project 
Mayhem’ to deliberately destabilise all forms of social cohesion. In one scene he shouts “God 
damn it, an entire generation pumping gas, waiting tables; slaves with white collars. 
Advertising has us chasing cars and clothes, working jobs we hate so we can buy shit we 
don't need […] Our Great War's a spiritual war... our Great Depression is our lives. We've all 
been raised on television to believe that one day we'd all be millionaires, and movie gods, and 
rock stars. But we won't. And we're slowly learning that fact. And we're very, very pissed 
off” (Fight Club, 1999). 
Destructiveness is different than the escape into authoritarianism primarily because it 
has no manifesto except that it demands not to have one. It is the last attempt to escape from 
‘freedom to’ that is of importance when it comes to capitalism and to which “…the majority 
of normal individuals find in modern society” (Fromm, 2008 [1942], p. 159): automaton 
conformity. 
For Fromm, conformity exists whereby the individual introjects and identifies with 
civilization in such a way that individuals adopt a personality that is characteristic of social 
and cultural norms. By doing so, the individual reneges the dichotomy of the external and 
internal world resulting in a feeling of powerlessness and isolation. Modern man’s 
personality, Fromm argues and alludes to, is like a protective shield, similar to a chameleon: 
“The person who gives up his individual self and becomes an automaton, identical with 
millions of other automatons around him, need not feel alone and anxious any more. But the 
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price he pays, however, is high; it is the loss of his self” (Fromm, 2008 [1942], p. 159). As I 
will show in chapter 3, this is indicative of what I call the Standard Route .  
 Under a state of conformity, the individual believes that they are the seat of agency, 
that their mental life really is ‘theirs’. However, this is a deep illusion and “…a dangerous 
one for that matter, as it blocks the removal of those conditions that are responsible for this 
state of affairs” (Ibid, p. 160). Essentially, everyone under this state is a Pinocchio, but a 
puppet that is unaware of its strings.  
Rates of depression are growing at an alarming rate, and yet approximately forty years 
ago it was hardly seen anywhere (Leader, 2009, p. 11), why? Our contemporary society is 
growing extremely fast not only in terms of complexity, but the requirements needed from 
individuals to feel incorporated within it.    
 The concept ‘Capitalism’ has exacerbated a great deal of scholarly criticism and been 
defined by many scholars including Oliver James, Slavoj Žižek, Noam Chomsky and Simon 
Tormey as a major cause of current psychological misery and depression.1 Indeed the entire 
movement of the Frankfurt School generated a model of critique that seemed to be solely 
hostile toward capitalism (Kellner, 1989 & Kellner, 1995). The term capitalism, if mentioned, 
almost predisposes the listener to a critical disposition whereby it either leaves them 
indifferent, helpless, or outright furious as Fredric Jameson notes: “Capitalism was itself 
always a funny word in this sense: just using the word – otherwise a neutral enough 
designation for an economic and social system on whose properties all sides agree – seemed 
                                                          
1 Respectively their works: The Selfish Capitalist: Origins of Affluenza (2008), Violence 
(2009), Can Civilization Survive Capitalism (2013), and Anti-Capitalism: A Beginner’s 
Guide (2004).  
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to position you in a vaguely critical, suspicious, if not outright socialist stance: only 
committed right-wing ideologues and full-throated market apologists also use it with the 
same relish” (Jameson, 1992, p. 21). 
 The imperialistic nature of capitalism seems to be homogenous with its unwavering 
efficiency. We don’t only have ideas, but are said to capitalise them, people don’t just miss 
opportunities but fail to capitalise. Capitalism is everywhere we look, the products, the roles 
we play, the very way we perceive: it is through these manifest commodities that the latent 
superstructure of capitalism can be seen. 
 However, we must suspend judgement as capitalism has been said is the only system 
that we currently have that works within our complex modern age. That is, capitalism has 
generated wider equality, health, growth, democracy and arguably more freedom, 
substantially more so than any previous economic or political organisation. For example, in 
1820 around 85% of the world’s population lived on less than 1 dollar a day. By 1950 this 
dropped to 50% until what we have today of only 20% (Saunders, 2008). This is a direct 
result of the spread of capitalism according to the social researcher Peter Saunders: 
“Historically, it was capitalism that delivered humanity from the “soul destroying” weight of 
feudalism. Later, it freed millions from the dead hand of totalitarian socialism. While 
capitalism may not be a sufficient condition of human freedom, it is almost certainly a 
necessary one” (Ibid, p. 16). 
 Capitalism, according to some, is the direct practical outcome of libertarian values. 
One of capitalism’s greatest defenders Milton Friedman explained that political libertarian 
values were inseparable from economic freedom. In his work ‘Capitalism and Freedom’ 
(1962), Friedman argues that a libertarian is always wary of any form of intervention and that 
this should be taken with regards to the market: “A liberal is fundamentally fearful of 
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concentrated power. His objective is to preserve the maximum degree of freedom for each 
individual separately that is compatible with one man’s freedom not interfering with other 
men’s freedom. He believes that this objective requires that power be dispersed. He is 
suspicious of assigning to government any functions that can be performed through the 
market, both because this substitutes coercion for voluntary co-operation in the area in 
question and because, by giving government an increased role, it threatens freedom in other 
areas” (Friedman, 2002 [1962], p. 39). 
  The Conference on Inclusive Capitalism that took place in 2014 aimed at addressing 
the future and major drawbacks of capitalism. Numerous high profile speakers including 
Prince Charles, President Bill Clinton and the managing director of the International 
Monetary Fund, Christine Lagarde, presented differing views on attempting to ‘renew the 
capitalist system’, but why was this necessary? Some of the problems that were addressed 
included issues of income inequality, manipulations by business owners to generate 
favourable economic processes at the detriment of the lower socioeconomic strata and the 
dangers of political influence as Madsen Pirie from the Adam Smith Institute indicated: “Just 
as democracy can be corrupted by repressive populism, so can capitalism be perverted by 
"rent-seeking" - when people seek to gain more than the goods and services they produce are 
worth to others. Sometimes they use political influence to sustain monopolies or to prevent 
new entrants and innovators from competing for custom. Sometimes they use governments to 
provide subsidies from taxpayers, or to prohibit cheaper imports” (Pirie, 2013). 
Capitalism, or any form of economic system, has great influence on political 
discourse. With capitalism claiming to generate greater freedom and equality through the 
medium of the free market, many of the methods used rely on an inherent positivistic 
philosophy what I call protestant rationalism. 
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Historically, the obscure concept ‘freedom’ has undergone very complicated 
transformations. Before the reformation of 1517, seen with Martin Luther’s famous ‘Theses’, 
individuals were religiously persecuted whereby thoughts were enclosed within an 
ideological framework (positive liberty) of dogma presented and propagated by the church. 
After Luther nailed his ‘Theses’ to the door of the Church at Wittenberg in 1517,  the 
populace of Europe experienced a collective and momentous ontological break: a liberation 
of Eros, a process of exploring negative liberty, an increase in education, a 
reconceptualisation of nature and the beginnings of the age of Enlightenment.      
 With the Enlightenment, the insistence of reason over myth, personal self-liberation 
and the subscription to moral maxims generated by collective rationality radicalised the 
capitalistic enterprise. Despite its obscure character consisting of infinite particulars, its 
inherent characteristic is that defined by Weber as “Generating profit through peaceful and 
rational exchange” ” (Weber, 2005 [1905], p. 35). This inherent core of capitalism has 
remained embedded as its absolute temperament, its beating heart whose vibrations 
continuously distort, destroy and recreate its outwards appearance giving it an elusive and 
transfigured persona. This destabilising ability allows capitalism to be in a continuous state of 
metamorphosis that makes it extremely malleable and efficient at overcoming external 
attacks.  
 The outcome of Descartes’ Cogito Ergo Sum led to a dramatic loss of depth in the 
human subject; by assuming the absolute idealism of thought as the definitive prerequisite for 
existence, Descartes’ and his contemporaries, Locke and Hobbes to name a few, generated a 
rejection of the destabilising nature of the unconscious and the establishment of a 
bureaucratisation of the identity.  
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This bureaucracy insisted a regained maturity that Kant emphasised in his short essay, 
‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment’ (1784), as being an active participation 
of the subject to transcend the myth embodied by authoritative control and to “dare to think 
for oneself”. However an unexpected outcome came from this dictum – the establishment of 
a new epistemology, an objectification of reality and the instalment of a new ‘rational fear’, 
the result of which led people into a unique form of collective Weltschmerz.   
 The English poet John Milton (1608-1674) was extremely observant of the dangers of 
adopting a closed all consuming thought and associated it with the fall and the devil. Milton’s 
epic masterpiece ‘Paradise Lost’ (1667) documents the fall of man as well as the great 
rebellion by Lucifer against God. When Lucifer falls from heaven he attempts to set up a new 
world where selfish thought will reign supreme; divorced from the ultimate transcendent 
object of God’s radiance: “Farewell, happy fields, where joy for ever dwells! Hail, horrors! 
Hail, infernal world! And thou, profoundest hell, receive thy new possessor – one who brings 
a mind not to be changed by place or time. The mind is its own place, and in itself can make a 
heaven of hell, a hell of heaven […] Here we may reign secure; and, in my choice, to reign is 
worth ambition, through hell: better to reign in hell than serve in heaven” (Milton, 2013 
[1667], p. 8). This ‘pure system of thought’ aims to wrench language away from the bedrock 
of tradition and interpretation and suspend it within a castle in the sky. This castle in the sky 
is the realm of the Aufklärer, enlighteners, whose epistemological space constitutes a worship 
in the unfaltering earthy dominance of reason, scientism and objectivity. It was not only 
Milton that saw this danger but also Dante Alighieri (1265 – 1321).2 
                                                          
2 The Aufklärer were known as the ‘Enlighteners’, a term that was used quite frequently by 
the Romantics to denote a selection of thinkers of the Enlightenment that included Kant, 
Moses Mendelssohn and Voltaire. 
Thistlethwaite: 18 
 
Another epic masterpiece ‘The Divine Comedy’ (1320), documents the travels of 
Dante though the three realms of the dead: hell (Inferno), purgatory (Purgatorio) and paradise 
(Paradiso). Dante is guided by the Roman poet Virgil through hell and purgatory whereas he 
is guided by Beatrice through heaven. What is important, and observant by Dante, is how 
Lucifer is not punished by flames but imprisoned in a lake of ice, consumed in thought, 
without time, forever. When Dante sees Lucifer he cries: “O reader, do not ask of me how I 
grew faint and frozen then – I cannot write it: all words would fall far short of what it was. I 
did not die, and I was not alive; think for yourself, if you have any wit, what I became, 
deprived of life and death. The emperor of the despondent kingdom so towered - from 
midchest - above the ice […] how every sorrow has its source in him!” (Alighieri, 1995 
[1320], p. 209-210).  
The analogy with ice is of paramount importance as I believe it shares the concept 
outlined by Milton of a system of thought that is literally frozen; suspended away from divine 
creation. Lucifer is made to suffer as a pariah, one who is completely suffocated and 
suspended within his own objective desire to create a world where his “mind is its own place” 
(Milton, 2013 [1667], p. 8), which is a “mind not to be changed by time or place” (Ibid).   
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Inferno Satan – By Gustave Doré (1832 – 1883)  
My theory is as follows: The modern spirit of capitalism maintains its existence via 
ensuring protestant rationalism is continuously implied as ideal and that certain discontent 
within this system, expressed as Weltschmerz, should be explored as a romantic reaction and 
an attempt to regain lost fantasmatic autonomy. Corporate training and the rise of ego-
management schemes throughout the workplace ensure that the ‘subject’ remains 
incorporated and identified within this ideological framework as the ‘romantic nature’ 
deliberately destabilizes the positivistic and therefore inherent capitalist discourse. 
This work argues that this fantasy of autonomy is an empirical concept that is made 
concrete, weighed down and given substance through the interpellation of the individuals 
Logos vis-à-vis the superego.   
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The work demonstrates, via historical analysis, the periodical changes in this 
objectification of fantasy resulting in a mourning of lost autonomy and Angst. The work will 
explore three historical movements: the Protestant Reformation, Romanticism and 
Contemporary Capitalism and show a gradual waning of fantasmatic autonomy generated by 
the politicization of the epistemological viewpoints of the Aufklärer. These viewpoints stem 
from the Enlightenment and insist on an eradication of the ‘pathological’ elements of desire 
and thus the fantasmatic foundations of the subject.   
In viewing the development of capitalism from 1517, the work will show how the 
subject becomes more objectively commodified by succumbing to the demands of the Logos 
that is interpellated by the prevailing Nomos of Protestant Rationalism. The Demos therefore 
undergo periodical changes of subjective deterritorialization and reterritorialization marked 
by changes in the structure of this given signifying regime.   
The work finishes by arguing that the contemporary Aufklärer, cognitivists, aim at 
trying to digitise the Logos and standardise the Demos by working under the aegis of a 
reconceptualised Protestant Rationalism. However, this will be unpacked as a vain attempt to 
view the subject as a purely rational being that discounts the processes of desire and ignores 
the fact of the impossibility of generating a formal system of the subject as demonstrated by 
the work of Kurt Gödel. Thus, by attempting to mold and conceptualise the subject through 
the Logos leads to a repression of the fantasy of autonomy and contributes to the Angst 
inherent in contemporary civilization.   
The work will use numerous philosophical notions, including by rarely mentioned 
theorists such as Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788) and Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772 - 
1834), to show the limits of the rationalistic viewpoints of the Enlightenment. The work will 
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also show how the fantasy of the subject can act as a vehicle for conscience that can bypass 





















Chapter 1: The Lacanian Toolbox 
Introduction 
“Desire is the very essence of man; that is, the conatus whereby man endeavours to persist in 
his own being.” (Spinoza, 2002 [1677], p. 330) 
According to Arthur Schopenhauer, Hegel was a “…flat-headed, insipid, nauseating, 
illiterate charlatan, who reached the pinnacle of audacity in scribbling together and dishing up 
the craziest mystifying nonsense. This nonsense has been noisily proclaimed as immortal 
wisdom by mercenary followers and readily accepted as such by all fools, who thus joined 
into as perfect a chorus of admiration as had ever been heard before” (Schopenhauer as cited 
in Popper, 2002 [1945], p. 247).3 Well over a century after Schopenhauer’s death in 1860, the 
linguist Noam Chomsky said almost exactly the same of Jacques Lacan whom he believed 
was a “…conscious charlatan, and […] was simply playing games with the Paris intellectual 
community to see how much absurdity he could produce and still be taken seriously" 
(Chomsky, 1982, p. 32). Indeed, many similar claims have been addressed to Jacques 
Derrida, Michel Foucault and Paul Ricoeur, whose works are considered by some to 
constitute a hermeneutic invasion of philosophy (Murray, 1989). However, the question 
remains, are these accusations justified? 
It is my belief that these claims are inherently fallacious and even border on an ad 
hominem attack. Most, if not all, of these claims stem, I believe, from a particular paradigm 
of absolute literalism. To explain further, the arguments laid against these thinkers arise from 
a purely objective epistemology that fails to incorporate, or even sufficiently unpack, 
                                                          
3 I have not been able to find the Schopenhauer reference and therefore I am relying on 
Popper’s usage.  
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antithetical notions of objectivity as the subject, contradiction and dialectics. For them, the 
Aufklärer, truth is simply true, a fact is simply a fact and a thought is simply a thought, all of 
which are wrenched away from their wider contexts of place, time and meaning, but most 
importantly the people that perceive them. In other words, they misuse language by 
succumbing to its great illusion, which is “…to believe that its signification is what it 
designates” (Lacan, 1953, p. 18).  
This specific epistemological foundation of absolute literalism, systemic to the 
Enlightenment (Aufklärung), almost trivialises philosophical enquiries considering the nature 
of being vis-à-vis ontology. To emphasise my point, many tenets of absolute literalism, 
including the Kantian notion of a priori knowledge, are extremely unsatisfactory in 
explaining consciousness and require one to suspend individuality, the subject or ‘I’, and 
reduce everything to a system of universality whereby the passions are pathological and the 
subject is an obstacle.4 Much of this myopic epistemology relies heavily on Kant, who tried 
to fully ground knowledge in pure a priori understanding. However, this would be shown 
much later to be limited as it struggles to take into account major problems such as irrational 
numbers, and contradictions within formal systems as demonstrated by Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems (1931). Kant also attempted to develop a system of ontological 
coercion within his ‘Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals’ (1785) by dispensing with 
desire and sensibility and to reduce all mental functioning to the categorical imperative 
“…act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that 
                                                          
4 Kant himself argued that the major obstacles of pure reason include freedom, immortality 
and God (Kant, 2007 [1781, B7, 8], p. 41). I would superimpose imaginary and irrational 
numbers here with immortality as they align with notions of infinity.   
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it become a universal law [… And …] act as if the maxim of your action were to become by 
your will a universal law of nature” (Kant, 1998 [1785, p. 421], p. 31).  
Walter Kaufmann (1965, p. 9) argued that “…no philosopher since 1800 has had 
more influence [than Hegel]”. Indeed, many other authors have provided huge commentaries 
on the legacy of Hegel’s work documenting, extensively, contemporary misunderstandings of 
many of his ideas, most notably Terry Pinkard’s work ‘Hegel a Biography’ (2000). However, 
what about Jacques Lacan? 
  Comprehension of Lacan’s concepts, specifically desire and subjectivity, cannot be 
fully unpacked unless one envisions his work in relation to Alexandre Kojève. Lacan 
considered Kojève to be his “…master for having initiated me into Hegel” (Lacan, 2009 
[1953], p. 42). Over a period of six years, 1933 – 1939, Kojève held a series of seminars, 
specifically discussing Hegel’s ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’ (1910 [1807), in Paris at the École 
Pratique des Hautes Études, whereby Lacan attended regularly and was even considered an 
“assiduous attendee” (Lucchelli & McGowan, 2016, p. 324-325). Kojève’s seminars on the 
Phenomenology were seminal in the development of French intellectual thought, although 
criticised by some Hegel specialists such as Jean Hyppolite and Pierre-Jean Labarriére. The 
seminars were also attended by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and George Bataille (Stewart, 1996, 
p. 8).5  
Recently, a series of unpublished letters have shown Lacan’s deep appreciation and 
close acquaintance with Kojève, whereby Lacan once wrote “I am very grateful that you are 
                                                          
5 Jon Stewart’s work ‘The Hegel Myths and Legends’ (1996) is acknowledged as an excellent 
work that addresses and corrects previous and contemporary prejudice against Hegel 
(Schellhammer, 1997).  
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willing to give me your time and your insights on a subject that affects me so deeply” (Lacan, 
1935 as cited in Lucchelli & McGowan, 2016, p. 337).6 
According to Roudinesco’s biography of Lacan, Kojève and Lacan began a 
collaborative work titled ‘Hegel and Freud: Attempt at a Comparative Interpretation’ 
(Roudinesco, 1997, p. 105). However, the work remained unfinished and what remains is 
only a series of notes and a rough introduction by Kojève whereby he equated Descartes’ 
cogito of ‘I think’ with Hegel’s ‘I want’ (Auffret, 1990, p. 447 as cited in Roudinesco, 1997, 
p. 105).7 However, one of the most obvious examples of Kojève’s impact was seen within 
Lacan’s introduction of the mirror stage, presented in 1936, which will be discussed later 
(Lucchelli & McGowan, 2016, p. 334).  
This chapter aims to provide the reader with a toolbox of Lacanian concepts that will 
be used to formalise much of the following chapters. My aim is to try and outline Lacanian 
concepts as succinctly as possible and by doing so, challenge the accusations of obfuscation.  
Lacan’s theory of the subject as void will be examined, as well as the development of the 
ego. Kojève will be used only to provide further clarification of complex Lacanian concepts, 
especially the development of self-consciousness vis-à-vis the ego and the dialectical process 
of master-slave. The chapter will first outline the development of the subject, the ‘I’, and its 
relation to desire, whereby the reader will come to find that the ‘I’ of Lacan is inherently an 
empirical concept, followed by an examination of the Lacanian triad of the Real, Symbolic 
and Imaginary, with finally an outline of the mirror stage. 
                                                          
6 Alas, Lacan didn’t specifically mention what was the subject that affected him. However, 
Lucchelli & McGowan (2016, p. 327) argue that it is likely to be in relation to Hegel’s 
Phenomenology and its discussion of madness.     
7 Dominique Auffret’s biography of Kojève is currently only available in French.   
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Kojève (1969, p. 4) argued that “The (human) I is the I of a Desire or of Desire.” In 
order to unpack this statement and understand it in Lacanian terms, it is important to 
psychoanalytically outline the very beginning of life and the antagonistic primary relationship 
with the mother. For Freud, the very early stages of psychosexual development are 
constituted by an oral phase. During this stage the infant literally tries to consume the world 
and its objects, including other human beings. During this very primitive state, the infant has 
to rely on, and is completely submissive to the primary nurturer, the mother. The infant, in 
response to the dangers and anxiety of reality, literally tries to devour the primary nurturer by 
a process of identification and introjection. This in turn leads to the first ‘objectification’ of 
the infant’s ego as the infant’s ego is literally a manifestation of an ‘Other’: “At a very early 
age, the little boy develops an object-cathexis of his mother, which originally related to the 
mother’s breast and is the earliest instance of an object-choice on the anaclitic model” (Freud, 
2010 [1923], p. 34-35). 
Before this object-cathexis, the infant’s internal world is fundamentally fragmented. 
That is to say, the rudimental pre-unified ego world is characterised by no clear 
differentiation or dialectical processes of objects that are presented to it (Lacan, 1938, p. 16). 
The baby both rejects and accepts the same object, as seen with the refusal and acceptance of 
breastfeeding, whereby the world is treated in a profoundly ambivalent manner. Full 
acquisition of one’s body from reality is also underdeveloped, even up to the twelfth month 
(Ibid, p. 17). Before this identification, there is no fully acquired self-consciousness, that is to 
say the baby does not know what it is, only an animalistic consciousness that has not realised 
the “negating-negativity” (Kojève, 1969, p. 5) of the ‘I’.  
To acquire the “negating-negativity” of the ‘I’ is a complex process. However, in 
order to provide further clarification one can provide an analogy with the pre-unified ego 
animalistic world and Hegel’s notion of sense-certainty. Objects that exist outside in the 
Thistlethwaite: 27 
 
world, the Kantian in-itself, present themselves to the infant, the pre-unified ego subject, as 
“…keeping mere apprehension (Auffassen) free from conceptual comprehension 
(Begreifen)” (Hegel, 1910 [1807], p. 27). In other words, objects presented to the pre-unified 
ego subject have no content, they are empty of meaning and exist merely as a ‘This’. They do 
not even have classification, because language has not been acquired. This consciousness can 
be considered a ‘pure Ego’ according to Hegel, whereby “The I does not contain or imply a 
manifold of ideas. The ‘I’ here does not think: nor does the thing mean what has a 
multiplicity of qualities” (Ibid). In this state there are only two ‘thises’ one of which is the ‘I’, 
which does not yet think, and the other the simple object (Ibid). However, there exists a 
fundamental object that is continuously dominating the external world of the infant, the 
primary nurturer vis-à-vis the mother. 
The Primary and Absolute Master (Eros & Thanatos) 
The process of identification with the mother is a very important one for Lacan as it is 
also within this process that the first manifestations of desire are seen, as well as the 
beginnings of subjectivity: “…the mother is not simply the one who gives the breast (sein) 
[…] she is also the one who gives the sign (signe) of signifying articulation, and not only in 
so far as she speaks to the child as she obviously does […] but in so far as all sorts of the 
mother’s games, the games of hide-and-seek […] In these hiding games she reveals to him 
how to make something disappear and to make it reappear, to make his own face disappear, 
or to make it reappear, or to hide the face of the child, and to rediscover it; she reveals to him 
the revelatory function […] It is in the midst of this that there are made the first 
identifications to what is called on this occasion the mother, the mother as all-powerful, and 
as you see, this has an import other than the pure and simple satisfaction of need” (Lacan, 
1959 [19/11/58], p. 5-6).   
Thistlethwaite: 28 
 
It is important to note that Lacan, as well as Klein (1997 [1948]), believed the 
maternal relationship to be one fraught with anxiety and conflict: “If we try to visualize in 
concrete form the primary anxiety, the fear of annihilation, we must remember the 
helplessness of the infant in face of internal and external dangers […] It would seem that this 
experience has the effect of making the external world, including the first external object, the 
mother’s breast, appear hostile” (Klein, 1997 [1948], p. 31). Kojève’s viewpoint predated this 
observation, although much more generally and not in psychoanalytic terms, whereby the 
genesis of self-consciousness is an attempt for not only recognition but most importantly in 
response to the threat of annihilation and risk to life: “…to speak of the “origin” of Self-
Consciousness is necessarily to speak of a fight to the death for “recognition”” (Kojève, 1969 
[1947], p. 7).  
Huson (2006) outlines the similarities of Lacanian theory with Hegel, specifically 
death, which Hegel observes as the “sovereign master” (Hegel, 1910 [1807], p. 52) and Lacan 
as the “absolute master” (Lacan, 2009 [1960], p. 341). However, this master is not an external 
object but an intrapsychic manifestation of the given external object, presented as master, 
within a given dialectical exchange. In other words, the primary master I believe to be the 
mother which is the dominant object within an infant’s external world. However, this object 
is experienced internally as an engagement with death and therefore the mother embodies the 
first real engagement by the infant with a threat to its life: “…beyond the finite master the 
absolute master awaits” (Huson, 2006, p. 77). 
Because the infant is unaware of the self-consciousness of the mother, and deems her 
simply to be an external object that invades their space, the true dialectical movement of 
“absolute abstraction” has not taken place. In other words, the infant in sense-certainty is 
simply “…not certain of the other” (Kojève, 1969, p. 10). This ‘pure-ego’ or pre self-
consciousness exists only within sense-certainty and has not moved through the proceeding 
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stages of perception and understanding (Hegel, 1910 [1807], p. 55). It is a world without 
desire and consists in thinking that is merely “…the discordant clang of ringing bells, or a 
cloud of warm incense, a kind of thinking in terms of music, that does not get the length of 
notions, which would be the sole, immanent, objective mode of thought” (Ibid, p. 58).        
The infant’s internal world and connection to reality is therefore invaded by the 
mother, primary master, which is deemed inherently as a vehicle of death, the absolute 
master. Thus, as the baby is completely submissive and vulnerable, it must succumb to the 
primary master and become an object of recognition: the primary slave. In this sense Hegel, 
Kojève and Lacan are innately Hobbesian inasmuch as they deem the inherent stance of the 
human condition as one constituted upon antagonism and violence. 
In referring back to the primal relationship with the mother, the baby is presented with 
a threat and becomes an ‘object’ of recognition for the mother. However, the baby is not 
physically killed and thus leaves their consciousness in a permanent state of anxiety. When 
the baby cries it is addressed, inconsistently, by the mother. However, the child is completely 
ignorant of how this will be dealt with. Thus, and because the baby’s internal world is 
constituted upon the Other (Mother) as the primary slave, the infant in dealing with this void 
of ambiguity can only respond by developing a fundamental fantasy. This fantasy is premised 
upon uncertainty and provides an intrapsychic safe haven. For Lacan this fantasy is based on 
a fundamental question, Che vuoi?8 As Lacan (1959 [19/11/58, p. 10) points out that the baby 
                                                          
8 Italian for ‘What do you want’? This term, Che Vuoi, was not used by Lacan accidentally 
but was directly taken from the work ‘The Devil in Love’ (1772) by Cazotte. In summary, a 
man, Alvare, decides to become a Satanist and engages in a ritual to conjure the devil. Upon 
doing so the window bursts open and the head of a large camel says to the protagonist “Che 
Vuoi”? The stunned protagonist is not only unsure if it is the devil himself, but why he has 
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“…does not know the message that comes to him from the response to his demand in the 
field of what he wants.”  
As the infant is ignorant of what the mother wants, this presents considerable anxiety 
and therefore the baby has to develop its own solution to this tension within fantasy. Thus, 
the very foundation of fantasy is based on a radical lack, a lack in the form that can never be 
signified, a lack that forever divides the subject in language. This lack is essentially the void 
of uncertainty (Ø), the gulf between the subject and the Other. This disturbing phenomenon, 
that we can never fully grasp what the other wants of us, provides fantasy as a defence by 
giving us the illusion that we are in the driver’s seat of its chaotic unknowable process. Lacan 
represents this lack as the signifier of the phallus, which is essentially the signifier of desire 
and fantasy. 
By reviewing the Oedipus complex, Lacan reiterates the observation that the child 
originally does not know what the mother wants, but eventually comes to know the horrifying 
truth: it is not me, the baby, the primary slave, what mummy wants, but my father! The desire 
of the mother is therefore equated with the phallus, because she desires what she lacks (a 
penis), but this is not meant to be taken literally but metaphorically as the phallus represents 
that which she cannot know or possess: “If the desire of the mother is the phallus, the child 
wishes to be the phallus [in this case the object of the slave] in order to satisfy that desire. 
Thus the decision immanent in desire is already felt to be experienced in the desire of the 
                                                          
taken the form of a camel and is speaking Italian? The protagonist then proclaims that 
“Thousands of ideas, sentiments and reflections, arising in my heart at the same time, made 
an instant impression on my mind, and gave me resolution to conquer my terrors” (Cazotte, 
1925 [1772], p. 8). This, of course, is indicative of Alvare constituting his fantasy in response 
to uncertainty.  
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Other” (Lacan, 2009 [1958], p. 320). To clarify, because the mother does not know, and 
cannot know, what she wants concretely (Lacan, 2016 [17/06/1959], p. 319-320), this is 
indirectly introjected by the child as an answer to its question Che Vuoi? Therefore, the child 
eventually comes to know that there is something that the mother wants, the father (the 
phallus), but can never truly pin it down in articulation/signification because the mother is 
also barred in language.  
 
 
Figure 1: Lacan’s Mother/Child Relation. 
The above image may help the reader understand exactly what Lacan outlined in 
terms of the fundamental beginnings of desire. Essentially, desire manifests itself as a desire 
to know, to know what the mother desires, the primary master, and is expressed in the 
question Che vuoi? However, this can never be achieved because the mother’s desire itself is 
based on an unfathomable enigma. Thus, the mechanism of desire is to always destabilize, 
distort and conceal. Žižek provides clarification by stating that the enigmatic message from 
the Other [Mother] always resists translation, and that “… while there is something, some 
Thistlethwaite: 32 
 
hard kernel [ɸ], which resists symbolization, this kernel is not the immediate Real of 
instinctual or some other kind of causality, but the Real of an indigestible traumatic encounter 
[Uncertainty of what the primary master, as a vehicle of death, wants], of an enigma that 
resists symbolization. And not only is this Real not opposed to freedom – it is its very 
condition. The shocking impact of being affected/’seduced’ by the enigmatic message of the 
Other derails the subject’s automaton, opens up a gap which the subject is free to fill in with 
his (ultimately failed) endeavours to symbolize it. Freedom is ultimately nothing but the 
space opened up by the traumatic encounter, the space to be filled in by its 
contingent/inadequate symbolizations/translations” (Žižek, 2011 [2001], p. 58).  
The relation with the mother therefore constitutes the foundation of the subject qua 
subject for another. More succinctly, the infant has to adopt the role of slave which is the 
primary subjective prerequisite and condition for all humans. That is to say, the subjects 
beginnings can only be generated via an experience with another subject: “There can be no 
other subject than a subject recognised in the other […] a subject as such, of a subject who 
can grasp himself as subject, who grasps himself as subject in the other, in so far as the other 
thinks of him as subject” (Lacan, 2016 [20/05/1959], p. 263). However, what is important to 
demonstrate are the disastrous consequences of a devouring perverse mother, that is to say a 
mother who deems their own child as their own phallic object i.e. transitional object.9      
                                                          
9 In very rare cases the mother can severely pervert this primitive foundation of the subject. 
The Medea Complex, otherwise known as Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, is where the 
mother neglects or physically/sexually abuses her children. In cases like this, children usually 
grow up with physical illnesses and babies from perverse mothers usually develop severe 
personality disorders (Welldon, 2011, p. 70). Children that have experienced abuse also show 
low empathy, social cognitive development, depression and major difficulties in relating with 
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What is important to note is that this fantasy of the subject, first based upon the 
relation with the primary master, has to be mediated to prevent an engrossing discourse. In 
other words, the relationship between the primary master and the subject has to be regulated; 
otherwise desire becomes unbridled and chaotic leading to psychosis in later life. The 
regulator therefore has to be discussed, namely the secondary master.  
The Secondary Master (Logos) 
The father in Lacanian psychoanalysis is a dead one. What this essentially means is 
that there is simply “no Other of the Other” (Lacan, 2009 [1960], p. 344). To clarify, the 
relation with the mother and the child is paramount, whereby any interference is deemed by 
the toddler as a hurdle or imposter that prevents the inherent desire to be loved and 
recognised by the mother, which Lacan states is essentially what all demand is (Ibid, p. 344). 
The entity that separates the baby from the mother is not the father, which is non-existent in 
the mind of the infant, but what Lacan calls ‘The Name of the Father’ (Ibid, p.74) in its more 
religious legislative significance. However, the father figure, or secondary master, is of 
course in the real world, the legislator and enforcer of this law of prohibition (Ibid, p. 242). 
Laws exist for Freud as a prohibition against taboo, whereby the most heinous of 
these are incest and cannibalism (Freud, 2005e [1913], p. 5-22; Lacan, 1953, p. 41; Lacan, 
2009 [1953], p. 73).10 Thus, the paternal function is to frustrate the infant’s desire for too 
much recognition from the mother. The infant is therefore presented with the fundamental 
                                                          
peers and their families (Conaway & Hansen, 1989; Emery, 1989). This is what would be 
expected with a disturbance in the establishment of the very foundations of the subject in 
Lacanian terms.    
10 Keep in mind that cannibalism is to literally eat and devour the Other.  
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command “No!” in its attempt to become a replacement father for the mother i.e. to become 
the phallus of the mother. Therefore, the paternal function not only deals with the structuring 
of real and imaginary relations (Lacan, 2009 [1953], p. 74) but also establishes a certain 
imprinting or regulatory function, speech and the symbol, upon the unbridled discourse of the 
infant’s symbolic. The ‘Name of the Father’ descends upon the infant’s world in such a way 
that the infant’s desire is governed, managed and regulated.  
The secondary master is that which observes and regulates desire. In other words, the 
character of the secondary master is persecutory, which Lacan (2009, p. 4) believes 
“…structures human knowledge as paranoiac.” This is why Freud observed that mentally ill 
patients often experience the delusion of observance, of being ‘looked-at’, and that this can 
be considered a hidden, failed and unintegrated ‘Name of the Father’: “They complain to us 
that perpetually, and down to their most intimate actions, they are being molested by the 
observation of unknown powers – presumably persons […] in each of us there is present in 
his ego an agency like this which observes and threatens to punish, and which in them has 
merely become sharply divided from their ego and mistakenly displaced onto external 
reality” (Freud, 2001 [1932], p. 59).   
If the symbolic law fails, such that the ‘Name of the Father’ has not successfully taken 
place, the result (foreclosure) is an unstructured, unrecognisable and unbridled desire leading 
to severe psychosis in later life. As the ‘Name of the Father’ civilizes the infant into the world 
and restrains and regulates the processes of the unconscious, the discourse of the other vis-à-
vis the symbolic, madness becomes a “…negative freedom of speech that has given up trying 
to make itself recognised […and…] objectifies the subject in a language without dialectic” 
(Lacan, 2009 [1953], p. 75). The paternal function therefore acts as a type of dam that 
prevents the complete overflow of the unconscious into the imaginary register. This dam 
therefore prevents the individual from dreaming whilst awake, which essentially is what 
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madness is. As this lies in the space between the symbolic and imaginary, this is where guilt 
and anxiety manifest themselves (Lacan, 1953, p. 28). However, they adopt a more mature 
character as it is no longer just simply an anxiety of not knowing what the Other wants, but 
an anxiety of ‘knowing’ the consequences: castration for attempting to satisfy too much 
desire.11 
Mature anxiety is but an “…affect of the subject” (Lacan, 1963, p. 57). When a 
subject is anxious it loses something and this something is the Object a (Ibid, p. 58). Object a 
is what Lacan calls the object cause of desire which exists within fantasy and maintains the 
function of desire as being the “…most intense thing the subject attains at the level of 
consciousness, in his realization as a subject” (Ibid, p. 59). As the ‘Name of the Father’ 
frustrates this process, as the child cannot fully participate in its desire for the mother, Object 
a is lost and thus Lacan believed that neurosis is practically identical to a retreat away from 
the desire of the father (Ibid, p. 77), which is essentially an enforcement of the law. 
To clarify, when a subject is engaged in a process to satisfy his/her desire, that of the 
Other, there is always a counterpart that aims to inhibit it, the ‘Name of the Father’, the 
secondary master. The uneasiness experienced for the subject is therefore generated due to a 
contradiction between the desire of the mother and the desire of the father whereby the 
Object a slips away and is disallowed due to a prohibition enforced by the symbolic law. The 
father is therefore closely aligned with the superego, which is primarily unconscious (Freud, 
2010 [1923], p. 43), inasmuch as he presents an “…obstacle to the realization of the Oedipus 
wishes [desire]” (Ibid, p. 40). As the symbolic law essentially gives the password, language 
                                                          
11 This castration complex is also present in female children. However, as they do not have a 
penis, the threat is the potential loss of love from the mother (Freud, 2001 [1932], p. 87). 
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and the symbol, to enter into civilization, the subject now adopts another desire of the Other, 
namely the big Other i.e. civilization.       
The Tertiary Master (Nomos) 
Kojève states that humans that have not undergone a project that presents a risk to 
their life are deeply flawed as they have failed to achieve a full “autonomous Self-
Consciousness” (Kojève, 1969, p. 12 – 13).12 In other words, a full autonomous Self-
Consciousness is radically different from a simple animal consciousness. The purely 
autonomous Self-Consciousness is a strictly human construct that is fundamentally 
fantasmatic. For example, animals that meet one another simply do not grasp the other as a 
separate consciousness; it is completely closed to them. George Herbert Mead helps clarify 
by observing: “We say the animal does not think. He does not put himself in a position for 
which he is responsible; he does not put himself in the place of the other person and say, in 
effect, “He will act in such a way and I will act in this way”” (Mead, 1967 [1934], p. 73).  
However, humans, even though not having access to the mind of the other through some 
weird telepathic ability, realise the other within their fantasy as having a similar construct 
because their own Self-Consciousness is premised on the other in the first place: “This world 
is, to be sure, “foreign” to him; he must “deny” it, transform it, fight it, in order to realize 
himself in it” (Kojève, 1969, p.14) and “The subject feels that he is the other and that the 
other is him. This reciprocally defined subject is an essential stage in the constitution of the 
human subject” (Lacan, 1953, p. 40). 
                                                          




Marx’s concept of estranged labour also represents this foreign entity, which the 
subject attempts to fight: “The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself. The 
worker puts his life into the object; but now his life no longer belongs to him but to the 
object. Hence, the greater this activity, the greater is the worker’s lack of objects. Whatever 
the product of his labour is, he is not. Therefore the greater this product, the less is he 
himself. The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that this labour becomes 
an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as something 
alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him; it means that the life 
which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien” (Marx, 
1988 [1844], p. 72).  
The negating-negativity of the ‘I’, within the strictly human consciousness, essentially 
means the process of engagement with others in the fight for recognition, which is in a 
continual process of victory and defeat. This of course, as just mentioned, is radically 
different than animals. Because the ‘I’ is essentially premised upon the other, the subject 
wants an ‘I’ for-itself and thus engages in a master-slave battle for recognition with the desire 
to attain self-mastery. If a subject physically kills the other, they have in essence killed the 
very thing that established their consciousness in the first place and thus a compromise is 
needed. 
Instead of engaging in a physical battle, the subject has to “overcome dialectically” 
(Kojève, 1969, p. 15). This means that the individual has to subjectively battle against the 
other with the aim of stripping the other of their autonomy whilst also retaining their own 
subjective truth which, in doing so, transforms through a process of sublimation: “…he must 
leave him life and consciousness, and destroy only his autonomy. He must overcome the 
adversary only insofar as the adversary is opposed to him and acts against him. In other 
words, he must enslave him” (Ibid). By subjectively enslaving the other, instead of killing 
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him, the subject is able to retain their own consciousness as an object of recognition. To 
clarify, if the subject were to kill the other they have essentially relinquished the very thing 
that provided recognition in the first place because the dead cannot recognise the victory of 
the victor.  
When Achilles kills Hector, he is not only seeking satisfaction for his revenge, but 
also desires to be recognised by the Trojans en masse by stripping them of their power and 
humiliating them, as well as being recognised for eternity by the Greeks as attaining mastery 
over the Trojans. If there was nobody to recognise the victory of Achilles, if the only two 
people on earth were Hector and himself, Achilles would have essentially killed Hector at the 
cost of complete subjective destitution and sacrifice of his own human self-consciousness. 
However, it must be pointed out that this experience could still imprint itself upon the fantasy 
of Achilles, although these are merely daydreams of recognition that maintain our wellbeing. 
As Pascal states in his ‘Pensées’ (1669), fantasies can act as a substitute: “As nature makes us 
always unhappy in every state, our desires picture to us a happy state; because they add to the 
state in which we are the pleasures of the state in which we are not. And if we attained to 
these pleasures, we should not be happy after all; because we should have other desires 
natural to this new state” (Pascal, 2006 [1669], p. 30 [109]). The Greeks and Trojans 
therefore represent a collective Other. In other words, the desire of an entire society or 
collective can have a direct impact on the subject. However, as stated earlier, there is “no 
Other of the Other” (Lacan, 2009 [1960], p. 344) and therefore the big Other should not be 
viewed as a multitude of Others but a singular entity. The term Che Vuoi is therefore directed 
toward society such that the subject seeks, fantasmatically, what society wants, and 
consequently answers its own question within fantasy.  
The law of any given society is primarily established to prevent the “overcoming 
dialectically” to spill out into society creating a self-destructive and practically anarchistic 
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world. Thus, the law prohibits a specific type of “enjoyment” (Kojève, 1969, p. 17) that is 
attained by the victor, namely what Lacan calls “Jouissance”: “Experience proves that it 
[Jouissance] is usually forbidden me, not only, as certain fools believe, because of a bad 
arrangement of society, but rather because of the fault of the Other if he existed: and since the 
Other does not exist, all that remains to me is to assume the fault upon ‘I’, that is to say, to 
believe in that to which experience leads us all […] to original sin” (Lacan, 2009 [1960], p. 
351). In other words, the process of a subjective battle to “dialectically overcome” is the very 
condition upon which laws are created and are necessary. The fundamental prohibition 
behind law is to prevent people achieving Jouissance i.e. enjoyment gained in attaining 
victory and becoming a master. So, why is attaining mastery and experiencing Jouissance so 
damaging if at all possible? 
The great paradox the master has to deal with is the fact that once he has won a battle 
over autonomy, it is only the slave that recognises this. And because the slave is deemed by 
the master as having no autonomy he is thus recognised, and therefore his Self-Consciousness 
is premised, upon a ‘thing’, not another human: “The Master, therefore, was on the wrong 
track. After the fight that made him a Master, he is not what he wanted to be in starting that 
fight: a man recognized by another man. Therefore: if man can be satisfied only by 
recognition, the man who behaves as a Master will never be satisfied” (Kojève, 1969, p. 19 -
20).13  
The only truly satisfied man is therefore a slave because the master will always be 
unsatisfied by being recognised by a dead thing. Essentially, the master has not attained pure 
                                                          
13 As Plutarch states in his ‘Moralia’ (100AD), Alexander the Great wept when he heard 
about the infinite number of worlds and that: “…when the number of worlds is infinite, we 
have not yet become lords of a single one” (Plutarch, 1939 [100AD], p. 178-179).   
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autonomous Self-Consciousness because in order to have it, he must be recognised by 
another autonomous Self-Consciousness: “The complete, absolutely free man, definitively 
and completely satisfied by what he is, the man who is perfected and completed in and by this 
satisfaction, will be the Slave who has “overcome” his Slavery. If idle Mastery is an impasse, 
laborious Slavery, in contrast, is the source of all human, social, historical progress” (Ibid, p. 
20). The slave is in a constant process of becoming, a radical transformative negating-
negativity of the ‘I’ in order to satisfy the desire to become what is deemed within fantasy to 
be a master. To clarify, the master is essentially impossible because it only exists as a 
fantasmatic construct manifested by engaging with the other.  
Desire, Need and Demand in Relation to Fantasy 
Lacan stated that desire could be viewed as the “motor of the dream” (Lacan, 1959 
[26/11/1958], p. 2). However, what desire truly desires is a “desire for death” (Ibid) because 
it can never be satisfied, or articulated in life, and only reaches its climax in its endpoint. 
Desire is thus the continual process of searching without ever finding, a constant frustration, a 
process of grasping, as Tantalus did, at the food that can never be touched.14 However, this 
desire is mediated by the symbolic law i.e. ‘The Name of the Father’ and thus is hemmed in 
and given direction through language. The question therefore remains: what purpose does 
desire have in relation to demand?  
 If I say “I want freedom” am I not implying that “I desire freedom” and therefore give 
desire an object? According to Lacan, this is not the case because desire always oversteps the 
mark, it always wants more than simply the object in-itself in the real world. The ‘real’ object 
                                                          
14 This implies that there is an object for desire, the grapes that Tantalus wants, but this is 
slightly misconceived. Desire has no object, it is essentially grasping at nothing.   
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emerges in fantasy and therefore, I don’t just simply want freedom, but everything else: a 
perfect freedom that conforms exactly to the features of my fantasy of an unblemished, 
perfect autonomy: “Why is there need for a beyond of the demand? There is need for a 
beyond of the demand in so far […] that demand by the necessities of its articulation, 
deflects, changes, transposes need. There is therefore the possibility of a residue” (Lacan, 
2016 [07/05/1958], p. 279). Need is transformed in demand, the signifier, namely love and 
recognition, but desire is always the residue left over from attempting to satisfy the object of 
need. As the subject has to constitute themselves within the gap, fundamentally the void (Ø) 
at the level of the symbolic and the signifier, which is always inexhaustible and frustrated, 
when the subject desires something it essentially is within the realm of fantasy because 
desire, first and foremost, is the desire of the other. The question then is not why I desire 
freedom, but how this came to be in the first place: “...fantasy does not mean that when I 
desire a strawberry cake [freedom] and cannot get it in reality, I fantasize about eating it 
[experiencing it]; the problem is, rather: how do I know that I desire a strawberry cake 
[freedom] in the first place? This is what fantasy tells me” (Žižek, 2008 [1997], p. 7). 
The desire for freedom is therefore deemed incorrectly by the subject as the object the 
master has, what Lacan calls the Agalma which is “…the object the subject believes his 
desire aims at and regarding which he most completely mistakes the object for the cause of 
desire” (Lacan, 1963, p. 70). The subject therefore misrecognises, méconnaissance, the other 
and believes that in order to attain this freedom they must succumb to a process of work, the 
discourse of desire, for the master. The object of freedom is therefore never attained because 
it is a fantasmatic object that exists within an unsatisfied master which does not even exist in 
the first place. Thus, the subject’s desire for the object of freedom is fantasmatic and will 
never be satisfied, for to do so would be to become an unsatisfied master. Therefore, the 
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subject is engaged in continuous labour in order to achieve an impossible reward i.e. 
Jouissance in attaining mastery and autonomy.  
The Subject is Empirical and Divided in Language 
According to Lacan, when people speak of the ego, the Hegelian and Kojèveian 
autonomous Self-Consciousness or Being for-itself, as being that which contains the subject, 
or somehow is the subject, they are grossly mistaken. For him, the subject is not what 
someone is, but simply a product, a consequence of the experience of dealing with the 
enigma of the other. The subject exists within the other, the unconscious, piggybacking along 
the chain of signifiers that continuously reveals and conceals itself at the mercy of the 
discourse of desire i.e. the unconscious and the process of dialectical overcoming. This is 
why Lacan states that the subject is literally a process of alienation, negating-negativity, 
because it is consumed and lost in language, in other words the symbolic order: “Once the 
structure of language has been recognised in the unconscious, what sort of subject can we 
conceive for it? […] Being of non-being, that is how I as subject come on the scene, 
conjugated with the double aporia of a true survival that is abolished by knowledge of itself, 
and by a discourse in which it is death that sustains existence” (Lacan, 2009 [1960], p. 330 & 
332).  
The ego for Freud and Lacan is nothing but a collection of identifications, a toolbox 
for dealing with the external world: “We have formulated the idea that in every individual 
there is a coherent organization of mental processes, which we call his ego. This ego includes 
consciousness and it controls the approaches to motility, i.e. to the discharge of excitations 
into the external world” (Freud, 2010 [1923], p. 8), and “At any rate, the process, especially 
in the early phases of development, is a very frequent one and it points to the conclusion that 
the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes, and that it contains a 
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record of past object-choices” (Ibid, p. 31). This external world is originally the enigma of the 
m(Other) and is addressed by identifying with her and thus the phallus.15 Lacan says that the 
ego can be viewed like an onion, and by peeling back the layers one is simply going through 
all the different identifications and dialectical conflicts, eventually reaching the core which is 
simply a void (Verhaeghe, 1998, p. 174). Therefore one could say that the ‘me-ness’ of our 
identity is the totality of our identifications and conflicts with others, but the freedom we 
experience as agency, that is to say our experience of the ‘I’, is nothing but a void, a lack, a 
non-being which exists within the other. The ‘me-ness’ is not within the purview of the 
Lacanian subject. The Lacanian subject is very much anti-identity or anti-me, it is a 
catastrophizing void that continuously punches a hole through our autobiography, automaton, 






                                                          
15 m(Other) designates the mother. 
16 By autobiography I mean the fantasy of writing our own history. The auto could be 
considered the imprinting of the void on an actual biography. Essentially, our real 
autobiography is a collection of dialectical conflicts and traumas, yet we are caught within 
the illusion of being the hand that writes the work, in fact we are being written by the 




Figure 2: Lacan’s Onion Metaphor for the Ego 
Could the void of the subject be similar to our mind’s eye? Arguably, Lacan would 
again say no, because it automatically supposes that there is some type of ownership or 
agency in the object (mind’s eye). This ownership is merely a fantasy that clouds the real that 
I am merely acting on behalf of the other. The experience of the mind’s eye is only peering 
into the void and experiencing the process of metonymy, the discourse of the other, the 
signifying chain. Therefore, the process and experience of subjective autonomy is nothing 
more than a fantasy that protects us from the horrifying trauma and encounter with the real, 
the original traumatic encounter with the enigma and abyss of the other. 
What are these ‘Identifications with Other/s’? In order to answer this question, one 
can briefly turn to the works of Deleuze who characterises these identifications as 
“impersonal singularities” (Deleuze, 2003 [1969], pp. 102-103) or “Larval subjects” 
(Deleuze, 2001a [1968], p. 78).17 Essentially the subject is experienced as a passive synthesis 
                                                          
17 Further clarification of these terms would be beyond this work. However, for further 
information, see Roberts (2007).  
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of thousands of “little witnesses [larval subjects]” (Ibid, p. 75), which are essentially the 
“molecular functions of the unconscious” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000 [1972], p. 324). 
Deleuze & Guattari state that analysis should primarily be involved with 
understanding these arrangements of molecular functions (Ibid, p. 323) and that the subject 
should be viewed empirically, which is essentially to view it as a “logic of multiplicities” 
(Deleuze & Parnet 2007 [1977], p. viii). However, Deleuze & Parnet do acknowledge that 
this multiplicity is very difficult to picture because it is not a singular concept but a living 
collection of multiplicity, which is given its energy through desire, and synthesised by time to 
form the experience of a singular entity of subjectivity: “Desire constantly couples 
continuous flows and partial objects that are by nature fragmentary and fragmented” (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 2000 [1972], p. 5). The experience of subjectivity is therefore a “pure becoming” 
(Deleuze & Parnet, 2007 [1977], p. ix) which exists primarily because of time. The subject 
therefore only exists in time and is not a static construct as defined by rationalistic 
epistemology i.e. Descartes’ Cogito.  
The multiplicity is essentially a collection of thoughts that follow certain lines, but 
lines without a solid direction. To help clarify this, one can ask a question: what does the 
unconscious look like? Deleuze and Parnet steadfastly refuse to adopt the image of a tree, 
because a tree has very well defined features and its branches follow a certain direction, but 
should be viewed as a rhizome: “We constantly oppose the rhizome to the tree, like two 
conceptions and even two very different ways of thinking. A line does not go from one point 
to another, but passes between the points, ceaselessly bifurcating and diverging, like one of 
Pollock’s lines […] These lines are true becomings, which are distinct not only from unities, 
but from the history in which they are developed. Multiplicities are made up of becomings 
without history, of individuation without subject” (Ibid, p. viii).  
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Symbolic, Imaginary and Real 
It was in the summer of 1953 that Lacan provided a talk outlining the symbolic, 
imaginary and real that he believed were the three fundamental registers of human existence 
(Lacan, 1953, p. 4). Going straight into definitional terms, Žižek (2006) provides a good 
illustration using the game of chess whereby the symbolic consists in the rules of the game 
(that become legislative through the ‘Name of the Father’), the imaginary as the shape of the 
pieces and finally the real that acts as the “…complex set of contingent circumstances that 
affect the course of the game” (Žižek, 2006, p. 9). To refer to what I have been outlining in 
relation to desire we can formulate the following: 
1. The symbolic is the realm of the signifier, the unconscious, the phallus and the 
discourse of the Other. According to Lacan, it is the place of symbols that constitute 
the “very structure of language” (Lacan, 1953, p. 16). It consists of many intersecting 
levels and “partakes of the order and register of language” (Ibid, p. 17). However, 
according to Johnston, Lacan stressed that the symbolic is not language itself: 
“…contrary to contemporary misunderstandings, the symbolic order is not language 
but an abstract machine that only takes the exchanges that occur within language as its 
support” (Johnston, 2008, p. 285).  There also remains a gap within the signifying 
chain, the void of the subject, but this void is not within the symbolic but the real. 
This, gap in the symbolic, is experienced in the imaginary register as vertigo, which is 
disrupting, and therefore the subject has to “create something transcendent [imaginary 
axis]” (Ibid, p. 19). Arguably, the symbolic is similar to the deceivers in Plato’s cave, 
as stated in the Republic, that hold up artefacts, symbols, that produce a shadow in the 
imaginary.  
2. The imaginary is the realm of the signified, the realm of illusion, the ‘mind’s eye’ and 
the very foundations of the ego. It is that which is right in front of our noses, our 
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immediate experience of the object of Self-Consciousness itself. It can be considered 
the layers in the ego, the identifications. The subject is experienced here as the fantasy 
of autonomy, an experience of vertigo, a signified object that is actually the signifier 
of nothingness within the symbolic order, the object of lack in the Other. The 
imaginary “represents something other than itself” (Lacan, 1953, p. 15) and is a 
displacement of the symbolic. We are therefore caught within an illusionary and 
fantasmatic world whereby Lacan agrees with Saussure that we are in a constant 
process of hallucination (Ibid, p. 9). It is the world of the subject’s personal game that 
they provide themselves, fantasmatically, in order to navigate their reality which they 
deem to be hostile. The neurotic experiences guilt and anxiety within the gap between 
the symbolic and the imaginary (Ibid, p. 28) where there is a contradiction/trauma in 
the subject’s automaton and thus, to alleviate this, the imaginary becomes 
“…everything that is artificially reproduced” (Ibid, p. 52). This is similar to the play 
of shadows in Plato’s cave that deceive the prisoners, the subject, into believing a 
false narrative.   
3. The real is notoriously difficult to explain and Lacan even mentioned that he didn’t 
fully explain it within his 1953 talk and cryptically said that it is “…either totality or 
the vanished instant [and that]…it always appears for the subject when he runs up 
against something, for example, the analyst’s silence” (Ibid, p. 42). It lies away from 
the imaginary and the symbolic, however it does have an impact on them. The real 
also contains the void of the subject, the uncertainty (Ø) in knowing what the Other 
wants, first and foremost the primary master. This void, therefore, can never be 
grasped. To explain further, because the imaginary and the symbolic both have 
something to do with language and/or discourse, the real is literally that which cannot 
be included within it, it is beyond language, completely inarticulable. It is associated 
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with the death drive inasmuch as its process deals with objects in reality, in other 
words, dead things. It is the absolute boundary that separates reality ‘in-itself’ and the 
human world, it is a world of the living dead. This could also, hypothetically, be 
where the Platonic world of mathematics enters the scene that will be covered much 
later in chapter 6. The real is that which disrupts the dream as a type of invasion. One 
can envision the real as a meeting point of reality, it is that space between the inner 
human world and that of the external alien one, a “pre-symbolic substance” (Žižek, 
1989, p. 12). Žižek uses the example of Robert Heinlein’s novel ‘The Unpleasant 
Profession of Jonathan Hoag’ (1942) whereby Hoag discovers that he is an art critic 
for a group of interdimensional beings that design universes as art projects. In 
critiquing this universe he suggests that there are some errors that need to be 
corrected. Whilst in a car, Hoag tells two others this story and tells them not to put 
down the window under any circumstances. Alas, one does, and all that is seen is a 
grey mass of nothingness which disappears when the window is put back up. This 
grey mass is the Lacanian real which lies behind the screen of human perception, 
whereby the window acts as that which translates the real into a symbolic language: 
“To those sitting inside a car, the outside world appears at a certain distance, 
separated from them by a barrier or screen symbolized by the windows. They perceive 
everything outside the car as a mode of reality which is discontinuous with the reality 
inside” (Žižek, 1989, p. 13). To once again use Plato, it wouldn’t be the true outside 
of the cave, reality in-itself, but the simple moment before illumination: “And if 
someone dragged him away from there [the cave] by force, up the rough, steep path, 
and didn’t let him go until he had dragged him into the sunlight, wouldn’t he be 
pained and irritated at being treated that way? And when he came into the light, with 
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the sun filling his eyes, wouldn’t he be unable to see a single one of the things now 
said to be true?” (Plato, 1997a [515e-516a], p. 1,133).       
 
 
Figure 3: The Real, Symbolic and Imaginary in Relation to the Ego.  
What is very important to note is that the ego, and therefore the imaginary, is also 
partly unconscious “…the ego, as we have learned, is also unconscious” (Freud, 2010 [1923], 
p. 21), and “The ego is not sharply separated from the id; its lower portion merges into it” 
(Ibid p. 23). This is the realm of the pre conscious and it is here where the signifier meets the 
signified, what Lacan called points de capiton (Bailly, 2009, p. 95).18 It is here where the 
radical lack, which is what the subject truly is, is transformed into the imaginary illusion of a 
                                                          
18 ‘Stitch-points’.  
Thistlethwaite: 50 
 
fantasy of autonomy. This is the dam created by the ‘Name of the Father’, the thing that 
prevents the overflow of the signifying chain into the imaginary, resulting in psychosis.    
The Mirror Stage and the Object of Self-Consciousness  
Lacan first outlined the Mirror Stage at the Marienbad International Congress of 
Psycho-Analysts in 1936 (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 251) but began to formulate it 
within his ‘Family Complexes in the Formation of the Individual’ (1938). However, the most 
widely accessed version was published within his ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the 
Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience’ (1949), which was incorporated 
within his Écrits (1966), that aimed at conceptualising identification and the ego with respect 
to the development of the subject. An additional hypothesis, within the 1949 work, also 
provided the rationale to why psychoanalysis should be opposed to any type of philosophical 
model that begins with the premise of the cogito as being a seat of agency (Lacan, 2009 
[1949], p. 1).  
 As I have outlined Lacanian theory with Kojève’s reading of Hegel we can begin to 
see the similarities including the concept of a negating ‘I’, the desire of the Other and 
enjoyment. As stated in the introduction, it will now become clear that the characteristics of 
the Lacanian mirror and the object of self-consciousness are very similar in their genesis.     
According to Lacan (2009 [1949], p. 2), numerous animals, including chimpanzees, 
dominate humans in early life with their physical attributes such as strength and dexterity. 
However, humans triumph very early on in one very specific area: being able to recognise 
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oneself in a mirror. This process has been extensively documented and observed as young as 
18 months (Nielsen, Suddendorf & Slaughter, 2006).19 
This event represents for Lacan a fundamental identification, otherwise known as an 
imago. The imago, Latin for ‘image’, is quite a complex term in psychoanalysis. However, 
the imago, with respect to Lacanian psychoanalysis can be considered an “unconscious 
representation” (Lacan, 2017 [1938], p. 14). Another way of thinking about this term is as a 
fundamental identification, a major blueprint in the stratification of the ego, one which 
organises and allocates the chaotic processes of the imaginary “fragmented body” (Ibid, 30), 
an “Unconscious prototypical figure which orientates the subject’s way of apprehending 
others; it is built up on the basis of the first real and phantasied relationships within the 
family environment” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 211).20 Lacan speaks of the mirror 
identification as a special one whereby it acts as a eureka moment. That is to say, using the 
works of Wolfgang Köhler, the recognition mimics the Aha – Erlebnis, the sudden bolt of 
lightning Archimedes experienced. As Köhler (1925, p. 217) argues, the Aha! experience acts 
as the sudden coming together of elements into a “complete method of solution”. 
It is within the Mirror Stage that the sense of agency, the void, is situated within the 
ego such that it “…symbolizes the mental permanence of the I, at the same time as it 
prefigures its alienating destination” (Lacan, 2009 [1949], p. 3). This experience is deemed 
                                                          
19 Originally Lacan believed that this process begins at 6 months but later changed it to 18: 
“Now, the recognition by the subject of his image in the mirror is a phenomenon that is 
doubly significant for the analysis of this stage: it appears after six months and its study 
demonstrates the tendencies that at that time constitute the subject's reality” (Lacan, 2017 
[1938], p. 29).  
20 The term complex and imago are interchangeable (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 211).          
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by the infant as a massive triumph in that he “…welcomes in it [The image of himself] its 
inherent mental unity” (Lacan, 2017 [1938], p. 31). This of course is interchangeable with 
Kojève’s notion of attaining self-consciousness as perceiving not the subject itself, but an 
object or reflection of himself: “Man becomes conscious of himself at the moment when-for 
the "first" time-he says "I." […]  Contemplation reveals the object [Mirror], not the subject. 
The object, and not the subject, is what shows itself to him in and by - or better, as the act of 
knowing” (Kojève, 1969, p. 3).   
Thus, the identification with one’s own image is deeply fascinating and narcissistic. 
However, it serves as a primary force that unifies the individual with their own body. The 
largely forgotten psychoanalyst Victor Tausk (1879 – 1919), within his seminal and 
posthumous work ‘On the Origin of the “Influencing Machine” in Schizophrenia’ (1919), 
called this type of narcissism ‘Organic Narcissism’ over the pathological type of ‘Psychic 
Narcissism’ (Tausk, 1991 [1933], p. 208).21  
For Tausk, even though not referring to the label of the ‘Mirror Stage’, this experience 
is where “The ego, thus discovered, is cathected with the available libido; in accordance with 
the psychic nature of the ego, narcissism develops; and, in accordance with the function of 
individual organs as sources of pleasure, autoeroticism results” (Tausk, 1991 [1919], p. 204). 
Organic Narcissism therefore acts as that which “…guarantees in the unconscious the unity 
and functioning of the organism” (Ibid, p. 208). One can think of it as the feeling of 
embodiment within one’s own mind as R. D. Laing indicated in his master work ‘The 
Divided Self’ (1962): “The embodied person has a sense of being flesh and blood and bones, 
of being biologically alive and real: he knows himself to be substantial. To the extent that he 
is thoroughly ‘in’ his body, he is likely to have a sense of personal continuity in time. He will 
                                                          
21 Victor Tausk, according to Paul Roazen (1969), was Freud’s most brilliant pupil.   
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experience himself as subject to the dangers that threaten his body, the dangers of attack, 
mutilation, disease, decay, and death. He is implicated in bodily desire, and the gratifications 
and frustrations of the body. The individual thus has as his starting-point an experience of his 
body as a base from which he can be a person with other human beings” (Laing, 1990 [1962], 
p. 67).    
The mirror is used as a metaphor for the object of self-consciousness and is strictly 
imaginary. It is the shadows on the back of Plato’s cave that reveal a false truth, namely the 
fantasmatic object of self-consciousness: “Then the prisoners [the subject] would in every 
way believe that the truth [Imaginary axis] is nothing other than the shadows of those 
artifacts [Symbolic axis]” (Plato, 1997a [515c], p. 1,133). 
   
 
Figure 4: The Mirror Stage 
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For Lacan the mirror stage acts primarily as a bridge from the inner world 
(Innenwelt), to the external one (Umwelt) (Lacan, 2009 [1949], p. 4). When someone 
recognises themselves, or are contemplating the object of self-consciousness (Kojeve, 1969, 
p. 3), they are, in essence, at the whim of symbolic stratifications i.e. the discourse of the 
other. Thus, psychic narcissism, is arguably not the subject but the discourse of an Other or 
the big Other. The mirror stage thus acts as a special imago that “…establishes a relation 
between the organism and its reality” (Lacan, 2009 [1949], p. 4). However, the reality in 
question is not a reality ‘out there’ in the physical world, but an internal reality which also 
contains the Umwelt. The ego thus presents itself to the ‘I’ as immediate reality (Imaginary 
register) but this is only an internalised representation of it, the internalisation of ‘otherness’; 
therefore the ego is the Umwelt whereby the symbolic represents the Innenwelt.  
The primary narcissism, or me-ness, of the ego is at odds with the destabilising 
alienation and negating-negativity of the ‘I’. The ‘I’ is the nothingness within Sartre’s ‘Being 
and Nothingness’ (1943), the seat of pure agency. However, what the existentialists fail to 
realise is the mere illusionary nature of this autonomy and that this ‘I’ “…is never more 
authentic than when it is within the walls of a prison” (Lacan, 2009 [1949], p. 7). The prison 
is the symbolic, of which the ‘I’ is its permanent captive with absolutely no hope of escape, 
except in suicide (Ibid). The ‘I’ of existentialism is presented in a humanistic tradition, a 
responsibility to delve into one’s consciousness and reach greater self-awareness. However, 
this is illusionary, for the ‘I’ is merely a product, a void that simply gets dragged along by the 






Cogito: Ergo Sum 
Lacan criticised Descartes notion of the Cogito in numerous works, but I would like 
to simply focus on one specific work, namely the ‘Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious’ 
(1957). As I have mentioned, the object of self-consciousness i.e. the ego, is the realm of 
illusion and contains hallucinatory objects that emerge in fantasy. When Descartes claims “I 
think, therefore I am” he is essentially thinking of the subject as an object, a cogitatum, 
within the imaginary realm, and thus misses the mark because he assumes that what he is, is 
the same as what he speaks of: “It is not a question of knowing whether I speak of myself in a 
way that conforms to what I am, but rather of knowing whether I am the same as that of 
which I speak” (Lacan, 2009 [1957], p. 182).  
As the majority of thought is within the unconscious, and because the real object of 
the subject as void lies buried within it, to be consciously aware of the ‘I think’ is only to 
observe an imaginary construct and therefore Descartes has only identified a fantasy, the 
fantasy of autonomy itself. Thus, for Lacan, the real formula of the cogito should be “I think 
where I am not [Symbolic], therefore I am where I do not think” (Lacan, 2009 [1957], p. 
183). To adopt a rationalistic conception of the subject, as Descartes did, is to reject the 
notion of “pure becoming” (Deleuze & Parnet, 2007 [1977], p. ix) in the Deleuzeian sense. It 
is to only perceive the signified fantasy of autonomy that is constantly “…subverted by the 
empirical” (Lacan, 2009 [1957], p. 183) whereby any scientific/rationalistic conception 
“…exclude[s] all ‘subjectivism’” (Ibid, p. 182). In other words, to objectify the subject is to 
immediately freeze it and wrench it away from the very process that creates it: time and the 
process of metonymy. It would be to destroy the harmony, similar to a piece of Bach, which 
provides the very beauty of the piece, namely the experience of the music itself: the subject is 
therefore an experience not a moment. It would be analogous to taking a picture of a dream, 
rather than seeing the entire story that is in constant flux.              
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Case Example: Shakespeare’s Coriolanus and the Primary Master 
Hollywood and literature are awash with the master slave dialectic with practically 
infinite examples. However, one should turn to Shakespeare’s tragedy Coriolanus, written 
sometime between 1605 and 1608, which I believe to be one of the most striking and best 
exemplars of the master-slave experience, primarily because of its maternal dimension. The 
protagonist Gaius Marcius, a Roman general, presents himself as an ultimate master who 
brutally dominates everyone around him and is even accused by Brutus, a tribune, of 
speaking of “…the people, as if you were a god to punish, not a man of their infirmity” 
(Shakespeare, 1922 [1605-1608], p. 106). The public despise Coriolanus, Gaius, who he 
deems as “dissentious rogues” (Ibid, p. 14) and by favouring them would be “beneath 
abhorring” (Ibid). In Lacanian terms, Gaius, refuses to submit to the desire of the people and 
thus he becomes a brutish pariah, his own master. He has essentially succumbed to the curse 
of the master by being recognised by slaves: “Know, good mother, I had rather be a servant 
in my way, then sway with them in theirs” (Ibid, p. 70). Gaius fears the big Other, the Demos, 
whereby to submit to them would be to relinquish his own truth: “Away, my disposition, and 
possess me some harlot’s spirit! […] I surcease to honour mine own truth and by my body’s 
action teach my mind a most irrelevant baseness” (Ibid, p. 131-132). This baseness is thus 
what he deems to be the object of the Demos. What is important to point out is that, using 
Lacanian terminology, Gaius lacked a fully developed paternal law to gain the keys to enter 
into the laws of civilization, Nomos. As Plutarch states: “While the force and vigour of his 
soul, and a persevering constancy in all he undertook, led him successfully into many noble 
achievements, yet, on the other side, also, by indulging the vehemence of his passion, and 
through an obstinate reluctance to yield or accommodate his humours and sentiments to those 
of a people about him, he rendered himself incapable of acting and associating with others 
[…] Education and study, and the favours of the muses, confer no greater benefit on those 
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that seek them than these humanizing and civilizing lessons which teach our natural qualities 
to submit to the limitations prescribed by reason and to avoid the wildness of extremes” 
(Plutarch, 2017 [75BC]).22   
Essentially, Gaius has been allowed to express too much desire which had not been 
effectively regulated by a secondary master therefore leaving him somewhat like a wild 
animal that is extremely resilient to external civilizing through the tertiary master: 
“Coriolanus, as drawn by Plutarch, is deprived by the loss of his father, of education and its 
civilising influence, so that he is unfit for society, choleric, impatient, uncivil, and unyielding. 
By nature he has an excellent understanding, a great heart, and temperance in everything but 
pride and choler. He is subject neither to love of pleasure nor love of money, and seeks only 
honour, cheerfully enduring all pains by which his natural valiantness-the virture honoured in 
Rome above all others-may be equipped to take the lead […] He seeks honour because of 
“the joy he saw his mother did take in him,” and thought all due to her “that had been also 
due to his father if he had lived” (Shakespeare, 1922 [1605-1608], p. xi-xiii). Gaius therefore 
has essentially become the phallus for the mother, namely the father itself with all its brutal 
legislative significance.   
Once banished from Rome, the vengeful Gaius turns to his sworn enemy Aufidius in 
order to gather forces and attack the Romans. What is important to observe here, is that Gaius 
dominates over everyone and attempts to be the ‘Name of the Father’ for everyone even by 
hoodwinking Aufidius, by gaining huge support and successfully launching an assault on 
Rome. In doing so, the Romans send numerous envoys to convince Gaius to stop, only to be 
                                                          
22 I must state that Nomos is different from the paternal law. The paternal law is but the 
signifier of Nomos such that all man made laws are merely manifestations of its pure 
expression, Logos.  
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turned away, including Gaius’s close acquaintance Menenius, a Senator, who after meeting 
with Gaius states “…there is no more mercy in him than there is milk in a male tiger […] 
When we banished him, we respected not them [The Gods]; and, he returning to break our 
necks, they respect not us” (Ibid, p. 211). However, the final envoy the Romans send is 
Gaius’s mother, Volumnia. 
Arguably the most poignant scene in the entire play is when Volumnia attempts to 
persuade Gaius to stop the sacking of Rome; and it is here whereby Gaius meets and submits 
to his only master, that of his mother. Volumnia states that if he were to continue along his 
vengeful path and destroy not only Rome but his wife, child and mother he will betray nature 
itself, be consumed in madness and cursed for all time: “There’s no man in the world more 
bound to’s mother; yet here he lets me prate like one I’ the stocks […] Say my request’s 
unjust, and spurn me back; but if it be not so, thou art not honest and the gods will plague 
thee, that thou restrain’st from me the duty which to a mother’s part belongs” (Ibid, p. 206-
207). This is indicative of the enormous power the mother has in establishing the very 
integral foundations of being, and it almost trivialises Gaius’s master mentality whereby 
Gaius responds “O mother, mother! What have you done? Behold, the heavens do ope, the 
gods look down, and unnatural scene they laugh at. O my mother, mother! O! You have won 
a happy victory to Rome; but, for your son, believe it, O, believe it, most dangerously you 
have with him prevail’d, if not most mortal to him. But let it come” (Ibid, p. 208).         
Conclusion 
The importance of Hegel was that his system challenged the positivistic belief that 
logic could be predictive. In other words, the technocratic world is intrinsically deficient in 
explaining the particulars of the human condition whereby the technocrat leads to “…the ever 
more intentional undertakings of a technocracy; to the psychological standardization of 
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subjects who are seeking jobs; and to acceptance of the established boundaries of society as it 
currently exists, head bent forward under the standard of the psychologist” (Lacan, 1963, p. 
61). Hegel’s system thus attempted to fill the gap by demonstrating how the universal can 
become particularised through the process of scansion (Ibid, p. 61), with scansion meaning 
the process of negation or the negating-negativity of the ‘I’. For Lacan, the existential gap 
that is presented in Hegel’s work, namely the problem of the subject, was also seized upon by 
Freud (Ibid, p. 62 – 63) despite the fact that he would have been arguably horrified at being 
associated with him.   
However, Lacan views Hegel’s dialectic to be false due to the power of mathematics and 
natural sciences (Ibid, p. 62). However, I will show in chapter 6 that mathematics can be 
shown to be wanting. That is to say, that even mathematics fails at universalising subjectivity 
by merely succumbing to absolute literalism and by doing so runs into contradictions as 
outlined by Gödel.   
The Lacanian subject is empirical inasmuch as its fantasmatic configurations is only gained 
via an experience with an Other, first and foremost the primary master. The real subject is 
non-existent and is essentially a void, however a void that is also empirical as it is gained via 
the trauma of not being able to signify the abyss of the Other, that is to say it is a 
manifestation of ignorance, of not knowing what the Other wants. Fantasy therefore acts a 
symptom or consequence of this trauma and is a strictly human construct as animals arguably 
do not fantasise. From this chapter the reader should now have a toolbox of terms that will be 
used throughout the following chapters. 
1. The primary master = The Mother (Eros) 
2. The secondary master = The Father (Logos) 
3. The tertiary master = Civilization (Nomos) 
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4. The subject is empirical. 
5. There is no agency in the subject. 
6. The subject is a void within the symbolic/unconscious. 
7. The subject is a fantasy of autonomy, a harmony and synthesis of partial objects that 
is experienced in the imaginary axis as vertigo. 
8. The subject is at the whim of the Other/unconscious. 
9. The mirror is a metaphor for the object of self-consciousness which is essentially a 


















Chapter 2: The Fantasy of the Subject and the Development of Early Capitalism (1517 
to the Age of Enlightenment) 
Introduction 
“Beware of the other’s dream, because if you are caught in the other’s dream you are 
screwed” (Deleuze, 2001b [1987], p. 103).  
“Every man is an angel in disguise, a god playing the fool. It seems as if heaven has sent its 
insane angels into our world as to an asylum, and here they will break out in their native 
music and utter at intervals the words they have heard in heaven; then the mad fit returns and 
they mope and wallow like dogs” (Emerson, 1965 [1835], p. 12).  
This quote by the American Romantic writer Ralph Waldo Emerson represents a 
deeply Socratic idea. That is to say Socrates, as represented in the works of Plato, believed 
that the human soul is deeply flawed and is in an epic battle with itself to achieve either a 
return to a divine world of mathematics or a debauched world of desire, as Socrates points 
out in the Phaedrus: “Now when judgment is in control and leads us by reasoning toward 
what is best, that sort of self-control is called ‘being in your right mind’; but when desire 
takes command in us and drags us without reasoning toward pleasure, then its command is 
known as ‘outrageousness’” (Plato, 1997b [237e-238a], p. 517).  
For Socrates, our recollection of mathematical terms and understanding is simply a 
remembering of a previous life when we were with the gods in a perfect world of the forms as 
primarily shown in the Meno where Socrates demonstrates that even a slave can recollect 
mathematical knowledge (Plato, 1997c [82a – 86a], p. 881-886), and any slip away from this 
is simply a process of forgetting: “Then if the truth about reality is always in our soul, the 
soul would be immortal so that you should always confidently try to seek out and recollect 
what you do not know at present—that is, what you do not recollect?” (Ibid [86b], p. 886).  
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It is within this chapter that I will utilize Plato’s Phaedrus as a template for the 
alterations in the subject - caused by a changing big Other, Althusser’s Infrastructure vis-à-
vis capitalism - by aligning and replacing its focus of love with the idea of the fantasy of 
autonomy. As Socrates description of love is essentially a remembrance of divine beauty in 
the other, that the subject seeks to perfect (Plato, 1997b [252d – e], p. 530), what will be 
demonstrated is the hypothesis that the advent of Protestantism and its Weberian connotations 
ushered in a oscillation of historical transgression, deterritorialization, against the prevailing 
big Other, Nomos, and reterritorialization. The subject therefore collectively engages in a 
process of radical desire, represented by the Socratic black horse, away from a given 
ideological bedrock, but reach a threshold and return to a new system of Nomos represented 
by the white horse. However, what is interesting to observe is that succumbing to the white 
horse or black horse results in a specific type of ontological blindness. 
As was outlined in chapter one, the Lacanian subject can be viewed empirically. That 
is to say that the ‘I’, even though a void within the symbolic axis, within the imaginary 
register is gained fantasmatically via experience; in other words, first and foremost, our 
experience with the primary master. An experience of transgression is therefore a 
radicalisation of desire, and therefore fantasy, whereby the negating-negativity of the ‘I’ is 
given full reign resulting in deterritorialization. However, the problem faced by the subject 
when undergoing this transgression is to literally become lost in their own subjectivity, that is 
to say, they succumb to the problem of solipsism vis-à-vis the error of Protagoras as 
mentioned in Plato’s Cratylus: “But if Protagoras is telling the truth—if it is the Truth that 
things are for each person as he believes them to be, how is it possible for one person to be 
wise and another foolish?” (Plato, 1997g [386c], p. 104). Thus, the blindness inherent in 
deterritorialization is one in which the subject is somewhat divorced from reality whereby 
taking it to its extreme results in madness i.e. foreclosure.  
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The blindness resulting from reterritorialization i.e. supersedence, which is a return to 
a new or previously transformed ideological bedrock, is quite literal in an ontological sense, 
for the subject without transgression is not a subject at all and does not exist. They become a 
pure automaton with no negation because they have supplanted the negating nature of the ‘I’ 
with a system of pure reason, a realm where the subject is nowhere to be seen. It is the curse 
experienced by Stesichorus who wrote badly of Helen of Troy whereby the gods punished 
him for trivializing the divine madness of love [The subject] with blindness, only to be cured 
with his encomium. It is this same curse that Socrates feared when he began his own 
interpretation of love in the Phaedrus: “And so, my friend, I must purify myself. Now for 
those [The Aufklärer] whose offense lies in telling false stories about matters divine, there is 
an ancient rite of purification—Homer did not know it, but Stesichorus did. When he lost his 
sight for speaking ill of Helen, he did not, like Homer, remain in the dark about the reason 
why” (Plato, 1997b [243a], p. 521).  
The chapter will begin with a discussion of how Nomos is established in the subject 
by outlining Althusser’s ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ (1970). Within this 
section the reader will see how the subject has to submit to the big Other and adopt certain 
ideological characteristics. The move into adopting this new societal law i.e. to join the realm 
of civilization, is akin to a second Oedipus, a secondary repression, whereby the subject re-
experiences tremendous anxiety by having to further relinquish their desire to that of the 
given ideological apparatus.  
Once the chapter has outlined the establishment of Nomos within the subject, the 
chapter will begin an historical outline of the development of capitalism from 1517, therefore 
aligning with the Weber hypothesis. The work will present the hypothesis that the different 
periodical changes in the development of capitalism coincided with periodical changes in the 
Demos. These changes will be viewed in light of Plato’s Phaedrus, specifically Socrates 
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concept on the structure of the soul, as well as Deleuze’s concept of deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization. The reader will come to see that certain periods of transgression against 
Nomos yield a radicalisation of desire, a subjective deterritorialization analogous to the 
Socratic black horse. These oscillations coincide with the huge sociological and political 
changes after 1517. These periods will be contrasted by the reestablishment of Nomos, 
primarily caused by the enforcement of Logos that is the primary barrier the subject has to 
submit to in order to prevent a collapse into madness i.e. subjective disorientation. These 
periods include the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, periods marked by a strict 
enforcement of rationalistic Nomos. However, the inherent problem with Nomos is its ability 
to expel the subject and thus establish a technocratic system that rejects idiosyncrasy thus 
creating a barren wasteland of pure thought vis-à-vis the categorical imperative.    
The structure of the following chapters will attempt to coat historical & economic 
development with the epistemological transformation of a purely religious Nomos with that of 
a gradual insistence of a rational, objective, materialistic and commodified one. The reader 
will be able to see how, through the process of the demystification of the world, the 
individual subject becomes more and more incorporated within an ideology of absolute 
literalism and commodification.  
Logos, Super-ego and Oedipus 
As mentioned in part one, the tertiary master represents the establishment of the big 
Other whereby it acts as a secondary repression. The first repression is that of the Oedipus 
complex whereby the ‘Name of the Father’ acts as a force that regulates the unbridled desire 
of the infant toward the primary master. By doing so, the infant experiences a process of 
repression, that is to say they have to emerge an idiosyncratic subject that is no longer 
conjoined with the primary master, whereby their desire becomes buried and repressed deep 
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within the unconscious. The super-ego, Freud says, is generated from the Oedipal conflict 
and is derived “…from the father-complex” (Freud, 2010 [1923], p. 66). Therefore the 
experience of Oedipus establishes the super-ego, which is analogous to the ‘Name of the 
Father’, and therefore further structures the id, symbolic, and acts as its representative (Ibid, 
p. 67). That is to say that the super-ego acts as that which establishes barriers or primary laws 
within the unconscious i.e. Logos.  
This Logos is essentially the categorical imperative (Ibid, p. 66), which Zupančič 
argues is simply pure super-ego: “What philosophy calls the moral law – and, more precisely, 
what Kant calls the categorical imperative – is in fact nothing other than the superego [And] 
In so far as it has its origins in the constitution of the superego, ethics becomes nothing more 
than a convenient tool for any ideology which may try to pass off its own commandments as 
truly authentic, spontaneous and ‘honourable’ inclinations of the subject” (Zupančič, 2000, p. 
1). 
After the dissolution of the Oedipus complex, the child can be said to be in a state of 
ideological readiness. The child is primed with both Eros, from the primary master, and 
Logos, gained from the secondary master, which essentially gives the keys to enter into the 
world of Others i.e. civilization. The child now engages with other children and is thrusted 
into civilization, engaging with the first tertiary master, education. However, as mentioned 
before, this is met with enormous anxiety as the child is periodically taken away from their 
primary and secondary masters. 
It is completely normal for young infants, 6-36 months, to experience anxiety when 
separated from their parents (Csóti, 2003, p. 86). This is not only prevalent when left alone at 
a friend’s house, but also the start of, what is called in the UK, the Early Years Foundation 
Stage whereby the infant attends nursery, which usually accepts toddlers around the age of 2 
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½ years. By this time the infant has already gone through the mirror stage, however it is now 
presented with another threat, other subjects/children, without the protection of their physical 
primary and secondary masters.  
As the child has gone through the Oedipus complex, they have internalised their 
primary and secondary masters and thus, even though they are no longer present in the 
physical sense, have a repressed intrapsychic substitute/representation of them. The child 
therefore has an individual identity, but one that is based only on the desire of the primary 
and secondary masters. To clarify, the child in submitting to the commands of Logos is now 
in a position of extreme ideological subservience that is primarily caused by fear, namely the 
fear of castration vis-à-vis the fear of transgressing the super-ego. It is exactly here whereby 
the infant’s world becomes available to the tertiary master for the first time and therefore the 
beginnings of adopting the civil desire of the big Other.23 The original repression of the 
Oedipus complex, and the establishment of the superego, is therefore essential for the infant 
to join civilization and it is here whereby Althusser’s concept of ‘full’ interpellation takes 
hold.24 
                                                          
23 I must point out that I do not suggest that there are no civil values within the infant before 
the tertiary master, as these can be gained through manners taught by the primary and 
secondary masters. However, these desires are strictly of them, not the desires of a big Other, 
which is a discrete Other. To clarify, the primary and secondary masters do channel the desire 
of the big Other, but the infant misrecognises these desires as belonging only to the primary 
and secondary masters because there is “no Other of the Other” (Lacan, 2009 [1960], p. 344).   
24 I have used the term ‘full’ interpellation here, as Althusser (1971 [1968], p. 176) believed 
that an individual is already a subject, interpellated, before they are even born. I disagree here 
inasmuch as Althusser fails to address the problem that the child cannot become an object of 
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Althusser’s Interpellation: Logos to Nomos 
For Althusser (1971 [1968], p. 171), the Logos provides the individual with a sense of 
obviousness to their existence. That is to say, the Logos gives to us the sense of perceiving 
ourselves as an object of recognition similar to the Lacanian concept of the mirror. As stated 
earlier, the Logos is acquired from the ‘Name of the Father’ and acts as a regulatory function 
to the unbridled processes of desire. One way to picture this is as a water dam, but could also 
be viewed as rocks in a river that guide and alter the direction of the processes of desire. 
Thus, the Logos acts as a type of territory, a blueprint or charioteer, in the Socratic sense, that 
guides, but can also be seized upon. 
Althusser introduces his concept of interpellation to explain how individuals become 
ideologically subjugated. Essentially, all ideology interpellates individuals by colonising and 
terraforming the subjects Logos i.e. its concrete nature (Althusser, 1971 [1968], p. 173-174). 
Because the Logos gives us the sense of obviousness of our existence as individuals, 
interpellation of it imprints the notion that even what we may deem to be common sense is in 
fact ideological: “…what thus seems to take place outside ideology (to be precise, in the 
street), in reality takes place in ideology. What really takes place in ideology seems therefore 
to take place outside it […] ideology never says, ‘I am ideological’” (Althusser, 1971 [1968], 
p. 175). It is now important to outline how interpellation seizes Logos, namely through 
Ideological State Apparatuses.   
As with any historical period there exists as specific Nomos that manifests itself 
through general communication such as what is deemed ‘polite’, ‘rude’ etc. to a more 
                                                          




objective cultural transmission as seen with the news, politics, education, the military and 
legal practice. Louis Althusser actively explored this phenomenon within his ‘Ideological 
State Apparatuses’ (1971 [1968]). 
 In his ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ (1971 [1968]), Althusser 
identifies two separate means of how the state implements its coercion, the ‘State Apparatus’ 
(SA), and the ‘Ideological State Apparatus’ (ISA) (Althusser, 1971 [1968], p. 127-186). 
According to Marx, every society has two underlying systems, the infrastructure and 
superstructure. The infrastructure remains as the base, the economic landscape, and in our 
case of capitalism, the reproduction of economic systems.25 The superstructure has two 
separate systems, the politico-legal and the ideological.  
 The two systems of the superstructure can be represented as the state apparatus, 
Politico-legal and the Ideological State Apparatus. The purpose of the superstructure of any 
society is to maintain its infrastructure. The SA’s maintain the essential core of the state by 
means of the courts, army, the police and prisons using the method of repression, the 
enforcement of the law, Nomos, itself, however, what is more interesting is the role of ISA’s. 
 Althusser outlines 8 ISA’s: religion, education, the family, legal, political, trade 
unions, communication and cultural. These are different to the SA’s such they remain within 
the private domain of society. As the SA’s utilize their force through overt violence, which 
are in the public sphere, the ISA’s use covert means to install values, and they do this 
precisely through ideology. The overt use of the SA is to allow for the conditions of the ISA’s 
                                                          
25 Althusser’s work Reading Capital (1965) dealt directly with Marx. However, there is no 
need to go into this as it would cause a digression in the chapter by focusing on the more 
philosophical undertones of Marx’s work.     
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to exist. What is important to observe is how these ISA’s exist primarily because of the SA, 
the given Nomos, and thus contribute to the eventual Ethos or Zeitgeist of society. Therefore 
by studying it we can gain insight into the deeper functioning of capitalism.  
 Althusser claims that the most dominant form of ISA in mature capitalism is 
education (Althusser, 1971 [1968], p. 156).26 Althusser argues that what we have today is an 
alteration of the role of the church whereby now we have the school-family couple rather 
than the church-family couple: “It takes children from every class at infant-school age, and 
then for years, the years in which the child is most ‘vulnerable’, squeezed between the Family 
State Apparatus and the Educational State Apparatus, it drums into them, whether it uses new 
or old methods, a certain amount of ‘know-how’ wrapped in the ruling ideology (French, 
arithmetic, natural history, the sciences, literature) or simply the ruling ideology in its pure 
state (ethics, civic instruction, philosophy). Somewhere around the age of sixteen, a huge 
mass of children are ejected ‘into production’: these are the workers or small peasants. 
Another portion of scholastically adapted youth carries on: and, for better or worse, it goes 
somewhat further, until it falls by the wayside and fills the posts of small and middle 
technicians, white-collar workers, small and middle executives, petty bourgeois of all kinds. 
A last portion reaches the summit, either to fall into intellectual semi-employment, or to 
provide, as well as the ‘intellectuals of the collective labourer’, the agents of exploitation 
(capitalists, managers), the agents of repression (soldiers, policemen, politicians, 
administrators, etc.) and the professional ideologists (priests of all sorts, most of whom are 
convinced ‘laymen’)” (Althusser, 1971 [1968], p. 155). 
 Althusser goes on to examine the intricacies of ideology by turning to Freud. 
                                                          
26 Let us not forget the statement by Francis Xavier “Give me the child until he is seven and 
I’ll give you the man.” 
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According to Althusser individuals are always by nature ideological. To explain further, we 
cannot define ourselves as a subject without being within ideology because it acts as a 
reference point for our connection to the world and reality: “But to recognize that we are 
subjects and that we function in the practical rituals of the most elementary everyday life (the 
hand-shake, the fact of calling you by your name, the fact of knowing, even if I do not know 
what it is, that you ‘have’ a name of your own, which means that you are recognized as a 
unique subject, etc.) – this recognition only gives us the ‘consciousness’ of our incessant 
(eternal) practice of ideological recognition – its consciousness, i.e. its recognition – but in no 
sense does it give us the (scientific) knowledge of the mechanism of this recognition. Now it 
is this knowledge that we have to reach, if you will, while speaking in ideology, and from 
within ideology we have to outline a discourse which tries to break with ideology, in order to 
dare to be the beginning of a scientific (i.e. subject-less) discourse on ideology” (Althusser, 
1971 [1968], p. 173). 
By polarizing ourselves into both an individual and a subject I think Althusser is 
adopting the same approach used by G. H. Mead (1932) in his ‘Mind Self and Society from 
the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist’, whereby he essentially states the same thing: “Social 
control is the expression of the “me” over against the expression of the “I.” It sets the limits, 
it gives you the determination that enables the “I,” so to speak, to use the “me” as the means 
of carrying out what is the undertaking that all are interested in” (Mead, 1967 [1932], p. 210). 
Weber and the economy before 1517 
It has been demonstrated that there were substantial economic developments before 
1517, however I suggest that these trends were ontologically different as retaining a 
theological Zeitgeist that standardized the economic landscape of the collective. To elaborate, 
the people under those booms were still tied to, and reliant on the ideology of the tertiary 
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master of the time, the Roman Catholic Church.    
According to Randall Collins in his work ‘Weberian Sociological Theory’ (1986), 
Max Weber’s contribution has been greatly misunderstood because of the lack of focus on his 
mid-period works such as ‘Sociology of Religion’ (1920), and ‘The Religion of China: 
Confucianism and Taoism’ (1915), as well the insistence of the ‘Weber Thesis’ developed in 
his Magnum Opus ‘Protestant Ethic’ (1905) that he later developed. Collins argues that, 
unfortunately, Weber was unaware of the discoveries, by modern historians, of economic 
booms before the Middle Ages.27 ““The Weberian Revolution of the High Middle Ages” is a 
phenomenon that I believe Weber would have discovered if he had lived long enough to 
complete his comparative studies of the world religions. For modern historiography now has 
abundantly documented what was scarcely visible in Weber’s day: a full-fledged economic 
boom in the Europe of A.D. 1050-1300. My argument is that the institutional prerequisites of 
capitalism fell into place then. This theme is in keeping with the general line of revisionist 
economic history of recent decades, which finds many of the traits formally thought to be 
associated with industrialism (e.g., family structure, property relationships) already present 
several centuries earlier”” (Collins, 1986, p. 9). 
 Although Collins criticizes Weber for overlooking economic booms before the 
protestant reformation, Collins negates the essential core of Weber’s point: a purely rational 
and peaceful exchange of capital that, I suggest, only reached its peak during the 17th 
                                                          
27 Another important point that Weber overlooked is that before the industrial revolution 
workers mainly worked independently rather than for an ‘organisation’. Many writers 
understood this growing trend after World War 2 whereby this process grew exponentially 
(Argyris, 1957 & Presthus, 1962).  
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century.28 To elaborate, even though Collins correctly identifies prior economic bubbles 
before the protestant reformation, these economic environments were dramatically different 
to one that’s core was more rationally dispersed, organized and independent. For example, 
one of the key differences between Feudalism and Mercantilism against post reformation 
capitalism is the free market: “Mercantilist ordering principles defined the international 
capitalist economy for several hundred years. Although there was variation among the 
principal mercantilist powers, the system’s main features were common to all. First and 
foremost, mercantilism depended on substantial government involvement [the Catholic 
Church] in the economy” (Frieden, 2011, p. 18). And in regards to Feudalism: “The 
economic basis on which the feudal system rested, manorialism, was essentially a 
relationship of dominance and subordination between those who claimed authority [the 
Roman Church/tertiary master] over the land and those families who cultivated it. People and 
land, then, were the basic ingredients of feudalism” (Goucher; LeGuin & Walton, 1998, p. 2). 
The origin of capitalism is complex because its characteristics vary from one period 
of history to another.29 If we view capitalism as a historical movement we can see that it has 
gained considerable complexity since its abstract beginnings that historians still debate today 
with regards to Feudalism (Beattie, 2011 & Katz, 1993), and Mercantilism (Polanyi, 2011, p. 
51–87). There have been purely materialistic historiographies regarding its genesis as seen 
with Marx & Engels, however what is interesting is the cross comparison of religion, 
specifically Protestantism, to capitalism that was pioneered by Max Weber’s ‘Protestant Ethic 
                                                          
28 Indeed many have suggested that Capitalism developed with Roman trade (Rostovtzeff, 
1960).  
29 For an excellent review of the literature looking at the development of Capitalism up to 
1928 see Sée (2004).  
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& the Spirit of Capitalism’ (1905) and provides a sophisticated portrayal of capitalism’s 
history prior to the crash of 1929.30 
 According to Weber the deep-rooted factor that separates capitalism from other forms 
of trade is its goal of generating profit using mainly peaceful and rational exchange. The 
history of capitalism is universal and very old, Weber states, however what separates this 
form, compared to modern capitalism is that “…in modern times the Occident [the West] has 
developed, in addition to this, a very different form of capitalism which has appeared 
nowhere else: the rational capitalistic organization of (formally) free labour. Only suggestions 
of it are found elsewhere” (Weber, 2005 [1905], p. 35) as well as the fact that “The modern 
rational organization of the capitalistic enterprise would not have been possible without two 
other important factors in its development: the separation of business from the household, 
which completely dominates modern economic life, and closely connected with it, rational 
book-keeping” (Ibid, p. 36). 
 Weber’s real contribution is the cross comparison of Protestantism with capitalism, 
inasmuch as the more a society has embedded or developed forms of the ‘rational ethics of 
ascetic Protestantism’ the greater the development of the capitalist enterprise.31 According to 
this viewpoint, the beginnings of Protestantism coincide with the beginning of modern 
capitalism, therefore Weber essentially argues that our modern economic system started at 
                                                          
30 Many have suggested that Weber’s work represents the most famous link between culture 
and economic development (Acemoğlu; Johnson & Robinson, 2005). I do not intend to 
provide an extensive commentary on Marx as it would be beyond this paper. However, I will 
briefly discuss his view of estranged labour in chapter 4. 
31 In many ways Weber’s work presents a criticism of Karl Marx such that religion relished 
capitalism, not that religion acted as the antithesis of capital.  
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the reformation with Martin Luther’s famous ‘Ninety-Five Theses’, despite Luther’s 
contempt toward the great merchants of his time.32 
How is this 'ascetic Protestantism' different to previous models of society or politic? 
In Weber's section ‘Aestheticism and the Spirit of Capitalism’ (Weber, 2005 [1905], p. 102-
125) Weber argues that objective and earthy values as well as the misuse of mortal time in 
their pursuit were considered morally suspect and even sinful: “Wealth is thus bad ethically 
only in so far as it is a temptation to idleness and sinful enjoyment of life, and its acquisition 
is bad only when it is with the purpose of later living merrily and without care” (Weber, 2005 
[1905], p. 108). 
The Nomos & Ethos before 1517 
The seeds of discontent were widespread across Europe in the run up to Luther’s 
‘Theses’. Indeed the sheer contempt directed toward the prevailing Nomos, the Catholic 
Church, was tremendous and according to Durant “No ruler in Europe could any longer think 
of the papacy as a moral supergovernment binding all the nations into a Christian 
commonwealth; the papacy itself, as a secular state, had become nationalistic; all Europe, as 
the old faith waned, fell into national fragments acknowledging no supernational or 
international moral law…” (Durant, 1957, p. 13). The reasoning behind this was simple, the 
Catholic Church had become so deeply corrupt and greedy that left it, in the eyes of the 
Demos, hypocritical and morally bankrupt. Perhaps the most poignant example of this 
                                                          
32 Weber presents a footnote whereby Martin Luther expressed complaints against the 
Fuggers (Weber, 2005 [1905], p. 42). Also, Weber at a later stage in his work, does accept 
that the reformation was not the sole cause of capitalism but did have a considerable effect on 
economic consciousness and capitalism’s development (Weber, 2005 [1905], p. 92).  
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corruption was the selling of indulgences, which became so unregulated that they were sold 
for glasses of wine, winning a stake on a game of tennis and even prostitution (Ibid, p. 23). In 
1430 an envoy sent the following to his prince about the current status in Rome: “Greed 
reigns supreme in the Roman court, and day by day finds new devices ... for extorting money 
from Germany. . . . Hence much outcry and heartburnings. . . . Many questions in regard to 
the papacy will arise, or else obedience will at last be entirely renounced, to escape from 
these outrageous exactions by the Italians; and this latter course, as I perceive, would be 
acceptable to many countries” (Montalembert as cited in Durant, 1957, p. 11).  
Before 1517, pursuing worldly pleasures was sinful as it was related to 'pleasures of 
the flesh'. Monetary wealth was used and culminated in such a way for religious importance 
only and it was this specific centralization of power that so disgusted Martin Luther. This was 
viewed therefore by him as not only an unethical use of money but also against the 'rational 
command by God' to use wealth in accordance with notions of duty and work. It was not 
merely a moral shift that occurred, indeed adherents to the reformation also deeply despised 
the use of money for bodily pleasures, but a reconfiguration and dispersal of wealth to adhere 
to what they believed was due to those that adopted this command by God to work: “This 
worldly Protestant asceticism, as we may recapitulate up to this point, acted powerfully 
against the spontaneous enjoyment of possessions; it restricted consumption, especially of 
luxuries. On the other hand, it had the psychological effect of freeing the acquisition of goods 
from the inhibitions of traditionalistic ethics [the ethos of the tertiary master]. It broke the 
bonds of the impulse of acquisition in that it not only legalized it, but (in the sense discussed) 
looked upon it as directly willed by God” (Weber, 2005 [1905], p. 115). 
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Figure 1: The Individual under a signifying regime 
Referring to Figure 1, before 1517 individuals were embodied within a specific 
epistemological universe, Ethos or Weltanschauung, whereby the collective were 
incorporated within a theocratic nomos such that, even though there remained variance in 
each subject’s conception of the world, had to be understood and expressed through the lens 
of Catholic teaching. Asking a peasant, scholar or member of the aristocracy what their 
conceptualisation of nature was, they may refer to their objective nature, as Roger Bacon 
(1220 – 1292) did, but this would be awash with theocratic significance.33      
The Demos refrained from straying too far from the analysis of nature from the 
standpoint of pure objectivity, although this began to rapidly change. Essentially subjects 
were interpellated into a mode of theological universalism that was maintained by the given 
signifying regime, namely Catholicism. To be exact, this was the period of early to middle 
Scholasticism (1200-1500) that included the scholars Peter Abelard, John Duns Scotus, 
                                                          
33 Roger Bacon has been considered by many historians of science to be a man very much 
ahead of his time (Hackett, 2002, p. 70-74).  
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Albertus Magnus and arguably the most influential, St Thomas Aquinas whereby the general 
Ethos consisted in subservience to the church. However, there was a growing unease and 
anti-clericalism mainly towards the monks that had collected large amounts of wealth 
(Müller, 1987, p. 35-36).  
Deleuze and Guattari in ‘A Thousand Plateaus’ (2004 [1988]) would refer to my 
concept of the tertiary master as a formalization of expression. That is to say my 
conceptualisation of nomos represents a “…specific formalization of expression […] a 
semiotic system” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004 [1988], p. 123). To clarify, via the process of 
interpellation, the given dominant social order, Catholicism in the case of the period of 
Scholasticism, regulated the symbolic order of individuals to ensure its survival, whereby the 
way in which this system expresses itself and observes subjects is through what Deleuze and 
Guattari call ‘faciality’ (Ibid, p. 127).34  
 This ‘faciality’ gives the signifier substance, which if effaced, or its gaze is damaged, 
leads to another regime (Ibid, p. 128). As just stated, the Demos refrained from straying too 
far away from the gaze of the signifying regime. Using Deleuze and Guattari, these 
individuals, Bacon included, who criticised the prevailing Nomos were merely priests, not 
prophets. In order to clarify this I must briefly define the two different types of delusion: 
ideational and active.35 
                                                          
34 One way to think of this is through the Hawthorne effect, or as Deleuze and Guattari quote 
Strindberg as “Surveillance by the face” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004 [1988], p. 128).  
35 What is important to highlight is that Deleuze and Guattari do not condone the idea that 
one should become mad in order to escape the established Nomos, only that by studying 
madness one can see the deeper workings of the signifying regime: “We are not saying that a 
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For Deleuze & Guattari, ideational delusions exist mainly with the bourgeois. They 
are usually paranoid and do not always have to be committed as they can still function in 
society. In relation to Scholasticism, criticism usually consisted of ‘interpreters’ that were 
still tied to the signifying regime. That is to say, even though they may consider themselves 
radical opponents, were still heavily interpellated and merely acted as the mouthpiece of the 
social order, in other words “The interpretive priest, the seer, is one of the despot-god’s 
bureaucrats” (Ibid, p. 126). 
Active delusions are very dangerous for the prevailing order. They exist usually 
within the working classes and rural citizens - monomaniacs that must be committed. What is 
important to note is the fact that these individuals have to be taken away from others as they 
are too dangerous for the very foundations of society “…God [nomos] and his psychiatrists 
[priests] are charged with recognising, among the de facto mixes, those who preserve 
[ideational], even in delusion, the class-based social order, and those who sow disorder 
[active], even strictly localized, such as haystack fires, parental murders, déclassé love and 
aggression” (Ibid, p. 134).         
The given signifying regime, the Althusserian ISA, of the time was one of extreme 
religious repression as Durant indicates: “The Church […] looked upon herself as the chief 
agent in maintaining morality, social order, education, literature, scholarship, and art; the 
state relied upon her to fulfil these functions; to perform them she needed an extensive and 
expensive organization; to finance this she taxed and gathered fees; even a church could not 
be governed by paternosters. Many bishops were the civil as well as the ecclesiastical rulers 
                                                          
people is possessed by a given type of delusion but that the map of a delusion, its coordinates 
considered, may coincide with the map of a people, its coordinates considered” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2004 [1988], p. 134-135).   
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of their regions; most of them were appointed by lay authorities, and came of patrician stock 
accustomed to easy morals and luxuries; they taxed and spent like princes; sometimes, in the 
performance of their multiple functions, they scandalized the saints by donning armor and 
lustily leading their troops in war” (Durant, 1957, p. 18).  
The enforcement of this signifying regime, via the state apparatus, was also extremely 
severe: “A score of offenses were capital: murder, treason, heresy, sacrilege, witchcraft, 
robbery, forgery, counterfeiting, smuggling, arson, perjury, adultery, rape (unless healed by 
marriage), homosexual actions, "bestiality," falsifying weights or measures, adulterating 
food, damaging property at night, escaping from prison, and failure in attempted suicide. 
Execution might be by relatively painless beheading, but this was usually a privilege of ladies 
and gentlemen; lesser fry were hanged; heretics and husband-killers were burned; outstanding 
murderers were drawn and quartered…” (Ibid, p. 758). However, what was surprising is that 
the public didn’t seem to resent these practices but even helped in the process (Ibid). 
  Europe was about to explode into full scale revolution in the run-up to Luther nailing 
the ‘Theses’ to the door of the Church at Wittenberg. Essentially the faciality of the 
signifying regime was deemed as some type of joke – an oppressive clown rather than an 
infallible emperor. However, what is important to point out is how the people were still 
caught within an ideological straightjacket. The given nomos of the time, despite being 
considered corrupt by the people, was still very much in charge and thus, using Althusser, the 
state and ideological apparatus could still function. However, within the ISAs, particularly 
education, there were clear examples of a new secular intellectual movement that outright 
challenged the prevailing status quo: “Philosophy, which in the thirteenth century had been 
the handmaid of theology, devoting itself to finding rational grounds for the orthodox faith, 
liberated itself in the fourteenth century with William of Ockham and Marsilius of Padua, and 
in the sixteenth became boldly secular, flagrantly sceptical with Pomponazzi, Machiavelli, 
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and Guicciardini” (Durant, 1957, p. 16). Essentially the seeds of revolution, the post and 
counter signifying elements of the signifying regime, were already blossoming within. As 
Deleuze and Guattari sate “Presignifying elements are always active in the signifying regime; 
countersignifying elements are always present and at work within it; and postsignifying 
elements are already there” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004 [1988], p. 132).       
The growth of industry also spelt bad news for the prevailing dogma that felt very 
much at home within rural and feudal life (Durant, 1957, p. 15) whereby Durant argues 
“Religion normally thrives in an agricultural regime, science in an industrial economy. Every 
harvest is a miracle of the earth and a whim of the sky […] The city worker, the merchant, 
the manufacturer, the financier, live in a mathematical world of calculated quantities and 
processes, of material causes and regular effects” (Ibid, p. 14-15).   
 Once people began to challenge the prevailing nomos, as seen with Luther’s ‘Theses’, 
the economic environment started to change as individuals started considering themselves 
‘free agents’ that could potentially devise an economic market that was also free from 
authoritative theocracy. Luther’s ‘Theses’ thus represented the culmination of well over a 
century of discontent and set in motion a momentous change: “Denunciations of the Church's 
shortcomings, by her enemies and her lovers, excited the schools, disturbed the pulpits, 
flooded the literature, mounted day by day, year by year, in the memory and resentment of 
men, until the dam [nomos] of reverence and tradition burst, and Europe was swept by a 
religious revolution more far-reaching and profound than all the political transformations of 
modern times” (Durant, 1957, p. 25). Thus, what was seen in the first half of the 16th century 
was a loosening of repression from the state and ideological apparatus. In the case of the 
subject, the tertiary master was under severe threat, from within, and with it the beginnings of 
a new establishment/tertiary master/postsignifying regime, one that was more heterogeneous; 
a new big Other that would revolutionize not only the economy but the people themselves.       
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1517 as Postsignifying Deterritorialization – The Black Horse Takes Flight 
 It is very difficult to truly comprehend what the demos of mainland Europe were 
experiencing during the beginnings of the reformation. Indeed we cannot do so, because we 
are already interpellated in our own ideological space of contemporary capitalism. That is to 
say that to view the mind-set of the early 16th century demos, is only possible through our 
own ideological lens. However, we can hypothesise based on their behaviour. 
Before 1517, the economy was very much aligned with the prevailing tertiary master, 
Catholic theocracy. Once Luther insisted that wealth be dispersed to represent one’s duty, 
rather than religious importance, the signifying regime experienced a dramatic reverberation. 
The prevailing nomos, its conventions, laws and customs, underwent enormous changes 
based upon the widespread discontent of the demos. The general ethos was one of excitement, 
a potential return of the repressed, Eros, caused by a loosing of the chains of theocratic 
repression – a collective emancipation of desire. The New Testament was now considered a 
work similar to the communist manifesto which provided a glimpse of a potential utopia for 
the peasants during their revolt (Durant, 1957, p. 382) and that “…the rebellion had flaunted 
Protestant colors and ideas: economic aspirations were dressed in phrases that Luther had 
sanctified; communism was to be merely a return to the Gospel” (Ibid, p. 393). Essentially 
the theses were based on a single phrase that Luther found in the book of Romans 1:17 “The 
righteous shall live by faith”, which challenged the dogma of the signifying regime that 
people could be saved through monetary contribution alone. 
Using Deleuze and Guattari, Luther’s criticism was analogous to the active delusion. 
That is to say that, instead of being merely an interpretive priest, he represented a full traitor, 
a prophet, a betrayer of the system, a “…traitor to all things and all people; his personal 
relation with the Devil resulting in betrayal, through good deeds as well as bad” (Deleuze & 
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Guattari, 2004 [1988], p. 139). Luther essentially threw open a door in a corridor of closed 
and prohibited doors, extended and intensified the gap in the symbolic order, showed that the 
emperor has no clothes and “…anticipates and detects the powers (puissances) of the future 
rather than applying the past and present powers (pouvoirs)” (Ibid, p. 137). This newly 
opened door represents for Deleuze and Guattari a point of ‘subjectification’ which “…is the 
origin of the passional line of the postsignifying regime. The point of subjectification can be 
anything. It must only display the following characteristic traits of the subjective semiotic: 
the double turning away, betrayal, and existence under reprieve” (Ibid, p. 147).36  
Luther thus started a passionate line of flight away from a “center of significance […] 
[the] departure of the line” (Ibid, p. 141). However, once the reformation was underway, 
Luther himself realized that this social revolution carried with it the dangers of unbridled 
desire: “The more we go forward, the worse the world becomes. ... It is clear enough how 
much more greedy, cruel, immodest, shameless, wicked the people are now than they were 
under popery. . . . We Germans are today the laughing stock and disgrace of all peoples; we 
are regarded as ignominious and obscure swine. . . . We steal, we lie ... we eat and drink to 
excess, and we give ourselves to every vice.... It is the general complaint that the young 
people of today are utterly dissolute and disorderly, and will not let themselves be taught any 
more … The women and girls of Wittenberg have begun to go bare before and behind, and 
there is no one to punish or correct them, and God's word is mocked” (Luther as cited in 
Durant, 1957 p. 765).  
Is it clear that the demos of mainland Europe during the 16th century was undergoing a 
                                                          
36 This ‘double turning away’ is essentially dealing with faciality. Essentially it is the subject, 
Luther in this case, turning his face away from the repulsed faciality of the signifying regime 
i.e. corrupt Catholicism. The two faces refuse to see each other.  
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lessening of societal repression, nomos, and thus an emancipation of desire/Eros; a return of 
the repressed. For Deleuze (2000 [1977], p. 118) “desire is revolutionary in its essence” and 
is repressed because it is so dangerous to the established order due to its “explosive” (Ibid) 
nature and “…is capable of calling into question the established order of a society” (Ibid). 
Was the excitement across Europe therefore an example of mass deterritorialization?  
Is this explosive desire not metaphorically analogous to the Socratic black horse in the 
Phaedrus? In the Platonic dialogue Phaedrus, Socrates outlines how the soul can be viewed 
as a charioteer with two horses, one black and one white. The black horse represents unbound 
desire which is indecent, boastful and outrageous (Plato, 1997b [253e], p. 531), which powers 
“…the spring that feeds the stream Zeus named ‘Desire’…” (Ibid, [255b – c], p. 532). The 
faciality of the clownish regime generated a resurgence of Eros, as seen with the extreme 
hubris of the Demos, which is one of the four divine madness’s i.e. love (Ibid, [265a], p. 541-
542), which I deem to be analogous to the fantasy of the subject.37 What is interesting is how 
similar Socrates view of desire is with that of Lacan whereby desire is the desire of the other: 
“It is as if he had caught an eye disease from someone else, but could not identify the cause; 
he does not realize that he is seeing himself in the lover as in a mirror” (Ibid, [255d], p. 232).     
As mentioned in chapter 1, the failure of the secondary master to regulate the 
processes of desire can lead to psychosis in later life. Of course this is rare but does allow us 
to glimpse into what pure unregulated desire can look like in adult life i.e. psychosis or 
extreme hubris. The demos in 16th century Europe did not become collectively mad per se, 
but experienced a loosening of repression whereby the dam of Logos revealed its cracks, see 
the dotted line in Figure 1, allowing for an increased overflow of desire, a deterritorialization 
                                                          
37 The other madness’s are prophecy, poetry and respite acquired from hardship that is gained 
from the Dionysus mystic rites i.e. drunkenness (Plato, 1997b [265b], p. 542).   
Thistlethwaite: 84 
 
away from the territory of the prevailing nomos, a “pure schizophrenic process” (Deleuze, 
2000 [1977], p. 283) whereby “…subjective abstract desire, like subjective abstract labor, is 
inseparable from a movement of deterritori-alization” (Ibid, p. 300). To clarify, the decoding 
of social conventions, of decoding nomos itself, leads to a resurgence of desire - a 
radicalisation of the fantasy of autonomy: “But such a man produces himself as a free man, 
irresponsible, solitary, and joyous, finally able to say and do something simple in his own 
name, without asking permission; a desire lacking nothing, a flux that overcomes barriers and 
codes, a name that no longer designates any ego whatever. He has simply ceased being afraid 
of becoming mad. He experiences and lives himself as the sublime sickness that will no 
longer affect him” (Ibid, p. 131).    
 
 





Alongside the deterritorialization of the demos, the economy underwent a monetary 
abstraction, which Deleuze calls a “deterritorialization of wealth” (Ibid, p. 225).38 Once 
Luther insisted that an individual’s duty for work should be recognized, this led to a sudden 
transgression of the economic coding, which resulted in the individual to freely comprehend 
their duty with infinite variability: they now could self-determine their economic status with a 
newly installed catharsis, dispersed wealth. The demos essentially no longer recognized the 
desire or faciality of the tertiary master. They saw it as a hypocritical, contradictory and 
corrupt force.  
Calvinism as Reterritorialization: The White Horse Returns 
 John Calvin (1509-1564), similar to Luther, was very much a “God-intoxicated man” 
(Durant, 1957, p. 462). Man was inherently a corrupt and sin ridden being that should be 
brought to heel and regulated, which in doing so, would have a chance to enter the kingdom 
of God (Ibid, p. 463). Fully embracing the reformed church, Calvin aimed at finally purging 
any Catholic influence from the developing new tertiary master, Protestantism. Any symbol 
or signifier that was related to the Presignifying regime had to be abolished as it was deemed 
as breaking the second commandment, constructing a graven image, which also included the 
crucifix (Ibid, p. 464).  
 Calvin took from Luther the concept of redemption by faith alone. That is to say that 
                                                          
38 The reader may be concerned with my use of Deleuze here. It must be stressed however 
that Deleuze was not concerned with the ‘understanding’ of his philosophy but rather its free 
application (Baumann, 2011) such that “Deleuze does in fact affirm the ontological priority 
of process over product, of creativity over objectivity, of affirmation over critical 
negotiation” (Dubey, 2007). 
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one could be saved and become one of the elect through being righteous in its own right. 
Anybody dealing in Catholicism was severely punished, whereby the Bible, now finally 
translated into English, would be considered the law, not its interpretation by a select few 
Catholic priests (Ibid, p. 472). Heresy again became a capital crime whereby “Discipline 
should be the backbone of personality” (Ibid, p. 473). Fundamentally speaking, the 
emancipation and destructiveness of desire/Eros had to be re-repressed: “Consistory and 
Council joined in the prohibition of gambling, card-playing, profanity, drunkenness, the 
frequenting of taverns, dancing (which was then enhanced by kisses and embraces), indecent 
or irreligious songs, excess in entertainment, extravagance in living, immodesty in dress. The 
allowable color and quantity of clothing, and the number of dishes permissible at a meal, 
were specified by law. Jewelry and lace were frowned upon. A woman was jailed for 
arranging her hair to an immoral height. Theatrical performances were limited to religious 
plays, and then these too were forbidden. Children were to be named not after saints in the 
Catholic calendar but preferably after Old Testament characters; an obstinate father served 
four days in prison for insisting on naming his son Claude instead of Abraham. Censorship of 
the press was taken over from Catholic and secular precedents, and enlarged (1560): books of 
erroneous religious doctrine, or of immoral tendency, were banned; Montaigne's Essays and 
Rousseau's Emile were later to fall under this proscription. To speak disrespectfully of Calvin 
or the clergy was a crime. A first violation of these ordinances was punished with a 
reprimand, further violation with fines, persistent violation with imprisonment or banishment. 
Fornication was to be punished with exile or drowning; adultery, blasphemy, or idolatry, with 
death. In one extraordinary instance a child was beheaded for striking its parents” (Ibid, p. 
474).   
 Regulation was also in education, the economy and society whereby “Calvinism gave 
to hard work, sobriety, diligence, frugality, and thrift a religious sanction and laurel that may 
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have shared in developing the industrious temper of the modern Protestant businessman…” 
(Ibid, p. 475).39 Coinciding with the Price Revolution, beginning in the first half of the 16th 
century, the reformation led to a shifting economic influence between the church and its 
political equivalents across Europe with considerable variability. According to Stefan 
Czarnowski, during the reformation the populace that embraced notions of Lutheranism were 
mainly those within the bourgeoisie and aristocracy. “He [Czarnowski] argues that it was in 
the ranks of the aristocracy (as well as the bourgeoisie) that the partisans of the Reformation 
were located. He sees the aristocracy as lusting after Church lands. The smaller landowners 
found it more difficult to fight the local curate, supported as he was by the still powerful 
Catholic episcopacy” (Wallerstein, 2011, p. 154).  
 The counter-reformation was aimed not only at Protestantism but the humanism seen 
during the renaissance age (Wallerstein, 2011, p. 156).40 Up to the beginnings of the age of 
Enlightenment the economy represented a dramatic shift from a centralized bank (The 
Church) to individual states.41 This was dramatically demonstrated with the ‘Peace of 
Augsburg’ (1555) whereby a settlement was made in which local princes, of Holy Roman 
Empire States, could choose to adopt Lutheranism or Catholicism thereby allowing 
independence, cuius regio, eius religio.42 “The Diet determined that in the future no ruler in 
                                                          
39 It must be stressed that Calvin did not endorse individualism or private judgement but 
merely a form of communal servitude resembling state socialism (Durant, 1957, p. 475).  
40 We can again see my point of a shifting or moving away from authoritative coercion and 
identification with the religious bourgeoisie to an ‘independent’ freeing of thought. 
41 The reader may note that this shares similarity with deregulation seen in the 20th century by 
neo-liberal policies instigated by Reagan, Thatcher and Clinton.   
42 “Whose realm, his religion.” 
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the empire should make war against another on religious grounds and that this peace should 
remain operative until the churches were peacefully reunited…The same freedom was 
furthermore extended to Lutheran knights and to towns and other communities that had for 
some time been practicing their religion in the lands of ecclesiastical princes of the empire” 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2014). 
It would seem therefore that with the substantial speed at which the reformation took 
hold led to massive restructuring of the power hubs of Europe caused by reactionary princes 
to their own angry and subjectively liberated citizens. With the rapid increase of this 
collective transgression from the Catholic tertiary master, the Protestants with their newly 
found taste for revolution began to question the very conceptualization of nature, which 
Catholicism dominated, resulting in an enormous alteration in education. What essentially 
occurred was a huge rupture by the European population in adherence to the Presignifying 
regime therefore leaving a new void that had to be filled.       
 According to Becker and Woßmann in their work ‘Was Weber Wrong? A Human 
Capital Theory of Protestant Economic History’ (2009), Weber was right in asserting that the 
‘work ethic’ played a key role in economic development, but that it was the rapid rise in 
education, promoted by the Lutherans and Calvinists, that really had the most dramatic effect.  
In their empirical study on 452 countries, the first of its kind, Becker and Woßmann 
identified that protestant workers earned considerably more than their Catholic counterparts 
(Becker; Sascha & Ludger Woßmann, 2009, p. 535-537). By promoting education, Luther 
gave the growing Protestant population of Europe a substantial advantage in economic 
affairs: “Our findings from nineteenth-century Prussia reveal that the Protestant Reformation 
had very long-lived economic consequences, spanning several centuries. Protestantism led to 
substantially higher literacy, which in turn led to economic progress. The link between 
cultural factors and economic development, although clearly present, may thus work quite 
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differently from what is generally assumed, in ways going beyond the Weber thesis” (Ibid, 
p.582). 
 From this research we can adopt the argument that the effect of the reformation was in 
setting up a critical and specific ‘work ethic’ whose consequences generated an increase in 
literacy and therefore economic growth.43 For example, in 1900 countries that had a majority 
of Protestants had universal literacy compared to majority Catholic countries that never 
reached full literacy (Markussen, 1990). With that being said the Weber’s terms ‘rational’, 
and ‘free labor’ can be understood in a specific light: the enhancement of self-determination 
and critical skills generated via education.  
 
 
Figure 3: Reterritorialization  
                                                          
43 This theory has now been identified as the ‘Human Capital Theory of Protestant 
Reformation’ (Becker; Sascha O., Ludger Woßmann, 2010). 
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The Continuation of Deterritorialization – The Postsignifying Prophets 
Despite the enforcement of the new Protestant signifying regime, even with its brutal 
repression, the taste of revolution was still very raw. With the shifting political and economic 
freedom starting with the ‘Peace of Augsburg’ (1555), the rate of productivity began to vary 
in accordance with each country’s specific valued commodities.44 With the rise in education 
and rate of literacy, the European period between 1555 and 1648 saw what Weber called a 
‘disenchantment’ of nature: “Only ascetic Protestantism completely eliminated magic and the 
supernatural quest for salvation, of which the highest form was intellectualist, contemplative 
illumination. It alone created the religious motivations for seeking salvation primarily 
through immersion in one’s worldly vocation (Beruf). This Protestant stress upon the 
methodically rationalized fulfillment of one’s vocational responsibility was diametrically 
opposite to Hinduism’s strongly traditionalistic concept of vocations. For the various popular 
religions of Asia, in contrast to ascetic Protestantism, the world remained a great enchanted 
garden, in which the practical way to orient oneself, or to find security in this world or the 
next, was to revere or coerce the spirits and seek salvation through ritualistic, idolatrous, or 
sacramental procedures” (Weber, 1965 [1920], p. 269-270).  
According to Peter Harrison within his work ‘The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise 
of Natural Science’ (1998), natural allegory, viewing the lamb as Jesus, the burning bush as 
God’s energy, the snake as the devil etc., presented a problem of defining a universal 
meaning and because church dogma expressed a ‘particular’ answer, the protestants in their 
refusal of accepting these interpretations opted for universal literalism. This therefore allowed 
the further removal of the Presignifying regime from nature and the beginnings of a natural 
                                                          




philosophy: “The Bible – its contents, the controversies it generated, its varying fortunes as 
an authority, and most importantly the new way in which it was read by Protestants – played 
a central role in the emergence of natural science in the seventeenth century” (Harrison, 2009 
[1998], p. 1).    
 This removal of the Presignifying regime, exposed an interpretive gap of the world. 
External reality could no longer be viewed anthropomorphically, objects such as a tree, rock 
or mountain were viewed in a purely objective manner as ‘in-themselves’, and essentially 
everything could be reduced to a facticity: “Nature, stripped of qualities, becomes the chaotic 
stuff of mere classification, and the all-powerful self becomes a mere having, an abstract 
identity” (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002 [1944], p. 6).      
Luther didn’t realise that his insistence on literacy not only led to growth in education, 
but also a dramatic increase in cognitive ability: “Protestant reformers not only emphasized 
education based on reading the bible but also recognized that education was instrumental to 
the goals to live in a civil society and to be successful in a more material sense” (Boppart, 
Falkinger and Grossmann, 2010, p. 17).  
 It is considerably definitive that this rise in Protestant thinking was an enormous 
variable in the birth of the scientific revolution. Notable works included Vesalius’s ‘On the 
Fabric of the Human Body’ (1543), Copernicus’s ‘On the Revolutions of the Heavenly 
Spheres’ (1543), Kepler’s ‘The Cosmological Mystery’ (1596), Galileo’s ‘Starry Messenger’ 
(1610) and Newton’s ‘Principia Mathematica’ (1687). However, what is important to note is 
that Luther quite violently disliked the removal of holy interpretation, as seen with his 
response to Copernicus’s ‘On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres’ (1543) whereby he 
stated that he was “…the fool who wanted to overturn the science of astronomy” (Luther as 
cited in Daneziz, Manimanis and Theodossiou, 2010, p. 189). It seems therefore that Luther 
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didn’t fully comprehend the consequences of his actions or as Durant & Durant (1961, p. 
613) state: “The Protestant Reformation achieved more than it desired”.   
 Protestantism created a deterritorialization of the masses, but also wealth, and laid the 
framework for a more liberal and dispersed economy; essentially religion, like government, 
was synonyms with the economy and with the reformation this began to separate: “The 
dazzling flowering of natural science during the 16th and 17th centuries resulted from the 
disintegration of the feudal economy, the development of merchant capital, of international 
maritime relations and of heavy (mining and metallurgical) industry” (Grossmann and 
Hessen, 2009, p. 44). 
 The majority of the demos quickly succumbed to this newly established signifying 
regime. However, there were those that continued along the passional line of flight taking it 
so far that perhaps even the most extreme Protestants wouldn’t dare follow. One such person 
was Giordano Bruno (1548 – 1600).  
 If Luther represented the active delusion and betrayer of Catholicism, Bruno would be 
the supreme madman of not only Calvinism but religiosity in general and I believe shows just 
how much momentum emancipated desire had gained from the reformation. Bruno was 
exceedingly well read and became very perplexed with obscure theological issues such as 
‘Why are there three people within one God?’ and ‘How can a priest turn wine into the blood 
of Christ?’ which made him very hostile to the teachings of Aquinas and Scholasticism 
(Durant & Durant, 1961, p. 616). In 1572 he became a priest, but this did not last long as he 
fled the monastery only 4 years later and went wondering for 16 years before settling in 
Geneva in a Calvinist citadel. However, again, Bruno got into trouble for pointing out 20 
errors in a lecture given by a Calvinist theologian (Ibid, p. 617).  
 Bruno moved to Oxford University and lectured in 1583 on Copernicus’s planetary 
Thistlethwaite: 93 
 
systems (Ibid, p. 618). During his time in England he published numerous works with some 
of the most dangerous and daring including ‘Of the Infinite Universe and the Worlds’ (1584) 
and ‘Of Magic’ (1590). Many of his works completely satirised religious belief and according 
to Durant and Durant (1961, p. 621) “His final [active] delusion was his hope that if he 
returned to Italy and should be questioned by the Inquisition, he could (as well he might) 
quote enough orthodox passages from his works to deceive the Church into thinking him her 
loving son.”45 
Of course there were other Deleuzian ‘Prophets’ against the Presignifying and 
postsignifying regimes. These included the Anabaptists Anneken Hendriks (1571), and Jacob 
Hutter (1536), the Bible translator John Rogers (1555) and the Spanish Renaissance 
Humanist Michael Servetus (1553) who were all burned at the stake. Essentially, these 
‘prophets’ were different than the Deleuzian ‘Priests’ as they were simply not afraid of 
transcending the faciality of the dominant signifying regime – in other words they simply 
“…ceased being afraid of becoming mad [a pariah]” (Deleuze, 2000 [1971], p. 131).   
 A decade after the execution of Giordano Bruno in 1600, Galileo Galilei 
demonstrated for the first time the empirical truth behind his claims via his telescope, thus 
ushering in the scientific revolution. However the grapple that Protestantism had on society 
and public discord was still very much apparent across Europe and it was the demand for 
greater industry, propagated by war that led to further substantial development in scientific 
                                                          
45 Bruno was convicted of heresy and burned at the stake on the 17th February 1600. At his 
trial he stated to the inquisitors “It is with far greater fear that you pronounce, than I receive, 





According to Boris Hessen in his work ‘The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s 
Principia’ (2009) problems arising with technological advancement during the 1600’s, with 
such things as mining, shipping, transport etc., were deemed too challenging with the 
prevailing universities that still held a religious affiliation and that the demand for solutions 
could only be found with a new ‘bourgeoisie thinking’ that removed even further 
Presignifying Catholicism: “The development of the productive forces in the age of merchant 
capital presented science with a number of practical tasks and urgently demanded their 
solution. Official science, based in the mediaeval universities, not only made no attempt to 
solve these problems, but actively opposed the development of the natural sciences. In the 
15th to the 17th centuries the universities were the scientific centres of feudalism. They were 
not only the bearers of feudal traditions, but the active defenders of those traditions” 
(Grossmann and Hessen, 2009, p. 53). 
This mechanical imperative backed with the desire to persevere and become 
victorious through the expansion of empire, meant that those who had greater technology 
would have the upper hand and therefore succeed. From understanding the individual 
components of mechanical constructs, from the leaps and benefits of inventions such as the 
microscope, innovations in telescope design and many more including the steam turbine, led 
to a ‘new method’ using vigorous systems of inquiry.   
The sheer explosion of discontent generated from the reformation led not only to the 
reestablishment of societal repression, by the postsignifying regime, but a newly found taste 
for self-emancipation: “…despite its original intolerance, the Reformation rendered two 
services to the Enlightenment: it broke the authority of dogma [Presignifying regime of 
Catholicism], generated a hundred sects that would formerly have died at the stake, and 
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allowed among them such virile debate that reason was finally recognized as the bar before 
which all sects had to plead their cause unless they were armed with irresistible physical 
force. In that pleading, that attack and defense, all sects were weakened, all dogmas; and a 
century after Luther's exaltation of faith, Francis Bacon [1561-1626] proclaimed that 
knowledge is power” (Durant, 1957, p. 939).    
Descartes: The First Aufklärer – Logos becomes Nomos 
The ‘Great Doubter’ René Descartes (1596-1650) has been identified as the founder 
of Cartesian philosophy. His cultural world was one whereby science began to demonstrate 
its power, however the Presignifying regime was still readily available to punish heresy and 
arguably led Descartes to live a life of voluntary exile within Holland’s mainly protestant 
population.46 Indeed, Descartes writings were condemned by not only the Catholic Church, 
but Calvinists as well (Heilbron, 1982, p. 27-28). However, after all the religious turmoil 
during the 17th century had exhausted itself, the new scientific regime felt a lot more 
welcome in Protestant countries (Jones, 2012, p. 27). Descartes most famous statement, 
Cogito ergo sum, elaborated in his first published work ‘Discourse on the Method of Rightly 
Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences’ (1637), was the result of a 
radical proposition: in order to grasp truth, or to find truth, we must begin by doubting 
everything we believe (Descartes, 1975 [1637], p. 6).    
Descartes seems to be the first philosopher to apply Galileo’s method of scientific 
skepticism to psychological phenomena (Kirkieboen, 1998). I believe this new way of 
                                                          
46 There is no need to cover all of Descartes work indeed that would require a substantial 
amount of stamina and time. However I will demonstrate that his Cartesian mode of thinking 
presents one of the epistemological foundations of the Aufklärer.  
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materialistic conception represented the first of yet another signifying regime: Protestant 
rationalism. To explain further, the reductionism of Descartes method reaches a curious 
point, the Logos, and then stops. Is it possible that Descartes was merely channeling the purge 
of Catholic ‘objects’, such that his philosophy was merely a form of protestant asceticism? 
This is highly likely, as Hans Lassen Martensen (1808-1884) pointed out in 1837 that 
“Descartes said: cogito ergo sum and de omnibus dubitandum est. He thereby produced the 
principle for modern Protestant subjectivity” (Martensen, 1837 as cited in Stewart, 2007, p. 
245). However, one thing is definitely certain, Descartes approach was to purge the mind of 
empirical sense objects, objects that could have literally been placed there by the devil 
(Descartes, 1984 [1637] p. 17) and that “…the mere fact that I found that all my previous 
beliefs were in some sense open to doubt was enough to turn my absolutely confident belief 
in their truth into the supposition that they were wholly false” (Ibid, p. 41). Could it not be 
that the doubt created in the protestant reformation had an indirect effect on Descartes 
meditations? That is to say, the dissolution of the Presignifying regime of the Catholic 
Church and the eradication of its signifiers within the new signifying regime was similar to 
Descartes own self-doubt?      
The general consequence of Descartes theory is that doubt reaches a point at which it 
cannot go further because it is ‘self-evident’, and this ‘evidence’ is substantial enough to 
cease further investigation and therefore claim it true. However, this has numerous problems 
and was addressed by numerous later philosophers including Kierkegaard (1985 [1844] p. 38-
42 & 2009 [1846], p. 265-266). For him, Descartes is a “woeful professional figure” 
(Kierkegaard, 2009 [1846], p. 266) who merely constructs a tautology that is simply a system 
of pure thought only: “Foolishness, foolishness, it is not a question here of your self or my 
self but of the pure I’. But this pure I can hardly have any other than a purely thought – yes, 
existence. So what is the sense of the inferential form? There is no conclusion, for the 
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proposition is a tautology” (Ibid, p. 265). Descartes is simply a man that demands certainty; 
an abstract thinker who will suffer “…allegation[s] of ethics against him” (Ibid, p. 266).    
Grimsley (1966, p. 36) clarifies by pointing out that “…Kierkegaard thinks Descartes 
may ultimately be seen to have had a bad influence on the development of modern 
philosophy.” The reason why is that many later philosophers, I would also include Leibnitz 
and Kant here, simply molded their own philosophies upon the Logos which is simply 
ideality or protestant rationalism - a construct simply antithetical to true autonomy, or at least 
its fantasy: “For an abstract thinker to try to prove that he is there through the fact that he 
thinks is a curious contradiction, because as much as he thinks abstractly he abstracts 
correspondingly precisely from his being there. True, his being there becomes to that extent 
clear to him as a presupposition from which he wants to detach himself, but the abstraction 
itself becomes an odd sort of proof of his being there, precisely because if it were completely 
successful his being there would cease” (Kierkegaard, 2009 [1846], p. 265).   
This problem was also addressed by Nietzsche: “"There is thinking: therefore there is 
something that thinks": this is the upshot of all Descartes' argumentation. But that means 
positing as "true a priori" our belief in the concept of substance that when there is thought 
there has to be something "that thinks" is simply a formulation of our grammatical custom 
that adds a doer to every deed. In short, this is not merely the substantiation of a fact but a 
logical-metaphysical postulate- Along the lines followed by Descartes one does not come 
upon something absolutely certain but only upon the fact of a very strong belief. 
If one reduces the proposition to "There is thinking, therefore there are thoughts," one has 
produced a mere tautology: and precisely that which is in question, the "reality of thought," is 
not touched upon-that is, in this form the "apparent reality" of thought cannot be denied. But 
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what Descartes desired was that thought should have, not an apparent reality, but a reality in 
itself” (Nietzsche, 1968 [1901, 484], p. 268).  
 
Essentially the problem Kierkegaard and Nietzsche point out is that there exists a 
contradiction, a tautology of thinking as well as huge negative consequences on ethics that 
Descartes theory presents. Descartes general philosophy can be presented as such: 
 
 
Figure 4: Descartes Tautology 
What I am addressing here is that the Cartesian philosophy merely represents the 
limits of the imaginary, not the whole apparatus of the psyche or subject. As Lacan argues 
that real thinking does not take place in the imaginary: “What I give you is this, in its 
broadest formula. I really have to take the view that thought exists at the most radical level, 
and already conditions at least a vast part of what we know as the human animal. What is 
thought? The answer does not lie at the level [Imaginary] where they take the view that its 
essence is being self-transparent and knowing that it is thought” (Lacan, 2008 [1967], p. 107). 
What Descartes set up was an ontological landscape whereby the skeptical doubting, 
governed and introduced by the specific scientific stance of materialistic conceptualisation, 
could now be applied to the ‘object’ of the mind. In other words, Descartes self-criticism and 
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purge of empirical objects only leads him to the Logos, which he cannot pass. As Galileo 
looked through his telescope and identified an objective point, so Descartes looked inward 
and found an objective barrier. 
This new epistemology, of viewing the mind in a strictly mechanistic way had an 
enormous effect on the development of the Enlightenment. That is to say that if my body and 
senses could be doubted, what about the teachings of the bible? What about the very 
existence of God: “To Bruno and Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, Pascal and Bayle, Holbach 
and Helvetius, Voltaire and Hume, Leibniz and Kant, it was no longer a question of 
Catholicism versus Protestantism, it was a question of Christianity itself, of doubts and 
denials rising about the dearest fundamentals of the ancient creed. The thinkers of Europe -
the vanguard of the European mind-were no longer discussing the authority of the pope; they 
were debating the existence of God” (Durant & Durant, 1961, p. 613).  
 




 The subject could now be defined as this something = X i.e. the Cogito, although this 
only represents, at best, the object of the fantasy of autonomy. The Cogito is essentially a 
dead or passive object that rejects the notion of the subject as a “pure becoming” (Deleuze & 
Parnet, 2007 [1977], p. ix). As mentioned in chapter 1, this object is continuously 
“…subverted by the empirical” (Lacan, 2009 [1957], p. 183) whereby any 
scientific/rationalistic conception “…exclude[s] all ‘subjectivism’” (Ibid, p. 182).  
This Cogito is simply a mask of the void that pops out of nowhere as Žižek argues: 
“Paradoxical as it may sound, ex nihilo is a radically materialist notion […] This is creatio ex 
nihilo, when the body, this surplus-object, pops up ‘out of nowhere’. What emerges ex nihilo 
are the ‘immaterial’ pure semblances (whose first philosophical formulation is the Stoic 
theory of immaterial events, phantasmata) which conceal nothing, which are nothing but 
masks of the Void” (Žižek, 2011, p. 177-178). In other words, Descartes struggles to explain 
the origin of this Cogito and misrecognises it as a seat of agency which doesn’t exist in the 
first place. 
It is this realm of the Cogito that is of importance here, as I believe it to constitute the 
foundation of the metaphysics of the protestant ascetic. It is constructing a space of pure duty; 
an eradication of the empirical and the establishment of a mechanistic and standardising 
system. It is a place where the subject does not hear the voice of reason, as Kant would have 
it, but a barren wasteland of absolute eerie silence, an ethically passive territory. It is this 
same realm that Kant would make use of when constructing his categorical imperative, a 
realm of pure reason, although this would later turn out to be simply language itself. That is 
to say “reason is language” (Hamann, 1955 – 1975d, p. 177).  
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Figure 6: The Nomos of Protestant Rationalism 
The Enlightenment 
Pinpointing the beginning of the age of Enlightenment has been the subject of 
considerable debate, however I believe for arguments sake we can adopt the position that it 
was Galileo’s publication of the ‘Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems’ 
(1632). This single work led to the first formal investigation by the inquisition and eventual 
imprisonment of Galileo until his death in 1642.47 The work proved to be immensely popular 
and controversial, stunning scientists and the aristocracy: “The reading of the Dialogue 
stunned men of science, not only Galileo’s closest followers and not only in Italy. A scene of 
fervent excitement, amazement and rapture dawned. It was immediately clear that this was a 
revolution. ‘This is new light on ancient truths, of new worlds, new stars, new systems, new 
nations… it is the beginning of a new age,’ cried Campanella with his usual impulsive élan. 
                                                          
47 It is interesting to explore the contrast between Bruno’s investigation and Galileo’s. 
Perhaps if Galileo published this work a mere 32 years before the sentence would have been 
much more serious.  
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‘May He who guides all make haste. We for our own small part will follow. Amen’” 
(Bonechi, 2008, p. 85).  
 Before 1641 literature relied heavily on Christian dogma coated with such 
philosophies from Thomas More, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Michel de Montaigne 
demonstrating considerable restraint on critiquing the church, and for very good reasons: the 
potential execution for blasphemy. Indeed the genius that Montaigne and Machiavelli in their 
works demonstrated were very careful, restrained and elegant arguments that were still highly 
critical of religion with such works as ‘Essais’ (1580), and ‘The Prince’ (1532) respectfully. 
Strangely enough Montaigne within his Essais specifically his section ‘That a Man Ought 
Soberly to Meddle with Judging of Divine Lawes’ says “It suffiseth a Christian to beleeve 
that all things come from God, to receive them from his divine and inscrutable wisdome with 
thanksgiving, and in what manner soever they are sent him, to take them in good part. But I 
utterly disalow a common custome amongst us, which is to ground and establish our religion 
upon the prosperitie of our interprises. Our beleefe hath other sufficient foundations, and 
need not be authorized by events” (Montaigne, 2005 [1580], p. 205). 
Additionally Machiavelli was critical of religion such that he believed it a human 
creation, and could be utilised to keep people under control of the given prince (Machiavelli, 
2009 [1532] p. 40-42). According to Leo Strauss in his work ‘Thoughts on Machiavelli’ 
(1995): “Machiavelli is justly notorious or famous for the extraordinary boldness with which 
he attacked generally accepted opinions. He has received less than justice for the remarkable 
restraint which he exercised at the same time” (Strauss, 1995, p. 32). 
Before 1641 philosophers were critical of religion and did begin to insist on 
individual reason – however these were measurably more reserved then their successors as 
Jonathan Israel mentions: “It was a civilization in which almost no one challenged the 
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essentials of Christianity or the basic premises of what was taken to be a divinely ordained 
system of aristocracy, monarchy, land-ownership, and ecclesiastical authority. By contrast, 
after 1650, a general process of rationalization and secularization set in which rapidly 
overthrew theology’s age-old hegemony in the world of study, slowly but surely eradicated 
magic and belief in the supernatural from Europe’s intellectual culture, and led a few openly 
to challenge everything inherited from the past-not just commonly received assumptions 
about mankind, society, politics, and the cosmos but also the veracity of the Bible and the 
Christian faith or indeed any faith” (Israel, 2001, p. 18-19).  
However, it was before 1650 that I believe was the start of this rationalization and 
eventual secular development. Back in 1637 it was Descartes’ who explored the problem of 
skepticism outlined by previous thinkers including Michel de Montaigne in a brand new way: 
adopting absolute criticism and doubt to metaphysical matters.   
Paradoxically for Immanuel Kant in his essay ‘An answer to the question: What is 
Enlightenment’ (1784) – The term Sapere Aude was to be embraced whole-heartedly as a 
romantic notion to express one’s will, even if it meant going against reason. However Kant’s 
argument essentially called for a move into maturity by thinking for oneself, going against 
the dogma of scripture or imposed instruction and that this embraced on mass could be 
considered the age of Enlightenment. 
 Although Kant does maintain that a higher degree of freedom would be beneficial to 
intellectual pursuits, eventually what happens is that this movement sets up barriers against 
freedom itself. Reason expounded upon reason leads to eventual irrational outcomes, and 
therefore I believe Kant was perhaps the first to identify the tyranny of collective reason: “A 
high degree of civil freedom seems advantageous to a people's intellectual freedom, yet it 
also sets up insuperable barriers to it. Conversely, a lesser degree of civil freedom gives 
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intellectual freedom enough room to expand to its fullest extent” (Kant, 1784, p. 63).   
Conclusion 
 The sheer explosive momentum by which the protestant reformation took hold of 
Europe is still felt today. Before 1517 there was widespread discontent within the Demos, 
however this changed rapidly once Luther sanctified this with his Ninety Five Theses. Most 
of Europe then went through a very violent period marked by Catholic counteractions and 
religious wars that lasted from 1524 to 1648 despite the Peace of Augsburg in 1555.  
 The taste for revolution was widespread and only became settled once a new 
Protestant regime was able to regulate the chaotic processes of unleashed desire. This new 
regime was arguably even more repressive than before as punishment was laid against even 
minor transgressions. However, the sense of performing ones duty coupled with enormous 
changes in literacy, urbanisation and technology provided the intellectual space for 
metaphysical criticism and doubt culminating with Descartes Cogito ergo sum, the 
beginnings of a new protestant subjectivity.  
 This new regime of Protestant rationalism was seized upon by later philosophers 
including Spinoza (1632 – 1677), Leibniz (1646 – 1716) and Kant (1724 – 1804). However, 
radical their ideas were, were only priests in the Deluzeian sense as they merely acted in 
accordance with the prevailing regime. That is to say they merely channelled the prevailing 
and developing Nomos and acted as its bureaucrat. However, what was to come next was 
perhaps one of the greatest and profound periods in the history of philosophy, namely 
Romanticism, that would revolutionize the concept of the subject and construct a regime that 





Chapter 3: Romanticism 
Introduction 
“Rise up, thou monstrous ant-hill on the plain 
Of a too busy world!” 
(Wordsworth, 2015 [1850], p. 158) 
The rapid development of the Protestant Rationalist regime revolutionized Europe. 
Technology, science and commerce grew at tremendous speed and led to a new economic 
landscape whereby workers became standardized under the newly developed ‘Factory 
System’ that did not properly exist before the 19th century (Durant & Durant, 1965, p. 52-53). 
Workers were stripped of their individuality, their artisan occupations, and simply became 
working “hands” (Ibid).48  
The general Ethos of the time, its manners and customs, were very diverse. 
Prostitution was rife, especially in London, where the number reached around 50,000. 
However, they were generally given severe punishments (Ibid, p.63). Intoxication was also 
big business, whereby the average male Londoner consumed 100 gallons of beer per year 
(Ibid, p. 66). Slavery was in full swing; the government would literally be a hub for bribery 
(Ibid, p. 67-68) and general manners, including speech, was very crass and blasphemous 
amongst the lower classes. However, this was a lot more restrained in the coffee houses (Ibid, 
p. 79). 
                                                          




Religion was dying out at astonishing speed across Europe and was slowly being 
replaced with Protestant Rationalism whereby science and reason would act as its 
replacement. This reached a peak in 1793 with the terrors of France that aimed to purge 
society from priests and nobles whereby “…at least 300,000 suspects were arrested; 17,000 
were officially executed, and perhaps 10,000 died in prison or without trial” (Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 2017) within the space of two years.  
This new religion, science, challenged everything and set in motion a radical change 
of morality such that it overturned previously established religious values: “How could the 
soul or mind of man be immortal when it seemed so dependent upon the nerves and other 
tissues visibly doomed to decay? What must happen to the religion so challenged by a 
science daily growing in scope, achievements, and prestige? And what must happen to a 
civilization based upon a moral code based upon that religion?” (Durant & Durant, 1965, p. 
585). Except for Voltaire, the prevailing philosophy was one concerned with a full assault 
against theocracy and an attempt to set up a new system of morality.49 
Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) claimed that even atheists could be moral in his ‘Historical 
and Critical Dictionary’ back in 1702 by stating “…that fear and the love of Divinity are not 
always the most active principles motivating the actions of men. [And] Their [Atheists] 
sobriety, chastity, probity, contempt of wealth, zeal for the public well-being, their desire to 
be of service to their neighbour, did not proceed from their love of God, and did not tend to 
honour and glorify him. They themselves were the origin and the object of their behaviour: 
                                                          
49 These philosophers included Helvétius, d’Holbach, Turgot, Mably, d’Alembert and 
perhaps the most well-known Denis Diderot who once claimed that man will never be free 




l’amour-propre [love of self] was its foundation and the term is self-explanatory” (Bayle, 
2000 [1702], p. 313).  
The prevailing philosophers also despised individualism and thought that patriotism 
and nationalism were corrupt forces that “…narrowed the conceptions of humanity and moral 
obligations” (Durant & Durant, 1965, p. 779). However, within the prevailing Protestant 
Rationalist regime lay hidden a movement that would throw many of these tenets into 
complete disarray.   
 To address the Romantic Movement has been the bane of many academics, writers 
and artists. It is infamous for being immensely complicated, if not impossible to define. 
Professor Northrop Frye, according to Isaiah Berlin (2000 [1965], p. 1), spent an large 
portion of his life on the subject and insisted that when anyone attempts a generalization, 
even along the lines, for example, that it was a reaction to the Industrial Revolution, or that it 
was a new attitude toward nature, will find themselves faced with a ‘romantic’ that 
counteracts such a claim. The Italian art and literature critic Mario Praz within his most 
famous work ‘The Romantic Agony’ (1933) indicated that to even define the term is to treat 
shadows as if they were solid substance (Praz, 1970 [1933], p. 1). The Belgian literary critic 
Paul de Man noted: “From its inception, the history of romanticism has been one of battles, 
polemics, and misunderstandings: personal misunderstandings between the poets themselves; 
between the poets, critics, and the public; between the successive generations” (de Man, 
1993, p. 4). 
Henri Ellenberger’s truly colossal work ‘The Discovery of the Unconscious: The 
History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry’ (1970) lists six characteristics of the Romantic 
period that include a deep feeling toward nature, a focus on nature’s “fundament” or attempt 
to penetrate the soul over the intellect, a preoccupation with the feeling of “becoming” 
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contrary to the Enlightenment standpoint of an eternal non-changing entity (reason), a 
retranslation and integrative approach to cultures and nations, a new approach to history such 
that each historical period (apart from the Enlightenment) was conjured in a new way by 
attempting to grasp their spirit and finally, and arguably the most important, a strong 
emphasis on the individual (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 200 - 201): “Romanticism produced its 
ideal type of Man. Its main features were an extreme sensitiveness enabling Man to “feel 
into” Nature and the “feel with” other men, a rich inner life, belief in the power of inspiration, 
intuition, and spontaneity, and the importance ascribed to emotional life” (Ibid, p. 202).  
There are literally hundreds of interpretations of what Romanticism is and it is very 
difficult to really pinpoint what the movement truly represented, however I believe simply the 
best work on the subject is the short work ‘Roots of Romanticism’ (2000 [1965]) based on 
Isaiah Berlin’s A. W. Mellon Lectures held at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, DC 
in 1965. This is not only because he covered enormous ground, but with his passionate use of 
language that really expresses well and transports the reader into the real ‘feel’ of what it 
meant to be a romantic. Here is where he gives a brilliant and passionate explanation of what 
Romanticism was: “Science is submission, science is being guided by the nature of things, 
scrupulous regard for what there is, non-deviation from the facts, understanding, knowledge, 
adaptation. The opposite of this, which is what the romantic movement proclaimed, may be 
summarized under two heads. One of these will by now be familiar, namely the notion of the 
indomitable will: not knowledge of values [Logos], but their creation, is what men achieve. 
You create values, you create goals, you create ends, and in the end you create your own 
vision of the universe, exactly as artists create works of art – and before the artists has created 
a work of art, it does not exist, it is not anywhere…The most central aspect of this view is 
that your universe is as you choose to make it, to some degree at any rate; that is the 
philosophy of Fichte, that is to some extent the philosophy of Schelling, that is the insight, 
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indeed, in our own century even of such psychologists as Freud, who maintain that the 
universe of people possessed by one set of illusions or fantasies will be different from the 
universe of those possessed by another. 
The second proposition – connected with the first – is that there is no structure of 
things. There is no pattern to which you must adapt yourself [Nomos]. There is only, if not 
the flow, the endless self-creativity of the universe [Eros]. The universe must not be 
conceived of as a set of facts, as a pattern of events, as a collection of lumps in space, three-
dimensional entities bound together by certain unbreakable relations, as taught to us by 
physics, chemistry and other natural sciences; the universe is a process of perpetual forward 
self-thrusting, perpetual self-creation, which can be conceived of either as hostile to man, as 
by Schopenhauer or even to some extent by Nietzsche, so that it will overthrow all human 
efforts to check it, to organize it, to feel at home in it, to make oneself some kind of cosy 
pattern in which one can rest […] To ignore this, to evade it, to attempt to see things as 
submissive to some kind of intellectualisation, some sort of plan, to attempt to draw up a set 
of rules, or a set of laws, or a formula, is a form of self-indulgence, and in the end suicidal 
stupidity. That at any rate is the sermon of the romantics” (Berlin, 2000 [1965], p. 119-120). 
Nowhere else have I found such a richly felt and passionate description of the 
Romantics. However, what’s important here is the astonishing similarity between the 
philosophy of Romanticism and the tenets of psychoanalysis, especially the focus on the 
‘Will’ over the ‘Intellect’, one could say the symbolic over the imaginary, as well as the 
insistence of the individual rather than the standardizing view toward human nature that was 
inherent within the Enlightenment vis-à-vis the established Protestant Rationalism.     
When the Romantic Movement began is also a controversial topic. Berlin stressed that 
it was within the German philosophy of the second third of the eighteenth century (Berlin, 
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2000 [1965], p. 6), Praz argues that the term can be traced all the way back to the latter half 
of the seventeenth century with Pepys (Praz, 1970 [1933], p. 12-13), then of course we have 
the French Revolution, the works of Rousseau, the reactions of English intellectuals such as 
Blake and Wordsworth toward the Industrial Revolution; it can also be argued that it began 
with the liberating factors of the Enlightenment such as its insistence of individual 
transgression of authoritative control demonstrated by Kant’s ‘What is Enlightenment’ 
(1784).  
However, I believe and share in the opinion expressed by Kenneth Clark and Herbert 
Read, that romanticism is a permanent state of mind that is always within human nature even 
if it may be hidden, suppressed or dormant (Berlin, 2000 [1965], p. 5). Indeed, romantic 
thinking can be traced to the ancient writings of Longinus (Gairdner, 1999, p. 78). 
Romanticism, I suggest, is human expression par excellence, it is our innate unbound and 
spontaneous subjective attitude toward the universe. A rejection of Descartes cogito ergo sum 
and an insistence of volo ergo sum. The Romantics attempted to transcend the boundary of 
Logos whereby originality, not similarity, was the dictum of the day. An age of prophets in 
the Deleuzian sense – a resurgence of Eros in the arts, philosophy and even science.50 An 
obsession with subjective emancipation from the then perceived chains of thought. 
According to Bertrand Russell in his work ‘A History of Western Philosophy’ (1945), 
Romanticism eventually ended in complete anarchy primarily because total or extreme 
form/expression of subjectivity essentially developed into a form of madness. However, 
Russell also protests that the opposite, an extreme form of objectivity, is also a form of 
madness: “Scientific technique requires the co-operation of a large number of individuals 
organized under a single direction. Its tendency, therefore, is against anarchism and even 
                                                          
50 See Goethe’s ‘Theory of Colours’ (Goethe, 2006 [1810]).  
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individualism, since it demands a well-knit social structure. Unlike religion, it is ethically 
neutral: it assures men that they can perform wonders, but does not tell them what wonders to 
perform. In this way it is incomplete […] The philosophies that have been inspired by 
scientific technique are power philosophies, and tend to regard everything non-human as 
mere raw material. Ends are no longer considered; only the skilfulness of the process is 
valued. This also is a form of madness. It is, in our day, the most dangerous form, and the one 
against which a sane philosophy should provide an antidote” (Russell, 2015 [1945], p. 494).51   
What we essentially have here is a great divide with subjectivity and individuality 
(Romanticism) on one side, and objectivity and sociability on the other (Enlightenment), 
between faith and reason, between art and science, the list goes on… Indeed the Polish 
philosopher Leszek Kołakowski had some very interesting remarks on this issue, essentially 
stating that a society based on reason and science will eventually become standardized based 
on an ‘ultimate equation’, whereas a society based on extreme subjectivity will be based on 
an ‘ultimate poem’ (Kołakowski, 1982, p. 230-231).52  
Kołakowski’s ‘Tanner Lectures on Human Values’, specifically ‘The Death of Utopia 
Reconsidered’ (1982), is an important work to consider. Within this work Kołakowski argues 
that essentially a utopia is impossible, even one based on reason or total expressionism can 
never satisfy human needs as they are always changeable. We can create a standard model for 
wolves, he argues, because they have limited and very well defined needs; however human 
                                                          
51 As mentioned in Chapter 2 these madness’s of reason and passion are the blindness’s seen 
with Stesichorus and Protagoras respectfully.    
52 The Psychoanalyst Paul Verhaeghe, that we will cover later, argues that both of these 
‘types’ of society have a representative pathology whereby we have hysteria (Romanticism) 
and Obsessional Neurosis (Rationalists) (Verhaeghe, 2014, p. 72).   
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needs are immeasurably complex and have no boundaries (Kołakowski, 1982, p. 238). This is 
expressed well within Dostoyevsky’s short novel ‘Notes from Underground’ (1864) whereby 
the protagonist offers his view on human nature: “…even if it were really the case that man 
turned out to be a piano key and if this were to be proven to him even by the natural sciences 
and mathematics – even then he wouldn’t see reason but would deliberately do something to 
contradict this, out of sheer ingratitude, just to have things his own way” (Dostoyevsky, 2009 
[1864], p. 28). 
According to the above quote, one essential characteristic of human beings is their 
spitefulness – literally our innate urge not to be pigeonholed, to deliberately go ‘against the 
grain’ in order to retain our sense, or fantasy, of individuality. During the regime of 
Protestant Rationalism grand scale attempts were made to normalize individuals, to be moral 
through the teachings of reason and in doing so become a conformist member of enlightened 
society. To shut oneself away from this was to be unhealthy, morally suspect, a rebel and an 
outcast. The latter I believe was radicalized during Romanticism and for that reason I believe 
it to be a much more accurate description of human nature primarily because it fully 
embraces the negating negativity of the ‘I’.      
To do equal justice for the figures of the Romantic Movement would be a colossal 
undertaking indeed. We not only have the English poetic titans - Wordsworth, Blake, Shelly, 
Byron, Coleridge and Keats, to name a few, but also the giants from Germany: Goethe, 
Herder, Fichte, Schlegel and Schelling. Each and every name mentioned is immeasurably 
unique and indeed many volumes have been written in studying just one of them. However, 
each one does share a similar philosophy that we can crudely label them with: an astonishing 
radicalization of expression and imagination, a deep and introspective criticism of Logos and 
a new found attachment and appreciation of nature and man’s relation to it. Furthermore, 
Romanticism had complete disdain and utter contempt of concrete metaphysics – more 
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specifically the Aristotelian insistence of observable materialism, a unique reactionary and 
revolutionary spirit, magical and spiritual introspective curiosity and a resurgence of Eros.    
This section will explore the works of three romantics: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Johann Hamann. Rousseau’s first major work ‘The First 
Discourse’ (1750) will be seen as a point of subjectification, in the Deleuzeian sense, as a 
major critique on the standardizing nature of Protestant Rationalism. That is to say, Rousseau 
set in motion the romantic critique of Nomos, which was essentially an attempt to transcend 
the Logos, resulting in an enormous creative output characteristic of the Romantic Ethos. 
Thus, the fantasy of autonomy was once again given ‘flight’. 
Coleridge’s ‘Biographia Literaria’ (1817) will be used to emphasize the importance of 
imagination in its relation to conscience and the fantasy of individual autonomy. This will be 
used as an overlay to Sagan’s work ‘Freud, Women and Morality’ (1988) whereby the reader 
will see that the relation with the mother provides the foundation of fantasy and thus 
conscience. 
Finally, the section will examine two works of Hamann namely his ‘Socratic 
Memorabilia’ (1759) and ‘Metacritique’ (1800) published posthumously. The reader will see 
how the Socratic dictum of ignorance acts as a severely damaging notion to the tenets of 
Protestant Rationalism as well as how Kant, and the Aufklärer, were merely contemporary 
sophists such that they misused language. That is to say, their epistemological foundations 






Rousseau: The Epiphany and First Discourse (1750) 
In Vincennes in 1749, the Franco-Swiss philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, after 
visiting his friend Denis Diderot in prison, lay down after a long walk in the summer heat and 
delved into the journal ‘Mercure de France’.53 Upon doing so he stumbled on an 
announcement of a prize by the Academy of Dijon for the best essay to the following 
question “Whether the restoration of the sciences and arts has contributed to purify morals”. 
After contemplating for a while on a potential answer, Rousseau was struck and completely 
overwhelmed by an idea and later said “I beheld a different universe and became a different 
man” (Damrosch, 2005, p. 212). He broke down into tears and his heart pounded. He had 
thought he discovered a new and profound concept and quickly scribbled down a phrase by 
Fabricius, a man denouncing the modern world and shouting “Madmen, what have you 
done!?” (Ibid, p. 212). 
In 1762 he wrote the following to a friend of his experience: “All at once I felt myself 
dazzled by a thousand sparkling lights. Crowds of vivid ideas thronged into my mind with a 
force and confusion that threw me into unspeakable agitation; I felt my head whirling in a 
giddiness like that of intoxication. A violent palpitation oppressed me. Unable to walk for 
difficulty in breathing, I sank down under one of the trees by the road, and passed half an 
hour there in such a condition of excitement that when I rose I saw that the front of my 
waistcoat was all wet with tears. . . . Ah, if ever I could have written a quarter of what I saw 
and felt under that tree, with what clarity I should have brought out all the contradictions of 
our social system! With what simplicity I should have demonstrated that man is by nature 
                                                          
53 Rousseau and Diderot eventually became passionate enemies. There was also the infamous 
and fascinating quarrel between David Hume and Rousseau which became quite well known 
and publicised throughout Western Europe. 
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good, and that only our institutions have made him bad!” (Rousseau as cited in Durant & 
Durant, 1967, p. 19).    
This ‘moment’ would later be called the illumination of Vincennes and it is in this 
very moment that I believe the Romantic condition was fully realized. I believe this to be a 
unique event, because it represents not only a purely theoretical alteration but also a radical 
psychical restructuring. To explain further, Romanticism, I suggest, is a ‘lived’ experience, 
not a purely cognitive one as with the Enlightenment – it is identification with the will not the 
faculties of reason. It is felt, experienced as an overwhelming feeling of Eros in the Freudian 
sense, catharsis to the point of almost transcending definition, a “pure becoming” (Deleuze & 
Parnet, 2007 [1977], p. ix).54 
In true romantic spirit, Rousseau said that the cause of his illumination was the logical 
outcome of traveling down a road whereby he became more and more alienated with his 
century and contemporaries and “…little by little I detached my heart from the society of 
men” (Rousseau as cited in Damrosch, 2005, p. 214).  
Rousseau set to work on his essay back in Paris, which eventually won him first prize. 
This short essay, that came to be known as the ‘First Discourse’ or otherwise known as 
‘Discourse on the Sciences and Arts’ (1750), was to have an enormous impact and made 
Rousseau famous overnight. Even though it was very common to criticize the prevailing 
corruption inherent in French society, this paper was surprisingly different and unique as 
                                                          
54 As I mentioned before, I believe the Romantic dimension to be continuously present even 
though suppressed. It is a lived experience, because it cannot be defined or allocated as a 
cognitive faculty. Indeed, to do so would go against the very sermon of the Romantics as 
expressed by Berlin.   
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Rousseau gravely disassembled Enlightenment thinking from within. Indeed, the work 
generated quite a controversy not only due to its message but also because of the motto he 
attributed to the work ‘Barbarus hic ego sum quia non intelligor illis’ and, instead of placing 
his name on the cover he proudly put ‘By a Citizen of Geneva’ which outraged those who 
embraced the Enlightenment doctrine of a disdain for patriotism (Ibid, p. 216).55 The work 
attacked the notion that society had become standardized through customs that on the surface 
seemed progressive, even moral, and yet only masked the deeper more powerful forces of 
human nature such that man is imprisoned within this societal framework: “We no longer 
dare seem what we really are, but lie under a perpetual restraint; in the meantime the herd of 
men, which we call society, all act under the same circumstances exactly alike, unless very 
particular and powerful motives prevent them” (Rousseau, 1923b [1750], p. 132). 
Rousseau goes on to protest that the Socratic dictum in the importance of ignorance 
had not been adhered to and had become inverted, such that if Socrates was brought from 
antiquity to the present day, late 18th century, he would not have been attacked for corrupting 
the minds of the youth, but mocked for being a ‘lesser’ thinker who has committed heresy by 
not fully accepting that the holy tool of reason, logic and science, radicalized during the 
Enlightenment, is the sole unquestionable arbiter and authority of knowledge.56 “The less we 
know, the more we think we know. The peripatetics doubted of nothing. Did not Descartes 
construct the universe with cubes and vortices? And is there in all Europe one single physicist 
                                                          
55 ‘In this place I am a barbarian, because men do not understand me.’ 
56 As we shall see later, this argument of using Socrates as a key figure of disassembling 
Enlightenment thinking was radically embraced by Hamann in his ‘Metacritique’ (1800) 
whereby he critiqued Kant’s concept of reason.   
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who does not boldly explain the inexplicable mysteries of electricity, which will, perhaps, be 
for ever the despair of real philosophers?” (Rousseau, 1923b [1750], p. 141). 
What I am trying to demonstrate here is that Rousseau did not necessarily attack 
science per se, but emphasized that individuals must be very careful of its repercussions on 
the social sphere of life and that the Demos had not yet realized that they essentially have 
become imprisoned and institutionalized in a society of their own creation. 
Rousseau had enormous influence later in life. With his famous opening lines to his 
magnum opus ‘The Social Contract’ (1762) that “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in 
chains.” (Rousseau, 1923a [1762], p. 5), he became immortalized as one of the first post 
Enlightenment thinkers. Rousseau was one of the first to realise that the regime of Protestant 
Rationalism carried with it a skewed and perverted set of virtues. Essentially, manners and 
customs had become artificial and had lost their original natural character: “Sincere 
friendship, real esteem, and perfect confidence are banished from among men. Jealousy, 
suspicion, fear, coldness, reserve, hate and fraud lie constantly concealed under that uniform 
and deceitful veil of politeness; that boasted candour and urbanity, for which we are indebted 
to the light and leading of this age… Ignorance is held in contempt; but a dangerous 
scepticism has succeeded it” (Rousseau, 1923b [1750], p. 133). 
With the slow eradication of religiosity throughout Europe and the establishment of 
the Protestant Rationalist regime, the Demos faced a problem: the consequences of 
slaughtering one faith, Catholicism, upon the altar of truth, and replacing it with a new one, 
science. This of course was addressed by Nietzsche in the ‘Gay Science’ (2001 [1882]): “We 
see that science, too, rests on a faith; there is simply no 'presuppositionless' science […] … it 
is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests - that even we knowers of 
today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by the 
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thousand-year old faith, the Christian faith which was also Plato's faith, that God is truth; that 
truth is divine ... But what if this were to become more and more difficult to believe, if 
nothing more were to turn out to be divine except error, blindness, the lie - if God himself 
were to turn out to be our longest lie?” (Nietzsche, 2001 [1882, 344], p. 200-201). What 
Rousseau raged against, I think, were the new systems of morality that were generated in 
response to what would be called much later as existential despair. In order to clarify this I 
would like to briefly outline the theological dispute that Sartre had with Dostoyevsky’s novel 
‘The Brothers Karamazov’ (1880). 
Dostoyevsky is widely misquoted as saying that ‘If God doesn’t exist, everything is 
permissible’. The actual quote is quite long and it is absurd to accredit it to the beliefs of 
Dostoyevsky himself. That is to say, the quote within the work comes from Ivan 
Karamazov’s hallucination of the devil: “I maintain that nothing need be destroyed, that we 
only need to destroy the idea of God in man, that's how we have to set to work” 
(Dostoyevsky, 1950 [1880], p. 788). The devil then gives an extensive encomium on the 
benefits of constructing a godless world: “Oh, blind race of men who have no understanding! 
As soon as men have all of them denied God […] Men will unite to take, from life all it can 
give, but only for joy and happiness in the present world. Man will be lifted up with a spirit 
of divine Titanic pride and the man-god will appear. From hour to hour extending his 
conquest of nature infinitely by his will and his science, man will feel such lofty joy from 
hour to hour in doing it that it will make up for all his old dreams of the joys of heaven […] 
In that sense, 'all things are lawful' for him. What's more, even if this period never comes to 
pass, since there is anyway no God and no immortality, the new man may well become the 
man-god, even if he is the only one in the whole world, and promoted to his new position, he 
may lightheartedly overstep all the barriers of the old morality of the old slave-man, if 
necessary […] He is so in love with truth…” (Ibid, p. 788-790).  
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It is the statement that ‘all things are lawful for him’ that is important here. Sartre 
obviously read this section very closely and provided a counteraction within his 
‘Existentialism is a Humanism’ (1946). For Sartre, the notion that everything would become 
legal without god is misplaced and actually the reverse is true: everything would become 
prohibited. Sartre argues that the suppression of religiosity during the eighteenth century 
opened up a gap that was being filled with an attempt to objectify the essence of man and, by 
doing so, construct a new objective system of morality: “In the philosophic atheism of the 
eighteenth century, the notion of God is suppressed, but not, for all that, the idea that essence 
is prior to existence; something of that idea we still find everywhere, in Diderot, in Voltaire 
and even in Kant […] In Kant, this universality goes so far that the wild man of the woods, 
man in the state of nature and the bourgeois are all contained in the same definition and have 
the same fundamental qualities” (Sartre, 2005 [1946]). This new system of universality I 
argue is the Logos itself, but only a specific interpretation of it vis-à-vis a Protestant 
Rationalistic one.  
What existentialism argues is that essentially, if one removes god, one cannot rely on 
anything except one’s own responsibility. That is to say that to justify ones actions one could 
no longer rely or lean against religiosity but a terrifying abyss: “Thus, the first effect of 
existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire 
responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders. And, when we say that man 
is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own 
individuality, but that he is responsible for all men” (Sartre, 2005 [1946]). When Rousseau 
states that we “…lie under a perpetual restraint” (Rousseau, 1923b [1750], p. 132) I think he 
is essentially targeting this new prevailing system of morality that is causing existential 
despair, which Sartre argues is “…that we limit ourselves to a reliance upon that which is 
within our wills, or within the sum of the probabilities which render our action feasible” 
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(Sartre, 2005 [1946]).57         
Rousseau’s ‘First Discourse’ (1750) was, primarily, a critique on the repressive nature 
of rationalistic Nomos to society whereby, believing that the world had become too 
standardized, sparked the fuse for further radical criticism of the prevailing Ethos. To clarify, 
Rousseau’s ‘First Discourse’ (1750) was a point of subjectification, similar to Luther’s 
‘Ninety Five Theses’ (1517) whereby the discourse attacked the prevailing signified regime 
of Protestant Rationalism, similar to the attack by Luther against Catholicism. However, 
Rousseau’s discourse would be much more radical in the sense that its target was the process 
of interpellation itself.   
 
Figure 1: Rousseau’s Critique  
                                                          
57 It must be stressed that Psychoanalysis is not a humanism. Psychoanalysis does not accept 
that the individual has agency i.e. responsibility. It is merely a fantasy and that what the 
subject deems as autonomy is but a representation of the desire of the Other.  
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Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality (1755) 
Rousseau argues that a society based on self-interest eventually leads to massive 
inequality. Rousseau suggests that, as a population grows in size, people tend to discuss 
certain values, beliefs and virtues via a form of comparison. When this happens, a system of 
meritocracy is born as specific attributes are judged and valued as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, leading to 
a society of selfishness and pride. This, over time, leads to a civilization based on the 
estimation of others, economic inequality and a specific political organization such that the 
ultimate Rousseaunian original sin consists in this meritocratic world view: “Each one began 
to consider the rest, and to wish to be considered in turn; and thus a value came to be attached 
to public esteem. Whoever sang or danced best, whoever was the handsomest, the strongest, 
the most dexterous, or the most eloquent, came to be of most consideration ; and this was the 
first step towards inequality, and at the same time towards vice” (Rousseau, 1923c [1755], p. 
212-213). 
What Rousseau wanted to address was that man is essentially good and that the 
prevailing Nomos had corrupted, and imprisoned, our inherent moral nature. Rousseau 
discovered that the Demos were simply prisoners chained to a wall of which they were not 
even aware, as they had become psychically institutionalized.58 Rousseau ‘beheld a different 
universe’, away from the doxa of Protestant Rationalism, therefore also adopting a 
deterritorialization: “So long as government and law provide for the security and well-being 
of men in their common life, the arts, literature and the sciences, less despotic though perhaps 
more powerful, fling garlands of flowers over the chains which weigh them down. They stifle 
in men’s breasts that sense of original liberty, for which they seem to have been born; cause 
                                                          
58 This is exactly why Rousseau at the very beginning of his first discourse quotes Horace 
“Decipimur specie recti” translated as “We are deceived by the appearance of right”. 
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them to love their own slavery, and so make of them what is called a civilised people” 
(Rousseau, 1923b [1750], p. 130-131).  
The Romantic Stance toward Urban Life 
The Romantic viewpoint towards urban life we now know was quite varied. The 
feeling included outright hatred as demonstrated by William Wordsworth’s ‘The Prelude’ 
(1798), specifically book seven ‘Residence in London’, a passionate critique where he speaks 
of everyone being strangers to one another, including neighbors who do not know each 
other’s name, as well as a ‘Dimming of the Stars’ in London’s night sky (Wordsworth, 2015 
[1798], p. 158). There is also William Blake’s ‘London’ (1794) whereby he says the 
following:  
 
“I wander thro' each charter'd street, 
Near where the charter'd Thames does flow. 
And mark in every face I meet 
Marks of weakness, marks of woe. 
 
In every cry of every Man, 
In every Infants cry of fear, 
In every voice: in every ban, 
The mind-forg'd manacles I hear.” 




However, other Romantics including the English poet Leigh Hunt (1784 – 1859), 
believed that the city represented an amazing mix of the modern and ancient, whereby both 
truly manifested themselves (Dart, 2008, p. 5). The Romantics also had a fascination with 
Gothic Architecture and one cannot forget the famous saying by Samuel Johnson (1709 – 
1784) that a man tired of London is tired of life. Indeed, what’s interesting is that Johnson 
preferred Fleet Street to a rural landscape (Russell, 2015 [1945], p. 678)! 
What is important to note is that even though there was considerable variability in the 
Romantic view toward urban life, their focus on the will and imagination was paramount. 
That is to say that the Romantics despised standardization. They sort originality and creativity 
in everything, including buildings.  
The Romantic Sermon on the Importance of Imagination & Childhood 
For the Romantics, the imagination was akin to a godlike function. Imagination to the 
romantic poets, Blake especially, is contrasted by reason or more suitably rationalism. This is 
clearly seen within Blake’s work ‘Milton’ (1804) whereby he accuses Bacon, Newton and 










“Who creeps into state government like a caterpiller to destroy,  
To cast off the idiot questioner who is always questioning,  
But never capable of answering, who sits with a sly grin  
Silent plotting when to question like a thief in a cave:  
Who publishes doubt & calls it knowledge: whose science is despair:  
Whose pretence to knowledge is envy: whose whole science is  
To destroy the wisdom of ages to gratify ravenous envy,  
That rages round him like a wolf day & night without rest.  
He smiles with condescension: he talks of benevolence & virtue:  
And those who act with benevolence & virtue they murder time on time.  
These are the destroyers of Jerusalem, those are the murderers 
 Of Jesus, who deny the faith & mock at eternal life:  
Who pretend to poetry that they may destroy imagination,  
By imitation of nature’s images drawn from remembrance.”  
(Blake, 1907 [1804], p. 45) 
 
Blake calls for war in the preface to ‘Milton’ against “…these dark Satanic Mills” 
(Blake, 1907 [1804], p. xix) by calling forth divine weapons: “Bring me my Bow of burning 
gold: Bring me my Arrows of desire: Bring me my Spear: O clouds unfold! Bring me my 
Chariot of fire” (Ibid). Blake also disliked Voltaire, Rousseau, Hume and Gibbon for trying 
to construct a “Natural Religion” (Ibid, p. 44) which will only create tearful children who will 
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“…be annihilated in thy annihilation” (Ibid). Another, and arguably one of the most famous 
romantic rebuttals, was seen within Keats ‘Lamia’ (1820): 
 
“Do not all charms fly 
At the mere touch of cold philosophy? 
Ther was an awful rainbow once in heaven: 
We know her woof, her texture; she is given 
In the dull catalogue of common things. 
Philosophy will clip an Angel’s wings, 
Conquer all mysteries by rule and line, 
Empty the haunted air, and gnomed mine – 
Unweave a rainbow” 
(Keats, 2012 [1820], p. 24) 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari (2000 [1972]) romanticism offers glimpses of what it really 
means to “…scale the wall” (Ibid, p. 132). That is to say, the romantics attempted to peer 
through the gaps of Logos and engage, attempt and utilise the creative power of Eros. In order 





Figure 2: Turner’s Transition 
From left to right: Fisherman at Sea (1796), The Harbour of Brest (1826-1828) and Snow 
Storm (1842). 
 
Turner goes through three distinct phases. The first, on the left, is clearly identifiable 
with strict and clear lines. The second resembles the works of Claude Lorrain (1600 – 1682), 
awash in light that seems to have been made through “delirious reconstruction” (Ibid). 
However, it is the last phase whereby Turner seems to escape form altogether, has 
transgressed into pure creativity whereby “Everything becomes mixed and confused, and it is 
here the breakthrough – not the breakdown – occurs” (Ibid).   
This transgression was also seen in music. The fourth movement to Beethoven’s 29th 
piano sonata (1818), known as the Hammerklavier, is considered one of the most technically 
challenging works in classical music. The work is essentially a huge fugue, a highly strict and 
rule bound form, and in the final movement of the Hammerklavier, Beethoven literally 
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pushes it to such an extreme that it almost disintegrates off the page. In one point he even 
turns his theme backwards, otherwise known as a cancrizan (DeVoto, 2017). For Adorno 
(2002 [1937]) Beethoven’s final works represent the extremes of both subjectivity and 
objectivity. To clarify, much of Beethoven’s work is of furious fragmentation, that is to say 
the destruction of musical conventions. Beethoven does not try to transcend form, the Logos, 
resulting in an incomprehensible mess, but simply to break it and create it anew (Ibid, p. 
565): “…the very late Beethoven is called both subjective and objective. Objective is the 
fractured landscape, subjective the light in which – alone – it glows into life. He does not 
bring about their harmonious synthesis. As the power of dissociation, he tears them apart in 
time, in order, perhaps, to preserve them for the eternal. In the history of art late works are the 
catastrophes” (Ibid, p. 567).      
 The Romantics literally tried to make their dreams a reality. I do not mean this as a 
sentimental statement, but that they quite literally tried to become mad by attempting to 
eradicate as many conventions as possible. The Logos for them was a grotesque hindrance, a 
barrier to pure creative freedom. It is also here where Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772 – 1834) 
would express his ideas about the imagination.  
Coleridge’s Imagination 
 Coleridge agrees with Aristotle, specifically his De Memoria, that ideas obey four 
fundamental laws of association that include connection in time and space, interdependence, 
likeness and contrast. However, Coleridge adds his own, ‘causation’ (Coleridge, 1971 [1817], 
p. 59). For Coleridge these processes are merely passive activities of the mind that act 
according to what he calls fancy: “It is the universal law of the passive fancy and mechanical 
memory; that which supplies to all other faculties their objects, to all thought the elements of 
its materials” (Ibid, p. 60). It is possible that Coleridge would consider this passive 
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mechanical construct the Logos and he did plan to write a treatise on the Logosophia but was 
never done (Ibid, 149). 
 This term, fancy, for Coleridge, fixes and defines. It is “…no other than the mode of 
memory emancipated from the order of time and space; and blended with, and modified by 
that empirical phaenomenon of the will which we express by the word choice” (Ibid, p. 167). 
Fancy is radically different from imagination because its characteristics are dead, whereas 
imagination is alive. It is the workings of a machine, it is the cogs and bolts that work from 
“…the law of association” (Ibid). I would consider the doubt of Descartes a process of fancy 
inasmuch as he simply drags and doubts all empirical phenomena into the Logos. However, 
this fancy is radically different than the imagination.     
 For Coleridge there exists two separate but intimately linked forms of imagination, 
primary and secondary. For him, primary imagination is the living force, one could say Eros, 
behind all human perception which provides the fuel for the expression of the fantasy of 
autonomy in the imaginary axis: “The primary imagination I hold to be the living power and 
prime agent of all human perception, and as a representation in the finite mind of the eternal 
act of creation in the infinite I AM” (Ibid).  
Secondary imagination is an offshoot of primary imagination or what Coleridge says 
is an “…echo of the former” (Ibid) that utilises primary imagination to dissolve and 
destabilise in order to recreate. Its method is to break down ‘objects’ into parts in order to 
rebuild and create anew and that this is what creative genius and poets do. Coleridge invented 
his own special term for this process, esemplastic, which essentially means “…to shape into 
one” (Ibid, p. 91). To help clarify, what the late Turner and Beethoven did was a practical 
example of utilising esemplastic imagination. They broke the rules, put everything into flux 
and then simply rebuilt it through their own fantasy of subjectivity. Arguably, those I call the 
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Aufklärer, do not use this process and simply abstract the world very similar to Descartes: 
“We only fancy that we act from rational resolves, or prudent motives, or from impulses of 
anger, love or generosity. In all these cases the real agent is a something – nothing – every – 
thing, which does all of which we know, and knows nothing of all that itself does” (Ibid, p. 
70).  
The world of the Aufklärer for Coleridge, even though he does not use this term, is 
one that is fundamentally crippled and tautological: 
 
“Some who deem themselves most free, 
When they within this gross and visible sphere 
Chain down the winged thought, scoffing ascent, 
Proud in their meanness; and themselves they cheat 
With noisy emptiness of learned phrase, 
Their subtle fluids, impacts, essences, 
Self-working tools, uncaus’d effects, and all 
Those blind omniscients, those almighty slaves, 
Untenanting creation of its God!” 




Figure 3: The Subject of Coleridge and Descartes 
The image above may help the reader understand the radical difference of thought 
between the Romantics and the Aufklärer. The Romantics were obsessed with the notion of 
the will such that the subject, even though a fantasy, was in a permanent process of 
becoming. The subject for them was in a constant creative flux that could not be pinned down 
through abstraction. The Aufklärer “Chain down the winged thought, scoffing ascent…” 
(Ibid). They form the “…mind-forg'd manacles” (Blake, 2001 [1794], p. 40) and “…clip an 
Angel’s wings [And] Conquer all mysteries by rule and line” (Keats, 2012 [1820], p. 24). 
They prefer to fix objects, including the empirical ‘I’, and isolate it in a realm of universality 
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without space or time i.e. the Logos.59 Thus, for the Romantics, childhood was a magical 
realm where the imagination really manifested itself. The Aufklärer on the other hand were 
primarily concerned with maturity and order whereby they “…completely eliminated magic 
and the supernatural quest for salvation, of which the highest form was intellectualist, 
contemplative illumination” (Weber, 1965 [1920], p. 269-270).    
According to Duncan Wu (2001, p. 277), Charles Lamb (1775 – 1834) was one such 
romantic, as well as Wordsworth, who viewed the movement into adulthood as a decline. 
Within Lamb’s work ‘Elia’ (1823) Lamb criticises the ‘Caledonian’ view of human cognition 
as too concrete and immoveable, whereby, according to Wu (2001, p. 278), Lamb is actually 
referring to the philosophy of Locke: “He [Locke] has no faltering’s of self-suspicion. 
Surmises, guesses, misgivings, half-intuitions, semi-consciousness, partial illuminations, dim 
instincts, embryo conceptions, have no place in his brain, or vocabulary […] Is he orthodox – 
he has no doubts […] Between the affirmative and the negative there is no border-land with 
him. You cannot hover with him upon the confines of truth, or wander in the maze of a 
probable argument. He always keeps the path. You cannot make excursions with him – for he 
sets you right” (Lamb, 1892 [1823], p. 123).   
Lamb criticises the world for being too mature and that the world had suppressed the 
beauty, imagination and innocence of childhood. The materialist world espoused by the 
Enlightenment/Protestant Rationalist regime forced people to become ‘mature’ but through 
cruel, artificial, abstracted and materialistic means that imprisoned the human imagination 
and creative component. Childhood for Lamb enshrouds the world in imagination, mystery, 
life and beauty which reason tears away: “Fantastic forms, whither are ye fled? Or, if the like 
                                                          
59 As the Italian romantic poet Giacomo Leopardi also stated “Freedom is the dream you 
dream, while putting thought in chains again” (Leopardi, 1997 [1845], p. 77) 
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of you exist, why exist they no more for me? Ye inexplicable, half-understood appearances, 
why comes in reason to tear away the preternatural mist, bright or gloomy, that enshrouded 
you? Why make ye so sorry a figure in my relation, who made up to me – to my childish eyes 
– the mythology of the Temple? In those days I saw Gods, as “old men covered with a 
mantle,” walking upon the earth. Let the dreams of classic idolatry perish, - extinct be the 
fairies and fairy trumpery of legendary fabling, - in the heart of childhood, there will, for 
ever, spring up a well of innocent or wholesome superstition – the seeds of exaggeration will 
be busy there, and vital – from every-day forms educing the unknown and the uncommon. In 
that little Goshen there will be light, when the grown world flounders about in the darkness of 
sense and materiality. While childhood, and while dreams, reducing childhood, shall be left, 
imagination shall not have spread her holy wings totally to fly the earth” (Ibid, p. 184-185). 
For Locke, the mind is passive and knowledge is achieved by the traces of sensation, 
whereby reflection became the mind’s ability to merely perceive an operation (Wu, 2001, p. 
36). For Locke, the human mind was a collection of historical sense impressions that can be 
manipulated through society via a type of cultural transmission and it was this that Rousseau 
was so horrified by because it destroyed and corrupted the natural essence of mankind. What 
must be stressed, is that I am not suggesting that adults should become children again, but 
that the creative force of Eros had been supressed and that children acted as the best possible 
exemplar of how it can be more fully expressed. As Norman Brown puts it in his seminal 
work ‘Life Against Death’ (1959): “Infantilism, however glorified, is no solution” (Brown, 
1959, p. 39).  
 Rousseau, I think, simply attacked the role of the superego and its relation to 
interpellation. That is to say he was attacking the Protestant Rationalistic Nomos that was 
confining the individual subject: “By reason alone, independent of conscience, no natural law 
can be established…the entire right of nature is only a chimera if it is not founded on a 
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natural need in the human heart” (Rousseau, 1979 [1762], p. 235). 
 The Romantics were obsessed with the power of childhood and, I think, utilized the 
genius that Charles Baudelaire indicated in his 1863 work ‘The Painter of Modern Life?’ 
“…Reason has taken up a considerable position; with the other, Sensibility is almost the 
whole being. But genius is nothing more nor less than childhood recovered at will – a 
childhood now equipped for self-expression with manhood’s capacities and a power of 
analysis which enables it to order the mass of raw material which it has involuntarily 
accumulated” (Baudelaire, 1995 [1863], p. 8).   
The Romantics as Subjects of Conscience 
“I conjure you all to look into your hearts, and to hearken to the secret voice of conscience”  
(Rousseau, 1923a [1762], p. 162). 
“I am husht until our city be a-fire, and then I’ll speak a little.” 
(Shakespeare, 1922 [1608] p. 208)  
 The above quotation is from Volumnia, the mother of Coriolanus, and is the last thing 
she says to him before he submits to her and ceases the attack on Rome. It is here whereby 
she beckons the conscience of her son by indicating that, if he were to continue to submit to 
the commands of the second and tertiary master, he will set Rome alight with rage only to be 
met with crippling guilt manifested by the memory of his mother’s foretelling.  
 The concept of conscience is quite ambiguous and contradictory within the 
psychoanalytic literature. Freud in ‘The Ego and the Id’ (2010 [1923]) equates it with the 
super-ego: “The superego retains the character of the father, while the more intense the 
Oedipus complex was and the more rapidly it succumbed to repression (under the influence 
of discipline, religious teaching, schooling and reading), the more exacting later on is the 
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domination of the super-ego over the ego-in the form of conscience or perhaps of an 
unconscious sense of guilt” (Freud, 2010 [1923], p. 40). However, Freud revised the notion 
of guilt, remorse and conscience within ‘Civilization and its Discontents’ (2002 [1930]): 
“One should not speak of conscience until the super-ego can be shown to exist. As for the 
sense of guilt, one has to admit that it predates the super-ego, and therefore the conscience” 
(Freud, 2002 [1930], p. 73).  
 Freud argues that guilt arises primarily through the outcome of a conflict between the 
desire to be loved by the external authority, what I call the primary master, and the drives, 
whereby if the subject submits to the latter will face remorse caused by a lack of love from 
the primary master: “Remorse is a general term for the reaction of the ego in cases that 
involve a sense of guilt; it contains, in largely unaltered form, the emotional material of the 
anxiety that is at work behind the sense of guilt. It is itself a punishment and may involve the 
need for punishment. Thus it too may pre-date conscience” (Ibid).     
Eli Sagan’s seminal, but widely neglected, work ‘Freud, Women and Morality: The 
Psychology of Good and Evil’ (1988) argues that conscience develops separately from the 
superego and should rightly be viewed as such. For Sagan, Rousseau “…found it necessary to 
attack the grip of reason on Western philosophy […] [And] obviously would have found the 
superego, whose primary function is the repression of desire, a monstrous moral faculty” 
(Sagan, 1988, p. 146). Sagan’s primary thesis is against the orthodox viewpoint that 
conscience is a part of a relation with the ego and ego-ideal, part of the superego, and that 
conscience is an identification with the primary nurturer, primary master, and develops pre-
oedipally. The development of conscience therefore predates the development of the 
superego otherwise it would never be able to compete against it: “…conscience, unlike the 
superego, does not have to wait until the child’s fourth or fifth year to make its presence felt. 
Conscience has its origins in the basic nurturing situation, and identification with the nurturer 
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[primary master] plays an essential role in its composition […] conscience, not the superego, 
is the essential element in moral social progress […Therefore…] Conscience and Eros 
contribute a crucial portion to those forces that drive history” (Sagan, 1988, p. 14-15).  
 In order to demonstrate his theory, Sagan uses Mark Twain’s work the ‘Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn’ (1884). Sagan focuses on the relationship between Huck, a young teenage 
boy, who befriends a black slave called Jim. What is important is that Huck does not obey the 
commandments of his superego, to hand Jim back to the authorities, but succumbs to 
conscience whereby he suffers guilt at what he deems to be an immoral activity when, 
ironically, is actually moral: “Huck’s response neatly demonstrates Freud’s concept that 
when people do something at variance with what their superego dictates, they will feel guilty 
and expect to be punished. Huck does feel guilty about helping Jim escape. His actions can be 
accurately described as feeling guilty about behaving morally” (Ibid, p. 18).  
 How is it that this power, conscience, can override the superego, even when at odds 
toward the tertiary and secondary masters? For Sagan, Twain, in very similar light to 
Rousseau’s belief that man is essentially good, argues that the superego is deeply linked with 
culture vis-à-vis the tertiary master and therefore holds many conflicting values: “Twain, who 
created Huck’s dilemma, despised “civilization” as much as did Huckleberry and liked to 
believe that only an individual living outside the boundaries of an unprincipled society could 
act morally […] [However] This is a romanticized view that ignores the fact that the very 
moral values Twain wishes to live by are themselves endorsed, even though in a hypocritical 
way, within the value system of the culture” (Ibid, p. 22). To clarify, superego functions are 
very much tied to the prevailing Nomos. That is to say that if Twain wrote a similar story in 
ancient Greece, slavery wouldn’t be considered immoral at all. As Sagan states that “The 
moral destiny of human beings is revealed, ultimately, through historical process” (Ibid, p. 
23) what is deemed moral in one century is different in another. However, Sagan insists that 
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there is still a distinct separate capacity, conscience, which is different than the superego such 
that the former is linked to system of morality whereas the latter is linked to values. 
 Sagan makes a bold claim: there are universal systems of morality: “…the concept of 
a universal human morality is valid and that the exercise of any of the three fundamental 
forms of tyranny – over women, over children, over other men – is always immoral, in any 
society, at any time in history, regardless of what the value system of the society may say in 
the attempt to rationalize it” (Ibid, p. 27).    
  For Sagan, relativism is inherently an immoral standpoint (Ibid, p. 32) because it can 
essentially rationalize away any value system and make it impossible to morally critique it. 
Sagan provides a historical overview, between 1600 -1800, and shows the gradual unfolding 
of conscience indicating a gradual development of equality. However, this process is 
massively complex and oscillates between progressive and regressive changes relating to 
dominance (Ibid, p. 37-38). The Protestant Reformation, viewed in light of the three types of 
tyranny, was fundamentally regressive toward children (Ibid, p. 40), and it was not until 
Rousseau whereby society became more progressive and who “…was one of the first 
persons, possibly even the first, to make the direct connection between children-rearing 
practices and the values of society on the whole” (Ibid, p. 41).  
 As the superego is aligned with Nomos, it is essentially a faculty related to the 
Althusserian ISA and SA and therefore is primarily concerned with repression, tyranny and 
dominance. Conscience, on the other hand, is aligned with Eros and acts as a spontaneous 
creative component that can burst through conventions: “As tyranny and domination 
diminish, equality, mutuality, and Eros flourish” (Ibid, p. 42). One such example of this 
natural component of conscience can even be seen in animals which Rousseau outlines: “I 
need not fear contradiction in holding man to be possessed of the only natural virtue, which 
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could not be denied him by the most violent detractor of human virtue. I am speaking of 
compassion [conscience], which is a disposition suitable to creatures so weak and subject to 
so many evils as we certainly are: by so much the more universal and useful to mankind, as it 
comes before any kind of reflection; and at the same time so natural, that the very brutes 
themselves sometimes give evident proofs of it. Not to mention the tenderness of mothers for 
their offspring and the perils they encounter to save them from danger […] it is well known 
that horses show a reluctance to trample on living bodies. One animal never passes by the 
dead body of another of its species: there are even some which give their fellows a sort of 
burial; while the mournful lowings of the cattle when they enter the slaughter-house show the 
impressions made on them by the horrible spectacle which meets them” (Rousseau, 1923c 
[1755], p. 197-198). 
 Sagan also shares in this view (Sagan, 1988, p. 173) by quoting Mary Midgeley: “As 
soon as the [care of the young] became current (chiefly among birds and mammals, though 
teleost fishes and certain reptiles did some of the pioneering), it provided an excellent 
repertory of gestures that could be used to soothe anger, to beg for help, and in every way to 
oil the wheels of society…it is at this point – long before the emergence of primates – that 
nature ceases to be Hobbesian” (Midgeley, 1980, p. 333).  
 Freud seems to overlook the role of the nurturing parent in the construction of 
conscience. In his ‘New Introductory Lectures’ (1933) Freud shows that the superego is only 
a representative of the severe, punishing and frightening features of the parents: “The super-
ego seems to have made a one-sided choice and to have picked out only the parents’ 
strictness and severity, their prohibiting and punitive function, whereas their loving care 
seems not to have been taken over and maintained […] the super-ego can acquire the same 
characteristic of relentless severity even if the upbringing had been mild and kindly and had 
so far as possible avoided threats and punishments” (Freud, 2001 [1933], p. 62). As the 
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super-ego comes “…from the father-complex” (Freud, 2010 [1923], p. 66) what were his 
views toward mothers? 
 Sagan argues that Freud was extremely ambivalent when it came to women (Sagan, 
1988, p. 104-118). However, it is with the nurturing power of the pre-oedipal situation where 
conscience is developed: “… [Freud] hardly mentions or analyses the great source of a 
healthy relationship to Eros: the mother-infant dyad […] Eros is nothing more, and nothing 
less, than an abstract, symbolic, and sublimated representation of the mother who nurtured 
us” (Ibid, p. 168-169). Therefore the act of conscience is primarily linked to the desire of the 
primary master inasmuch as it supersedes the ‘Name of the Father’ or at least is able to 
rework it in times of moral crisis.  
 Conscience, moral values and the fantasy of subjectivity are all heirs of the primary 
imagination and are not based on reason or cognition which is gained from the secondary and 
tertiary masters. This notion is also present with Hume who says “Morals excite passions, and 
produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of 
morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason […] An active principle [primary 
imagination] can never be founded on an inactive [Logos]; and if reason be inactive in itself, 
it must remain so in all its shapes and appearances, whether it exerts itself in natural or moral 
subjects, whether it considers the powers of external bodies, or the actions of rational beings” 
(Hume, 1985 [1738], p. 509).  
As mentioned in chapter one, the primary master establishes the very fantasmatic 
foundations in the subject. In other words, the primary master kick starts the process of desire 
and the development of fantasy as a response to the subjects question Che Vuoi? However, 
even though the primary master is originally classed as a vehicle of death this becomes 
deeply repressed and a reciprocal alliance develops whereby the subject “…starts to return 
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love to those who love it, and it accomplishes this by the mechanism of identifying with the 
nurturer” (Sagan, 1988, p. 169). Sagan goes on to quote René Spitz (1958) on his 
observations of a child of only thirteen months whereby “There are no problems with his 
drinking milk from a cup, but when he is offered cake, noodles, etc., he is more interested in 
offering these to his mother than in eating them himself” (Spitz, 1958, p. 391).         
Winnicott’s True and False Self 
As the primary master provides the subject with an identification for the possibility of 
a healthy conscience, which can override the superego in times of moral crisis, I would now 
like to reinforce this line of enquiry with the works of Donald Winnicott (1896-1971) to show 
in greater detail the role of the primary master in establishing the spontaneous nature of Eros 
in the subject.    
In his work ‘Ego Distortion in Terms of True and False Self’ (1960), Winnicott 
argues that during early infancy the infant experiences an event that can lead to what he 
called a false self, which diminishes a true organic and creative self: “It would appear to me 
that the idea of a False Self, which is an idea which our patients give us, can be discerned in 
the early formulations of Freud. In particular I link what I divide into a True and a False Self 
with Freud’s division of the self into a part that is central and powered by the instincts (or by 
what Freud called sexuality, pregenital and genital), and a part this is turned outwards and is 
related to the world” (Winnicott, 2007 [1960], p. 140).  
Winnicott observed that the nexus of this development relied solely on the behaviour 
of the primary nurturer vis-à-vis primary master. Similar to the identification with the 
nurturer, which Sagan argues as the beginnings of conscience, Winnicott argues that this can 
develop in two ways depending on whether the child has a ‘good-enough’ or ‘not good 
enough’ mother (Ibid, p. 145-146).  
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The infant’s world is one of spontaneity and omnipotence. A ‘good-enough’ mother 
realises this and does not intervene by substituting her gesture for the infants: “The True Self 
has a spontaneity, and this has been joined up with the world’s events. The infant can now 
begin to enjoy the illusion of omnipotent creating and controlling, and then can gradually 
come to recognise the illusory element, the fact of playing and imagining” (Ibid, p. 146).60 
However, the ‘not good enough’ mother intervenes with the child’s spontaneous and creative 
activity and therefore: “This compliance on the part of the infant is the earliest stage of the 
False Self, and belongs to the mother’s inability to sense her infant’s needs” (Ibid, p. 145). 
The eventual outcome of the False Self is an illegitimate existence whereby the 
person may still be able to function, however they feel phoney and unreal. Only the True Self 
can be creative and feel real. The False Self, on the other hand, exists as if one were a 
permanent actor, or automaton, that has to obey the rules of the external world and society 
and therefore “…the False Self, however well set up, lacks something, and that something is 
the essential central element of creative originality” (Ibid, p. 152). 
However, I believe, that despite the role of the mother in the early development of the 
False Self, it is within the Oedipus complex that we see the true and brutal suppression of 
creative originality, Eros. Essentially, civilization, during the Enlightenment, had become too 
compliant under the demands of the superego, and it was Rousseau who identified this by 




                                                          




Figure 4: The Schema of Abstraction 
I think it would be helpful for the reader to summarise the key points made so far by using 
this schema: 
1. This is the moment whereby the fantasy of the subject emerges. It is Coleridge’s 
Primary Imagination which is the “…living power and prime agent of all human 
perception, and as a representation in the finite mind [Imaginary Axis] of the eternal 
act of creation in the infinite I AM” (Coleridge, 1971 [1817], p. 167). It is here 
whereby Eros rears its head and is the point whereby the symbolic and imaginary 
meet. Its movement is defined by an ascension through the Logos.  
2. This is the point of abstraction whereby the fantasy of the subject either yields to the 
demands of the superego, 2-4, or engages in an act of conscience, 2-3. It is a point of 
conflict between secondary imagination and fancy whereby the former can either 
become esemplastic i.e. brought into one via a breakthrough, or destructive i.e. 
breakdown. When engaging with fancy the subject is undergoing a process of 
repression and it is here where the subject becomes objectified in submitting to the 
demands of the superego as well as the point of interpellation. The subject in moving 
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from 2-4 adopts the role of an objectified existence vis-à-vis the false self. I would 
consider the route 2-4 the Standard Route whereby the route 2-3 is very rare and is 
present only in moments of extreme stress/moral conflict. Laing clarifies in ‘The 
Divided Self’ (1955): “‘A man without a mask’ is indeed very rare. One even doubts 
the possibility of such a man. Everyone in some measure wears a mask, and there are 
many things we do not put ourselves into fully. In ‘ordinary’ life it seems hardly 
possible for it to be otherwise […] In the ‘normal’ person a good number of his 
actions may be virtually mechanical” (Laing, 1990 [1955], p. 95). One example of the 
conflict of 2 is seen in the classic Milgram (1963) experiment on obedience to 
authority. In the experiment a participant is continuously asked by an authority figure 
to administer an electric shock to another participant, which is actually an accomplice 
of the experimenter. Many hold this experiment as an exemplar to how easy it is to 
submit to authority. However, Fromm sees things differently: “I believe that the most 
important finding of Milgram’s study is the strength of the reactions against the cruel 
behavior. To be sure, 65 per cent of the subjects could be “conditioned” to behave 
cruelly, but a reaction of indignation or horror against this sadistic behaviour was 
clearly present in most of them […] The main result of Milgram’s study seems to be 
one he does not stress: the presence of conscience in most subjects, and their pain 
when obedience made them act against their conscience” (Fromm, 1992 [1973], p. 
75).  
3. The subject here is one of four things. A poetical subject that has successfully gone 
through the process of esemplastic imagination such that they have deconstructed the 
processes of fancy and rebuilt it using secondary imagination i.e. Beethoven & 
Turner. They have adopted one of the methods of alleviating the discontent 
experienced from the external world, sublimation, as Freud argues: “Another 
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technique for avoiding suffering makes use of the displacements of the libido that are 
permitted by our psychical apparatus and lend its functioning so much flexibility. 
Here the task is to displace the aims of the drives in such a way that they cannot be 
frustrated by the external world. Sublimation of the drives plays a part in this […] the 
artists joy in creating, in fashioning forth the products of his imagination” (Freud, 
2002 [1930], p. 17).61 The second is an actively delusional subject in the Deleuzeian 
sense i.e. a prophet who breaks through Nomos and foresees a new regime. A subject 
of conscience as seen with those that defied the authority figure in Milgram’s 
experiment. They are subjects of true courage in Aristotle’s Ethics such that they act 
in a noble manner, not in excess i.e. rashness (Aristotle, 1999 [350 BC, Book 3, 7], p. 
45). And finally a subject of breakdown. The subject of breakdown can best be 
exemplified via the film ‘Falling Down’ (1993) in which the protagonist, William 
Foster, played by Michael Douglas, suffers a complete emotional breakdown, one 
could say a blowout compared to burnout, whereby he fails to achieve esemplastic 
imagination and only acts in accordance with the first characteristic of secondary 
imagination, destructiveness. Foster simply does not care about conventions anymore, 
he retains some moral action, as defined by conscience, but uses it to destroy the 
value system of society. However, the process 2-3 does not usually last long for the 
actively delusional subject and subject of breakdown, which are very similar 
inasmuch as they have “…simply ceased being afraid of becoming mad” (Deleuze, 
                                                          
61 The others are intoxication, isolation, meditation through “…the wisdom of the east” 
(Freud, 2002 [1930], p. 17), enjoyment in watching and experiencing another’s art i.e. music, 
painting etc., sexual love, mental illness and religion. Although Freud does indicate there 
could be others (Ibid, p. 19).    
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2000 [1977], p. 131). Another very good example of the subject of breakdown is seen 
with the character Arthur Edens, played by Tom Wilkinson, in ‘Michael Clayton’ 
(2007). Arthur is a brilliant lawyer who happens to also suffer from manic depression. 
A major problem occurs when he decides to build a case against his own client, a 
multibillion agricultural conglomerate, primarily due to his conscience preventing him 
from supporting a company that has killed people through a carcinogenic weed killer. 
In the opening monologue Arthur states the following: “I realised, Michael, at that 
moment, that I had emerged as I have done nearly every day for the past twenty-eight 
years of my life not through doors of Kenner, Bach & Ledeen, not through the portals 
of our huge and powerful law firm, but rather from the asshole of an organism whose 
sole function is to excrete the poison, the ammo, the defoliant, necessary for even 
larger and more dangerous organisms to destroy the miracle of humanity” (Michael 
Clayton, 2007). Sadly, Arthur is eventually murdered by the conglomerate.     
Essentially subjects of breakdown exhibit an extreme form of Protagorean belief that 
relativize truth and therefore laws, similar to the activity of the peasants after the 
reformation, the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and the riots of 1968, which is usually 
met with severe re-repression by Nomos.62     
4. This is the process of fancy whereby the subject is continuously interpellated into a 
false self. It is here where the Aufklärer “Chain down the winged thought” (Coleridge, 
1971 [1817], p. 71) by using mechanical means gained from a Protestant Rationalist 
conceptualisation of the Logos. It is marked with a decent into the Logos as opposed 
to an ascent through it as outlined in 1.  
                                                          
62 Coriolanus could also be considered a subject of breakdown due to his extreme hubris. 
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5. This is the realm of the secondary master and is utilised by the prevailing signifying 
regime, Nomos, to objectify the subject’s existence into concrete terms i.e. the Cogito. 
It is here whereby the Aufklärer, Kant specifically, attempt to construct a new system 
of morality, which in turn works in synergy with Nomos. However, this is a realm of 
passivity and can only act in the construction of values, not morality itself as Hume 
argues: “Moral distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring of reason. Reason is 
wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or 
a sense of morals” (Hume, 1985 [1738], p. 510).           
The Romantics allow us to explore a potential solution as they primarily identified with 
Eros and the creative potential of childhood that can, under certain circumstances, transcend 
the demands of the secondary and tertiary masters. However, as Sagan pointed out before, the 
idea of relativism presents a big problem: if originality, creativity, Eros and conscience are all 
given full expression wouldn’t civilization essentially cease to function? That is to say, was 
there anything that they could ground themselves in to prevent a collapse into creative 
relativism? Would the Romantics simply suffer the same fate as Protagoras in believing that 
man is the measure of all things? How could they retain cohesion and yet retain their sense of 
individuality? How were they able to differentiate “…for one person to be wise and another 
foolish?” (Plato, 1997g [386c], p. 104).   
Johann Hamann 
“Hamann’s thought is what those who do not normally think would think if they did think.” 
Jean Blum (1912, p. 47- 48) 
It was Rousseau, in his ‘First Discourse’ (1750) and ‘Discourse on Inequality’ (1755), 
who delivered one of the first scathing critiques of a society based on reason by showing the 
negative consequences of meritocracy. Within this section I would now like to take this 
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critique into the epistemological realm. That is to say, the following chapters will engage 
directly with the underlying epistemological standpoint of Protestant Rationalism. To do this, 
the section will address the work of Johann Hamann (1730 – 1788). Two major works will be 
used, namely Hamann’s ‘Socratic Memorabilia’ (1759), which according to Betz (2012, p. 
20), is arguably the greatest attack on the fundamentals of Enlightenment thought since 
Rousseau’s ‘Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts’ (1750), and Hamann’s ‘Metakritik’ 
(1800) whereby he radically disassembled Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ (1781). The 
reader will be presented with two fundamental ideas: reason as language, and how reason has 
to be constituted on faith.63 The rationale for the points being made, in relation to the 
underlying hypothesis of this paper, is to demonstrate that Enlightenment ideas present a new 
doxa, a system of knowledge that suppresses individuality and weakens the conscience, 
therefore adopting a superego imperative. 
Johann Hamann is a philosopher who is not heard much in today’s society apart from 
seldom whispers in university philosophy departments. According to Berlin (2013, p. 341) he 
was one of the first thinkers to denounce and profoundly damage Enlightenment thinking, 
even before Rousseau. Hegel (1986 [1837], p. 325) spoke of him as being a “penetrating 
genius”, Goethe as well (Betz, 2012, p. 2), and even Kierkegaard went so far to say that he 
was one of the “most brilliant minds of all time” (Kierkegaard, 1980 [1844], p. 178). Hamann 
detested the world around him, saw and profoundly critiqued the bedrock of Enlightenment 
thinking, which he believed was based on a deep illusion and, if subscribed to, led to a bleak 
world of nihilism (Betz, 2012, p. 7).  
                                                          
63 I do not accept the term faith here and I will simply supplant it with the processes of the 
symbolic i.e. the unconscious.  
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Hamann did not detest reason per se, but how it was deformed and misused by the 
Aufklärer who were nothing but “hypocritical demagogues masquerading as angels of light” 
(Ibid, p.5) and who “parade reason like a shrine through the streets, even as they attempt to 
cover up its secret poverty, limitations and nakedness” (Ibid, p. 240). Hamann’s critique, very 
similar to Rousseau’s, although much more powerful, was that the world had forgotten, or 
even ignored, the essential notion of ignorance as taught by Socrates. In order to navigate our 
world we must have ‘faith’ in that which we cannot know. Hamann’s views slightly mirrored 
those of Hume who argued that single facts cannot deduce or lead to other facts because, by 
doing so, you merely use a logical process that cannot be represented in the real world 
(Berlin, 2013 [2000], p. 352). Blind faith therefore lurks behind all logical thought, whereby 
without it we simply wouldn’t be able to function, and even “…The Attic philosopher Hume 
has need of faith if he should eat an egg and drink a glass of water” (Hamann, 1955-1975a, p. 
379). The profound mistake that is made by the Aufklärer is that they “confuse words with 
concepts and concepts with real things” (Hamann, 1955-1975b, p. 264) and that most 
problems they run into are caused primarily by a misuse of language.  
Hamann’s ‘Socratic Memorabilia’ (1759) 
“Faith cannot be communicated like merchandise” (Hamann, 1955-1975c, p. 176) 
Hamann’s ‘Socratic Memorabilia’ (1759) is mainly a work of Christian apologetics 
but also a major critique of Enlightenment thought, and an attempt to rescue his friends Kant 
& Johann Christoph Berens (1729-1792), from its monstrous ideology. Hamann was 
concerned with the Aufklärer, the modern day Sophists, and their misunderstanding of the 
Socratic imperative of ignorance. Hamann identifies himself with the character of Odysseus 
in book IX of the Odyssey called ‘In the One-Eyed Giants Cave’. Odysseus, imprisoned in 
the cave of the Cyclops (Polyphemus), offers the Cyclops wine and when intoxicated, blinds 
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him and escapes. Before this, Odysseus convinces Polyphemus that his [Odysseus] name is 
‘nobody’. Upon hearing the screams of Polyphemus, the other Cyclops arrives and asks if 
someone had tried to kill him. Polyphemus replies “nobody’ is killing me…” Hamann views 
Polyphemus as the ideology of the Enlightenment: myopic, stupid and dangerous and has 
corrupted the gullible and curious Demos. Hamann therefore attempts to ‘free’ his eaten 
comrades Kant and Berens (Betz, 2012, p. 66-67): “You lack nor eyes nor ears, which 
nonetheless do not see, do not hear; and the artificial eye you form, the artificial ear you 
plant, is like your own, blind and deaf. You must know everything, and you learn nothing; 
you must judge everything, and you understand nothing; ever learning, and never able to 
come to the knowledge of the truth […] I throw myself, like the philosopher, at the hearing 
feet of a tyrant. My gift is in nothing but the lumps by which a god, like you, once burst in 
sunder. So let them be given to a pair of your worshipers [Kant & Berens], whom I wish to 
purge with these pills from devotion to your vanity” (Hamann, 2007b [1759], p. 4-5).64   
For Hamann, the Enlightenment represented another religious cult that has its own 
practices, priests and dogma whereby its altar is reason (Hamann, 1956 – 1963, p. 63). To 
base all investigation on reason will lead to “ghostly landscapes (Descartes), insular illusions 
(Kant), and, ultimately, ontological nihilism (Heidegger)” (Betz, 2012, p. 73). What the 
Aufklärer do is collect facts, which they do diligently, and arrange it into their ‘bible’ ‘the 
                                                          
64 The ‘gifts’ here can be understood metaphorically as the wine given to Polyphemus, but 
also a section from the apocryphal book of Daniel, ‘Bel and the Dragon’ whereby the hero 
feeds a dragon cakes that makes it burst open. The hero then cries ‘see what you have been 
worshiping!’ (Betz, 2012, p. 67). I also believe that this ‘nobody’ represents the ignorance of 




Encyclopédie’, however, they do not have the slightest grasp or concept in the larger 
significance of these facts and this is why it is an innately crippled, lifeless and, most 
importantly for Hamann, a faithless ideology. Essentially they “Unweave a rainbow” (Keats, 
2012 [1820], p. 24) and allocate all empirical phenomena in “…the dull catalogue of common 
things” (Ibid) which is essentially to “…pretend to poetry that they may destroy imagination, 
by imitation of nature’s images drawn from remembrance” (Blake, 1907 [1804], p. 45).  
No teaching is more traumatic to the systemic viewpoint of Enlightenment thinking 
than the one put forward by Socrates. For Hamann, Socrates represented not a proto-
Enlightener, which the Aufklärer insisted, but a proto-Christian (Betz, 2012, p. 80). Socrates, 
for the Aufklärer, was important inasmuch as he represented critical thought par excellence. 
The falsification of the scientific method, they argue, would be considered Socratic in nature 
because its aim is to reduce claims via reduction (Socratic Method) until a certain ‘proof’ is 
reached that cannot be denied, similar to Descartes discovery of the Cogito. However, they 
go down the Socratic questioning line and then stop when its full fruition is about to be 
revealed: “The opinion of Socrates can be reduced to these harsh tones, when he said to the 
Sophists, the intellectuals of his time: I know nothing. Thus it came about that these words 
were a thorn in their eyes and a scourge on their backs. All Socrates’ intuitions, which were 
nothing but the expectorations and secretions of his ignorance, seemed as frightening to them 
as the hair on the head of the Medusa, the navel of the Aegis” (Hamann, 1949 – 1957a, p. 
73).  
 The Aufklärer deem Socrates to be a ‘Church Father’ of Enlightenment thought 
whereby his scepticism acts as one of the founding maxims of scientism. However, Hamann 
points out that his scepticism is more of a sensation than a theoretical idea and that the 
Aufklärer merely use him as providing support to their ‘skeletal’ philosophy: “The ignorance 
of Socrates was sensibility. But between sensibility and a theoretical proposition is a greater 
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difference than between a living animal and its anatomical skeleton. The ancient and modern 
skeptics may wrap themselves ever so much in the lion skin of Socratic ignorance; 
nevertheless, they betray themselves by their voices and ears. If they know nothing, why does 
the world need a learned demonstration of it?” (Hamann, 1967, p.73).65  
 Hamann was very curious about the literalism and objectivity of thought the Aufklärer 
promoted. According to Sparling (2006, p. 15), Hamann condemned them in a similar 
manner to Luther despising the mosaic lawyers whereby “…the law without spirit was but a 
dead letter” (Ibid). Hamann was fascinated by Hume’s assertion of a continual miracle of 
creation within the human subject. What Hume meant by this was the continued ‘living’ act 
of spontaneous creation at work in human comprehension and mental life; how we don’t have 
to be in a continued state of ‘thinking’ to govern our lives, but rely on the creative miracle of 
belief: “My intension then in displaying so carefully the arguments of that fantastic sect, is 
only to make the reader sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that all our reasonings 
concerning causes and effects are deriv’d from nothing but custom; and that belief is more 
properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures” (Hume, 1985 
[1738], p. 234). 
For Hamann, Socrates was a precursor to Christ because Christ represented both the 
‘immortal’ and ‘divine’ act of faith, and the ‘mortal’ and ‘objective’ existence of the material 
world. To focus too heavily on the ‘objective’ literalism of words, as the Aufklärer do, was to 
exhibit the ‘Fall’ from the Garden of Eden and a further artificial separation from God 
(Sparling, 2006, p. 20), demonstrated by the route 2-4 in figure 4.  
                                                          
65 When Hamann speaks of sensation, he is referring to “a kind of sincere and humble 
intuitive certainty born of faith” (Sparling, 2006, p. 14).   
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 The most famous quote from Hamann is that “Poetry is the mother-tongue of the 
human race” (Hamann as cited in Dickson, 1995, p. 411). Hamann was attempting to 
demonstrate that poetry is more profound and accurate in its relation to the living will, 
intuition, revelation and faith than the concrete, artificial and “unnatural use of abstractions” 
(Ibid, p. 421) apparent in the language of the Aufklärer. Again, Hamann didn’t want to 
dispose of reason, indeed he believed it to be a divine gift that can act as the “bond of 
society” (Hamann, 1949 – 1957b, p. 231) but how it had become absolute, vacuous and 
divorced from the bedrock of faith. The language of reason, though important, is not the 
whole story, as for it to be fully understood and listened to there must be faith: “Faith is no 
work of reason and therefore cannot succumb to any attack by it; for faith arises as little from 
reasons as tasting and seeing do” (Hamann, 1949 – 1957a, p. 73). A true genius, in the spirit 
of Socrates, is not professing to simply know things, as the Aufklärer continuously do, but 
one who “knows only his dependence and weakness, or the limits of his gifts” (Ibid, p. 260).  
 The Aufklärer produce a new tower of Babel of confusion. They tend to see 
everything in the first person but cannot understand, or worse, ignore the innate kenotic basis 
of this process.66 According to Goethe “The principle to which all Hamann’s statements can 
be referred is this: ‘Everything that one sets out to perform, whether by deed, by word, or 
otherwise, must spring from all one’s united powers; everything taken in isolation is 
worthless.’ A magnificent maxim! but hard to follow” (Goethe, 1890 [1811], p. 108). The 
Aufklärer commit a fundamental error, they base their knowledge of the world on reason but 
never question the grounding of reason itself in the first place: “The soundness of reason is 
the cheapest, most self-absorbed, and most shameless self-aggrandizement, whereby 
everything is presupposed that remains to be proved, and whereby every free investigation of 
                                                          
66 The basis of revelation inherent in the production of knowledge. 
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the truth is more brutally barred than by the inerrancy of the Roman Catholic Church” 
(Hamann, 1949 – 1957b, p. 189). 
 As stated earlier, Hamann believed that the Aufklärer submit themselves to a demonic 
religion that “merely flatters their pride (herein lies the anti-Socratic movement), but conceals 
the true poverty and moribund condition of what they so proudly call “reason”” (Betz, 2012, 
p. 194). The void behind their epistemology is replaced with a vain ideology or private 
opinion that has no solid grounding and that “…reason’s operations are intimately connected 
with human volition and, as such, are profoundly affected by the passions and depravities to 
which the fallen will is prone […] it is all too possible for the progressive ideals of secular 
reason (liberté, égalité, and fraternité) to degrade into the Reign of Terror; or for the cold, 
calculating arithmetique politique of the Wannsee Conference to conceive a demonic 
“Endlösung.”” (Betz, 2012, p. 202).  
Kant’s pure reason according to Zupančič (2000, p. 1) is simply pure super-ego. By 
setting up a society based on pure secular reason, the superego, would lead to a morally 
relativistic landscape whereby any societal values could be simply reasoned or rationalised 
away, even the most oppressive ones. As Sagan observes that the superego can provide moral 
commandments, but a look through history shows that it has sanctioned slavery, racism and 
warfare which would be “…impossible without the functioning of the superego” (Sagan, 
1988, p. 13). Zupančič addresses Kant’s ‘Critique of Practical Reason’ (1788), specifically 
chapter 3 ‘On the Incentives of Pure Practical Reason’ to elaborate on what he calls Respect 
(Achtung). 
For Kant our desires seem to us utterly incompatible to universal legislation viz., the 
categorical imperative and duty to it, but “…nonetheless endeavours – just as if it amounted 
to our entire self – to validate its [universal legislation] beforehand and as primary and 
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original” (Kant, 2002 [1788, 74], p. 97). This universal legislation presents itself to us not as 
an object but specific feeling that is constantly in the peripherals of our consciousness and it 
is this feeling what Kant calls respect.67 Kant argues that the moral law, and its representation 
in consciousness as respect, is “…truly objective (viz., objective in every respect)” (Ibid, p. 
98) and it is here where Zupančič overlays Lacan’s concept of anxiety.  
Kant does critique Descartes Cogito inasmuch as he realises that the subject of it is 
non-existent as it becomes an object (Kant, 2007 [1781, B404-B406], p. 319-320). What that 
essentially means is that the Cogito is missing something, it lacks, and this lack is the loss of 
the subject itself. For Kant “The ‘I’ is just a thought, a representation like any other 
representation. The fundamental loss or 'alienation' this implies is the condition of the 
thinking subject, the subject who has thoughts and representations. It is this loss that opens up 
'objective reality' (phenomenal reality), and allows the subject to conceive herself as subject” 
(Zupančič, 2000, p. 143). In other words, our immediate experience is one of lack because 
language itself is never satisfactory as a carrier or expression of desire. That is to say the 
words and the objectification of the Kantian will, or Lacanian drive, immediately turns the 
subjective into the objective and therefore alienates us: “…anxiety is the way the subject 
experiences the drive, the surplus-satisfaction produced in its circuit – that part of satisfaction 
that the drive finds ‘beyond’ the subject” (Ibid, p. 146).  
As mentioned earlier, this experience of anxiety I would equate with the feeling of 
existential despair inasmuch as it is the experience of being unable to ground oneself in a 
universal system and it is this abyss that Kant filled with his moral law and thus the superego: 
“Respect for the moral law is therefore the sole and also indubitable moral incentive, and this 
feeling is also directed to no object except on this basis alone. First the moral law determines 
                                                          
67 I would argue that this feeling is on the peripherals of the Lacanian imaginary mirror.  
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the will [desire] objectively and directly in the judgment of reason; but freedom, the causality 
of which is determinable only through the law, consists precisely in this, that it restricts all 
inclinations, and hence the esteem of the person himself, to the condition of compliance with 
its pure law” (Kant, 2002 [1788, 78], p. 102). Kant deems desire as pathological: “Only then, 
insofar as reason by itself determines the will (instead of being in the service of the 
inclinations), is reason a true higher power of desire, to which the pathologically 
determinable power of desire is subordinate…”  (Ibid, [25], p. 37) and that any disagreement 
with the commands of the moral law, superego, are also pathological including 
disagreeableness (Ibid, [75], p. 98).  
A feeling of anxiety for Lacan arises as an “…affect of the subject” (Lacan, 1963, p. 
57) and can manifest itself from a “…flight from the father’s [secondary master’s] desire” 
(Ibid, p. 77). As this feeling creates enormous anxiety, an existential dread, what I and 
Hamann believe, is that Kant constructed a mystical system whereby “…mysticism is a 
search, construction, ascetic practice, assumption, however you want to put it, a headlong 
plunge into the Jouissance of God” (Ibid). As Lacan in his ‘Ethics of Psychanalysis’ (1959-
1960) stated: “From an analytic point of view, the only thing one can be guilty of is having 
given ground relative to one’s desire” (Lacan, 1992 [1959-1960], p. 319), what I take this to 
mean is that by yielding to the desire of the primary master, one could say the drive, and 
engaging in an act of conscience that can overwhelm the secondary master, one feels a sense 
of guilt from betraying the Kantian moral law. Thus, when Sagan points out that Huck is 
“feeling guilty about behaving morally” (Sagan, 1988, p. 18) he is essentially feeling guilty 
for submitting to his then truly moral desire which was at odds to the superego.   
The horrors of constructing a system of morality based on reason alone, where 
conscience and the imagination is repressed, is seen in many dystopic masterpieces, one of 
which is Yevgeny Zamyatin’s (1884-1937) ‘We’ (1924) whereby the entire society is run by 
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algorithms. One could say that they all adopt the role of Kantian duty which is abiding with 
the “…formal supreme principle of pure practical reason” (Kant, 2002 [1788, 39], p. 58), 
which “…commands compliance, and indeed the most meticulous compliance, from 
everyone” (Ibid [36], p. 54). Individuals are no longer subjects but numbers, completely 
standardised, there is no privacy as every building is made of glass and the concept of 
freedom is deemed a pathological and primitive belief: “It is for you to place the beneficial 
yoke of reason round the necks of the unknown beings who inhabit other planets – still living, 
it may be, in the primitive state known as freedom. If they will not understand that we are 
bringing them a mathematically infallible happiness, we shall be obliged to force them to be 
happy” (Zamyatin, 1993 [1924], p. 3). The protagonist later succumbs to the desire of the 
primary master i.e. conscience, but deems it completely irrational: ““I don’t want ✓-1! Take 
it out of me, this ✓-1!” That irrational root grew in me like some alien thing, strange and 
terrifying, and it was eating me, and you couldn’t make any sense of it or neutralize it 
because it was completely beyond ratio” (Ibid, p. 39).     
 The Aufklärer attempt to grasp the foundation of reasons’ soundness but miss the 
mark, similar to deeming shadows as a unified body. By suspending reason and detaching it 
from the bedrock of faith, the Aufklärer build elaborate ‘castles in the sky’, a Protestant 
Rationalistic conception of Logos, but a castle of thought that is innately “earthy, unspiritual 
and devilish” (Hamann, 1949 – 1957b, p. 223). One such ‘Church father’ of the 
Enlightenment was Kant and it is here where Hamann demonstrates the error of what the 






Hamann’s Metakritik of Kant (1800) 
“Reason is language. This is the marrowbone on which I gnaw, and I will gnaw myself to 
death on it” (Hamann, 1955 – 1975d, p. 177). 
 Hamann likes to introduce topics with mythical stories. With his ‘Socratic 
Memorabilia’, Hamann associated himself to Odysseus, with the Metakritik Hamann 
associates himself with the philosopher Simonides. The tyrant Hieron was so obsessed with 
the ultimate answer to the nature of reality and God’s existence that he asked Simonides 
everyday what the answer was. Simonides would always respond by asking for twice as 
much time to think about it than the day previously (Betz, 2012, p. 247).  
 Hamann and Kant were close friends and Kant even allowed Hamann’s son to attend 
his lectures free of charge (Betz, 2012, p. 233). Hamann, however, was deeply concerned to 
what the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ professed, calling it a work of mysticism and said that 
Kant was “…very intimate with me, despite the fact that last time I made him a bit bemused 
by approving of his Critique but rejecting the mysticism contained in it. He had no idea how 
he got to be a mystic” (Hamann, 1955 – 1975e, p. 355).  
 For Hamann, ‘reason’ must rely on language and that language is the absolute arbiter 
of thought itself: “Not only the whole capacity to think depends upon language…but [that] 
language is also the center of the misunderstanding of reason with itself” (Hamann, 1949 – 
1957b, p. 21, 130 & 286). And “With me it is not so much the question: What is reason? but 
rather: What is language?” (Hamann, 1955 – 1975d, p. 264). Thus, Hamann suggests that the 
origin of language cannot be addressed by reason, because reason is a part of language itself 
and therefore the investigation would create a chimera, great illusion, tautology or mysticism. 
This is why Hamann argues that language can both lie, misdirect and deceive, but it can also 
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reveal: “The auditorium of language is the seducer of our understanding, and will always be 
so until we come back home to the beginning and origin…” (Hamann, 1955 – 1975c, p. 173). 
 The reader may be aware that this viewpoint of language is uncannily similar to the 
ideas of Wittgenstein: “Other illusions come from various quarters to attach themselves to the 
special one spoken of here. Thought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, 
picture, of the world. These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one 
behind the other, each equivalent to each […] Thought is surrounded by a halo. – essence 
[Eros], logic, presents an order [Logos], in fact the a priori order of the world: that is, the 
order of possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought. But this order, it 
seems, must be utterly simple. It is prior to all experience, must run through all experience; 
no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it – It must be of the purest 
crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction; but as something concrete, indeed, 
as the most concrete, as it were the hardest thing there is. We are under the illusion that what 
is peculiar, profound, essential, in our investigation, resides in its trying to grasp the 
incomparable essence of language” (Wittgenstein, 2003 [1953, 96 & 97], p. 38).  
 According to Betz (2012, p. 233), Hamann’s ‘Metakritik’ is arguably the most 
profound and novel criticism of Kant’s philosophy. The real crux of Hamann’s argument 
rests on the premise that there is no such thing as ‘pure reason’ as reason is always caught up 
within tradition and interpretation, just as language, and therefore can never be suspended 
away ‘in the clouds’ from this historical process. Kant attempts to tear away reason from its 
natural foundation, integrated with faith and tradition, and re-establish it independently, free 
of contradictions, in an illusionary ‘castle in the sky’. This ‘pure reason’, which Kant so 
desperately tries to establish and reveal, is nothing but a two headed monster whose heads 
reveal either “a deceptive nothing […or…] an empty Something […] a material Nothing or an 
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intellectual Something […which…] for the mechanism of the Sensus communis amounts to 
the same thing” (Hamann, 1949 – 1957b, p. 219, 142).  
 What Hamann accuses Kant of is mainly a misuse of language. The Aufklärer and the 
entire Enlightenment project itself is, in essence, a massive elaborate charade of this misuse. 
Kant recognises this problem himself within his ‘Critique’ by stating that ‘pure reason’ can 
end up being self-conflictual: “It is sad, no doubt, and discouraging that there should be an 
antithetic of pure reason at all, and that reason, being the supreme tribunal for all conflicts, 
should be in conflict with itself” (Kant, 2007 [1781, A 740], p. 594).68 Thought, and therefore 
language, can never be pure but is always situated within a historical process of tradition to 
which it responds: “…language, Logos, is that which mysteriously unites both the particular 
and the universal, forming a mysterious analogy to the Logos who, in becoming flesh, united 
the human and the divine” (Betz, 2012, p. 244). Kant, therefore, has merely written a 
‘magical and mystical work’ based on his own a priori understanding of the preceding history 
of philosophy (Ibid).  
 Hamann argues that there is no such thing as a tradition-free standpoint because 
language is deeply incorporated within it, and because we use it to think and therefore make 
inferences, to go against it would suggest a gross hypocrisy (Ibid: p. 245). There are three 
“purisms” on which Kant bases his philosophy according to Hamann (2007a [1800], p. 207 - 
208): 
1. An attempt to free reason from all tradition, customs and faith in it, in order to make it 
an independent entity. 
                                                          
68 Essentially this means that reason itself cannot ground itself on reason because to do so 
will yield circular logic and inevitable contradictions.   
Thistlethwaite: 159 
 
2. A more transcendent attempt to suspend everything from experience and its following 
induction.  
3. A rationalistic, not empirical, conception of the questions of pure reason which is 
actually a misuse of language that is the “…last organon and criterion of reason, with 
no credentials but tradition and usage” (Ibid, p. 208). This is contrary to Kant who 
states that “…all the questions which pure reason places before us, have their origin, 
not in experience, but in reason itself, and must therefore be capable of being solved 
and understood as to their validity or invalidity” (Kant, 2007 [1781, A763], p. 608). 
    
Kant fails to see that these “purisms” cannot be separated from language, as well as how 
‘reason’ can even become ‘unreasonable’ without it, simply because it will not be able to be 
articulated or even communicated: “A reason without experience seems just as impossible as 
a reason without language. Tradition and language are the true elements of reason” (Hamann 
in Bayer, 2002, p. 157).  
The terms “a priori” and “a posteriori” have always been associated with the spatial terms 
“before” and “after” respectively. For Kant, reason exists ‘before’ language and it is here, 
Hamann argues, where Kant makes a major error by literally basing his entire ‘Critique’ on 
an “ass-backwards” (Hamann, 1949 – 1957b, p. 280) approach. Indeed if ‘reason’ exists 
separately from language, then there should be some ultimate sensible ‘truths’ that have 
always been with us and therefore the ancients were simply blind to them: “Nothing is in our 
understanding without having previously been in our senses: just as there is nothing in our 
entire body that did not first pass through our own stomach or that of our parents. The 
stamina and menstrua of our reason are therefore, most properly understood, revelations and 
traditions, which we assimilate as our own, transform into our own humors and powers, and 
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thereby measure up to our vocation partly to reveal and partly to pass on the critical and 
archontic dignity of a political animal” (Hamann, 1949 – 1957b, p. 39).  
If reason can be shown to be ‘pure’ does this also relate to mathematical axiomatic truth? 
Is ‘pure mathematics’ also suspended from language? For Hamann, mathematical certainty is 
once again simply based on an intuitive certainty related to simple sensation and he goes so 
far as to reduce this notion to a reduction ad absurdum: “…it goes without saying that if 
mathematics can claim the distinction of nobility on account of its universal and necessary 
trustworthiness, then even human reason would have to be considered inferior to the infallible 
and unerring instinct of the insects” (Ibid, p. 285).  
What separates our special and unique metaphysical world from that of insects is simply 
our more advanced language: “Metaphysics misuses the signs of language and figures of 
speech by transforming them into nothing but hieroglyphs and types of ideal relations, and by 
means of this learned nonsense works the straightforwardness [Biderkeit] of language” 
(Hamann, 1949 – 1957b, p. 285) it “…works the honest decency of language into such a 
meaningless, rutting, unstable, indefinite something = x that nothing is left but a windy 
sough, a magic shadow play…” (Hamann, 2007a [1800], p. 210). 
Again, this notion of mathematical truth is seen in Wittgenstein: “The philosophy of logic 
speaks of sentences and words in exactly the sense in which we speak of them in ordinary life 
[…] We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some 
non-spatial, non-temporal chimera. But we talk about it as we do about the pieces in chess 
when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing their physical properties. The 
question “What is a word really?” is analogous to “What is a piece in chess?” […] 
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Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language” 
(Wittgenstein, 2003 [1953, 108 & 109], p. 40).69 
Essentially, for Hamann, language exists prior to reason and Kant’s great error is to 
reverse this and aim at “separating what nature had joined together” (Betz, 2012, p. 253). 
Hamann views language as ““marvellous exchange,” a “ladder” with “intuitions rising” and 
“concepts descending” upon it” (Ibid, p. 256). Hamann states that “Sounds and letters are 
therefore pure forms a priori, in which nothing belonging to the sensation or concept of an 
object is found; they are true, aesthetic elements of all human knowledge and reason” 
(Hamann, 2007a [1800], p. 211). Kant’s philosophy therefore essentially attempts to hide the 
nuanced correlation of Logos and Mythos and it was this that Hamann exposed and according 
to Betz (2012, p. 257) “brought the entire structure of his [Kant] philosophy crumbling 
down.”  
Conclusion 
The Romantics gravely damaged the signifying regime of Protestant Rationalism by 
attacking its conceptualisation of the Logos, namely their elaborate misuse of language. 
Rousseau attacked its societal consequences as being too coercive and impersonal. This was 
caused by a synergy of this new system of morality and the prevailing Nomos. The subject 
                                                          
69 This chess analogy is used by Žižek to elaborate the Lacanian concept of the real, 
symbolic and imaginary. Here, where Wittgenstein is discussing the rules of the pieces, 
relates to the symbolic such that “The rules one has to follow in order to play it are its 
symbolic dimension: from the purely formal symbolic standpoint, ‘knight’ is defined only 




was heavily abstracted and objectified whereby the spontaneous element of the fantasy of 
autonomy was weighed down and rationalised.  
Coleridge focused on the moment the fantasy of autonomy manifested itself through 
primary imagination and provided an antithetical metaphysical approach to the fancy and 
objectification presented by the Aufklärer. The concept of conscience is aligned with the 
creative spontaneity of fantasmatic autonomy such that its genesis stems from the subjects 
role with the primary master and is able to bypass the repressive nature of the superego. 
However, the issue with the Romantics was their inability to ground themselves and 
succumbed to the problem of relativism. However, this was solved and elaborated upon 
within the works of Hamann whereby reason and its communicative ability is primarily 
language itself. The moment of primary imagination therefore emerges through the Logos 
and therefore becomes comprehensible, but the Aufklärer descend upon and misconceive its 
true character by reversing its processes and deem reason as a separate entity a priori to 
language. 
It must be stressed that the Romantics did not detest rationality but mainly its misuse and 
dominance and did not accept that it could explain every aspect of human life. This is 
different than rationalism which was considered a gross misuse of language, a static 
straightjacket that imprisoned imagination and weighed down the winged thought. Rousseau, 
Coleridge, Hamann and other Romantics did not think that reason was something wholly bad 
but that it neglected the constant creative force behind all human perception. That is to say 
that rationalism, pure reason, was simply a by-product, an a posteriori or retroactive system 
of fancy that came from the revelation of Eros ascending through Logos, in other words 
catharsis. As the fantasy of the subject emerges through Logos it is immediately 
comprehensible as an empirical phenomenal object. Language, not pure unchanging reason, 
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is therefore the construct behind all empirical phenomena including the empirical fantasmatic 
subject.  
Rationalism was deemed a hysteron-proteron by Hamann (2007a [1800] p. 209). As 
thinking rests on language, then one simply cannot think of something, pure reason, outside 
of it. In other words, language has to exist prior to the system of pure reason because 
otherwise we would not be able to even comprehend it. Kant’s philosophy, Hamann argued, 
is therefore assuming that there exists a universal language, similar to Leibnitz’s 
characteristica universalis, within all human beings (Ibid, p. 217).  
Despite the fact that the protestant rationalist regime suffered grave damage, its existence 
still persisted and the Aufklärer reigned supreme. The twentieth century battled over what 
would be the dominant Nomos, whereby either Nazism, Fascism, Communism or Liberal 
Democracy would reign supreme. However, it has been unfairly noted that Romanticism 
contributed significantly to the rise of Fascism and Nazism, specifically its focus on the 
heroic individual, nationalism, folklore and focus on passion, but according to Kamenetsky 
(1972, p. 198): “…what began as theory and philosophy [Romanticism] culminated in a 
perverted ideology.”  
The notion of engineering society through brutal scientific means practically censored 
conscience and reversed Rousseau’s prescription for a more compassionate world: “Fascism 
was influenced by Social Darwinism in at least two senses. The first was the emphasis on a 
hierarchical, evolutionary chain. Man was not born equal, nor was he essentially rational […] 
…the second aspect of Social Darwinism which was picked up by fascism was more the 
emphasis on survival of the fittest, the need to maintain a society based on the willingness to 
wage war, or at least healthy enough to avoid falling into the false cosiness of individualistic-
materialistic domesticity” (Eatwell, 1992, p. 74).  
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Essentially Fascism and Nazism fanaticised the meritocratic idea, which Rousseau hated, 
into an extreme form of social engineering. Indeed the scientism, in the form of Social 
Darwinism and eugenics, confirmed Hume’s belief that reason alone cannot be the source of 
moral behaviour (Hume, 1985 [1738], p. 510). This of course was a major concern for the 
Romantics who believed that science, although powerful, was a very dangerous weapon that 
should only be wielded by a wise and virtuous person: “Let men learn for once that nature 
would have preserved them from science, as a mother snatches a dangerous weapon from the 
hands of her child. Let them know that all the secrets she hides are so many evils from which 
she protects them, and that the very difficulty they find in acquiring knowledge is not the 
least of her bounty towards them. Men are perverse; but they would have been far worse, if 
they had had the misfortune to be born learned” (Rousseau, 1923b [1750], p. 139-140).            
Communism was equally monstrous. Communism attempted to purge religion from 
society and adopt a brutal state worship whereby any suspicion of superiority, as with the 
Kulaks, or belief that ran contrary to the notion of a glorious proletariat were either executed, 
starved to death or imprisoned in the Gulags: “…the root destruction of religion in the 
country, which throughout the twenties and thirties was one of the most important goals of 
the GPU-NKVD, could be realized only by mass arrests of Orthodox believers […] A person 
convinced that he possessed spiritual truth was required to conceal it from his own children! 
In the twenties the religious education of children was classified as a political crime under 
Article 58-10 of the Code-in other words, counterrevolutionary propaganda!” (Solzhenitsyn, 
1974 [1973], p. 37-38).  
People would even utilise this mass paranoia within communism to settle disputes by 
having innocent people imprisoned. By simply calling a person a podkulachnik, someone 
who worked with the Kulaks, quite simply “…finishes you!” (Ibid, p. 57). Zamyatin (1884-
1937) literally wrote the novel ‘We’ (1924) with all its rationalistic, scientific and dystopian 
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undertones, as a response to the changing social environment of Lenin’s Russia after the 
Bolsheviks won the revolution and were discussing how to engineer the new state: “Part of 
man’s bright future as a machine rested on the theories of an American efficiency expert 
named Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856-1915) […] Even so powerful a figure as Nadezhda 
Krupskaya, Lenin’s consort in what was to become the modern world’s most ruthless 
managerial class, wrote in praise of Taylor’s theories […] Men have finally become, if not 
actually machines, as machine-like as possible, utterly predictable and completely happy. All 
the messy inconvenience of freedom has been eliminated. Mere details, a final touch-up here 
and there, one last adjustment – these are all that remain” (Brown, 1993 [1992], p. xviii - 















Chapter 4 – The Development of Contemporary Capitalism: From Keynes to Hayek 
Introduction70 
“They preach only human doctrines who say that as soon as the money clinks into the money 
chest, the soul flies out of purgatory.” 
Martin Luther’s ‘Ninety-Five Theses’ No. 27 (Luther, 1997 [1517]). 
This section will show how the crash of 1929 sparked the development of a rigorous 
revision of capitalism which eventual repercussions led to the Freshwater School and the 
installment of a dramatic reconfiguration of how the Demos was viewed. After the Great 
Depression the protestant rationalist regime took on a highly observant regulatory function of 
not only the Demos but the market itself whose rationale was to maintain its smooth 
functioning and prevent a repeat of economic catastrophe. However, it was during the 1980s 
and the introduction of new economic theory, neoliberalism, that deregulated the market and 
created a space for a radical new Nomos. This new space led to the development of super 
companies which could now collude with the given protestant rationalist regime in similar 
fashion to the Fuggers with the signified regime of Catholicism. That is to say, super 
companies could now purchase favors, as well as contribute to the ideological state apparatus, 
                                                          
70 I have decided not to focus too heavily on the Frankfurt school, but I do briefly mention the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment to help clarify the effects of a deregulated market. The rationale 
for this is that despite the school’s massive contribution to this area, many ideas are diverse 
and too wide ranging to incorporate and unpack within a single chapter. Additionally, much 
of the literature refers explicitly to capitalism before the deregulation of the 1980s and the 
advent of neoliberalism whereby the dictum of excessive enjoyment became radicalised. 
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from the dominant signified regime.  
This chapter will introduce two new masters, the quaternary and quinary. The 
quaternary master is the market itself; individual businesses that have an effect on the subject 
by providing the desire to consume and compete in the social sphere for recognition. This 
master is related to the development of postmodernism such that it destabilizes grand 
narratives and simply repeats an endless cycle of production. The quinary master is unique 
inasmuch as the subject, in yielding to the desire of the tertiary master of protestant 
rationalism, joins or creates a workplace organization. In setting up, or joining an 
organization, the aim is to compete and submit to the quaternary master, the market itself that 
is regulated by the protestant rationalist regime. 
The latter half of this chapter will outline some of the features of contemporary 
capitalism and the modern workplace. The reader will see how workplace management is 
highly rationalized and maintained through ego management schemes. Contemporary work is 
therefore governed by a meritocratic system, but not a beneficial one that functions in relation 
to a synthesis of Eros and Logos, but an alienating one-dimensional entrapping system that 
works only by suppressing Eros. Thus, the fantasy of autonomy is replaced by one of 
conformity, imprisonment and automation whereby individual differences are only given the 
veneer of freedom. Of course this is not seen with all organizations, however the bigger the 
enterprise the more potential it has to monopolize the market and become a microcosm that 
can work in collusion with the tertiary master.   
The Quaternary Master: Agorae 
The Greek word Agora, which plural is Agorae, translates as “a gathering place; 
especially: the marketplace of ancient Greece” (Merriam Webster, 2017b). As the tertiary 
master, Nomos, of protestant rationalism created a tremendous freeing of capital during the 
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late 16th and 17th century, business flourished but was still under the control of a mercantile 
system. Between the mid-16th century and 17th century, capitalist organisations grew into 
super-enterprises, such as the ‘East India Company’ (1600-1874), mainly within the 
protestant-mercantile areas of Europe such as London. The more catholic areas still held onto 
feudal systems but were concerned and scared by the sheer momentum and dominance of the 
new protestant inspired enterprise: “The new business class, while cherishing its monopolies 
and protective tariffs, demanded a free economy, in which wages and prices would be 
determined by the supply of labor and goods; in which there would be no feudal or 
governmental control of production, distribution, profit, or property; and in which no stigma 
would be attached to commercial occupations, the charging of interest, or the manipulation of 
wealth. The barons and their peasants clung to the feudal concept of mutual obligation and 
group responsibility, of state regulation of wages and prices, of limits by custom and law to 
conditions of employment and profit. The barons protested that the new mercantile economy, 
producing for a national or international market, was disrupting class relations and social 
stability […] They dreaded the power of mercantile London, which, with a population of 
some 300,000 out of England's 5,000,000, was able to finance an army and a revolution” 
(Durant & Durant, 1961, p. 185).  
The regime of protestant rationalism held a mercantile regulation of the economy, but 
there were still moments of severe economic collapse. The tulipmania of 1634-1637 is held 
as a classic case example of an economic bubble (Garber, 1989, p. 535). At its peak the cost 
of one tulip bulb could cost as much as 5,500 guilders “…a weight of gold equal to $50,000 
evaluated at $450 per ounce” (Ibid, p. 537).71 However, in the beginning of 1637 the price of 
tulips collapsed, economically wiping out many individuals.  
                                                          
71 However, Garber (1989, p. 537) does indicate that the sources for this are unverified.  
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It was only until the sanction of Adman Smith’s ‘Wealth of Nations’ (1776) by Prime 
Minister William Pitt the Younger (1759-1806) in 1796 (Durant & Durant, 1967, p. 680) that 
full laissez-faire capitalism took hold. David Hume was influential in Smith’s ideas of a 
freeing of capital as Hume also did not agree with the mercantile market and the 
establishment of its monopolies (Ibid, p. 769).  
Smith’s main argument was that the higher the economic liberty of a country, the 
greater its wealth, whereby regulation by the government should be at a minimum (Durant & 
Durant, 1967, p. 770; Campbell & Skinner, 1976, p. 34-40). By freeing up the economy, 
Smith argued, one could pursue one’s self-interests and through the ‘invisible hand’ actually 
contribute to the betterment of society as a whole without even realising it: “…he intends 
only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other eases, led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention […]  By pursuing his own interest he 
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to 
promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public 
good” (Smith, 1976 [1776, IV.ii.9], p. 456). Despite the fact that Smith believed that pursuing 
self-interest contributes to the Agorae, Marx insists that they actually lose something: 
themselves.  
Marx’s concept of Estranged Labour is synonymous with this ‘invisible hand’. In his 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844), Marx argues that when the worker engages 
in the process of producing goods they lose themselves by becoming engrossed by the 
marketplace, the Agorae: “…the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful the 
alien objective world becomes which he creates over-against himself, the poorer he himself - 
his inner world – becomes, the less belongs to him as his own” (Marx, 1988 [1844], p. 71 - 
72). The worker does not really want to go to work, they are forced to, and therefore have to 
submit themselves to something that is simply alien. Over time this process creates greater 
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and greater alienation and misery and therefore the worker abstracts themselves to the whim 
“…of another [Agorae/Praxis]” (Ibid, p. 74).72       
Even though Smith argued that the government, Nomos, should have little influence 
over the Agorae, quaternary master vis-à-vis the market, he did outline the dangers of the 
development of monopolies and how monopolies could collude with Nomos to reduce 
competition and thus pervert the healthy functioning of the free market: “The interest of the 
dealers, however, in any particular branch of trade or manufactures, is always in some 
respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the public. To widen the market and to 
narrow the competition, is always the interest of the dealers. To widen the market may 
frequently be agreeable enough to the interest of the public; but to narrow the competition 
must always be against it, and can serve only to enable the dealers, by raising their profits 
above what they naturally would be, to levy, for their own benefit, an absurd tax upon the rest 
of their fellow-citizens. The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which 
comes from this order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never 
to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most 
scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose 
interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to 
deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, 
both deceived and oppressed it” (Smith, 1976 [1776, I.xi.10], p. 267).  
The quaternary master has a direct influence on individuals by the very fact that they 
submit and contribute to its functioning. The quaternary master, despite still being under the 
                                                          
72 What I will discuss later in chapter 5 is how capitalism, from the 1980s, blurred the 
separation of the Agorae from the worker even further by promoting ‘wellness’ and 
efficiency, which is actually a form of emotional regulation toward company goals.      
Thistlethwaite: 171 
 
watchful eye of Nomos, works in synergy with it as well as the Demos by battling for 
recognition. This new system by Smith revolutionised the capitalist world and dramatically 
increased the wealth of Britain. The ‘Freed Agorae’ demanded more educated technicians, 
workmen and managers to keep up with competitiveness and thus worked with the tertiary 
master by contributing enormous funds to public libraries and universities (Durant & Durant, 
1967, p. 681). However, in the drive for prosperity and efficiency, there was a dramatic 
reduction in the aesthetic beauty of city life (Ibid). This, as mentioned in chapter 3, led to 
many Romantic poets feeling a sense of alienation as the “…dark satanic mills” (Blake, 1907 
[1804], p. xix) took hold.    
The quaternary master therefore represents the Agorae, which is massively complex, 
but taken together as a whole acts as a singular entity to which the subject submits 
themselves. It is complex due to the innate competitiveness of the market with single 
business organisations, including banks, vying but also colluding with each other for greater 
and greater dominance and profit. 
 
Figure 1: The Quaternary Master 
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I have provided this schema of the quaternary master to help clarify its elements: 
1. This is the regulation of the market by the tertiary master. It is here whereby 
organisations have to submit to the rules set by Nomos. However, as a business gains 
greater power, monopolises, it can collude with Nomos to reduce the 
efficiently/influence of its competitors indicated by the two sided arrow. It is here 
whereby organisations might take an “…interest to deceive and even to oppress the 
public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and 
oppressed it” (Smith, 1976 [1776, I.xi.10], p. 267). 
2. This represents a business, bank, university, entertainment industry or any 
organisation that offers a commodity that engages in a process of competitiveness. 
This could also include the modern celebrity that can be considered a living business. 
The width of the line represents its size and general influence which, as it increases, 
moves up the hierarchical market chain and has a potential opportunity to political 
capital. 
3. This represents the classic interpellation process of the tertiary master upon the 
individual. The individual has to submit to the law and is made an ideological subject 
as outlined in chapter 2. 
4. This is similar to interpellation by the tertiary master, but the influence is from the 
collective organisation of corporations as well as what Adorno and Horkheimer (2010 
[1944], p. 120) call the ‘Culture Industry’. Its influence is whereby “Real life is 
becoming indistinguishable from the movies” (Ibid, p. 126), whereby “…no scope is 
left for the imagination” (Ibid, p. 127). Its influence is seen in advertising, film, TV, 
gossip and many more: “The assembly-line character of the culture industry, the 
synthetic, planned method of turning out its products (factory-like not only in the 
studio but, more or less, in the compilation of cheap biographies, pseudodocumentary 
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novels, and hit songs) is very suited to advertising […] Advertising and the culture 
industry merge technically as well as economically […] …the insistent demand for 
effectiveness makes technology into psychotechnology, into a procedure for 
manipulating men” (Ibid, p. 163). The impact of the Agorae in contemporary 
capitalism is so successful that “…consumers feel compelled to buy and use its 
products even though they see through them” (Ibid, p. 167).   
The Quinary Master: Praxis 
Merriam Webster defines Praxis as an “…exercise or practice of an art, science, or 
skill [Or] …practical application of a theory” (Merriam Webster, 2017c). This is the final 
master the subject submits to. It is simply being a subject within an organisation for the 
process of work. It is being an employee, employer, worker, teacher, freelancer or even a 
gang-member/criminal solely for the purpose of earning a salary. The subject joins what 
could be called a microcosm of intersecting master-slave struggles manifested by what has 
been termed ‘office politics’. The employee submits himself to his employer, but the 
freelancer, employer or entrepreneur also have to submit to their master of the Agorae itself. 
When it comes to militaristic or political occupations these are all within the realm of the 
tertiary master and therefore supersede the Agorae only inasmuch that no collusion has taken 
place whereby parts of the Agorae lie under the umbrella of Nomos. For example, under 
communism the ‘New Economic Policy’ (NEP) sort to place all previous ‘evil’ capitalist 
enterprises under the control of the state leading to purges of suspicious technical 
intelligentsia whereby “…those lackeys and servants of former capitalist bosses were kept in 
line by healthy suspicion and surveillance by the workers” (Solzhenitsyn, 1974 [1973], p. 
43). 
The subject has to adapt to the specific managerial system of the quinary master or 
risks the loss of their salary. The severity of this process can vary in accordance with the 
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demands and character of Praxis. The more repressive the managerial system is, that is to say 
that the more the subject is abstracted, as outlined in the schema of abstraction in chapter 3, 
the greater the probability of revolt i.e. subject of breakdown, or burnout results. However, 
the subject when undergoing this process of repression can deterritorialize and escape by 
“…finally [being] able to say and do something simple in his own name, without asking 
permission; a desire lacking nothing, a flux that overcomes barriers and codes, a name that no 
longer designates any ego whatever” (Deleuze, 2000 [1977], p. 131). Thus the subject can 
simply move into another microcosm if the previous one is too repressive. However, the 
subject can remain entrapped within their quinary master primarily due to the fear of potential 
financial destitution. 
The subject is therefore paid for their repression by Praxis. However, the employer or 
freelancer faces threats on two fronts. The first is the Agorae which demands competition. 
The employer has to compete against other employers from different quinary masters which 
share the aim of market dominance. The second threat is the quinary master workers who 
could unionise and limit the competitiveness of the Praxis itself. The employer thus has to 
find some type of equilibrium to allow the healthy functioning of their Praxis. If they simply 
obey the Agorae and gain larger profits they run the risk of alienating their workforce. If they 
yield to the collective desire of the workers they potentially loose the competitive edge in the 
Agorae. However, the employer could compete against the other quinary masters for the best 
wages offered to the employees whilst still maintaining large profits: “The scarcity of hands 
occasions a competition among masters, who bid against one another, in order to get 
‘workmen’” (Smith, 1976 [1776, I.viii. 17], p. 86).  
In order for a man to exist in this world is to submit to a master whom he is terrified 
by whereby “…without the discipline of service and obedience, terror remains in the formal 
domain and is not propagated in the conscious objective-reality of existence” (Kojeve, 1969, 
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p. 27). In other words they must obey the master’s laws in order to reach a higher conscious 
existence. The subject thus becomes recognised by these masters through work and is 
rewarded with praise, recognition and money. In relation to the quinary master this work is 
Praxis itself whereby “Without work that transforms the real objective World, man cannot 
really transform himself. If he changes, his change remains “private,” purely subjective, 
revealed to himself alone, “mute,” not communicated to others” (Kojève, 1969, p. 28). Work 
is therefore essential to stave off madness and criminality (Ibid, p. 28) which “…is sooner or 
later annihilated by the natural and social objective reality” (Ibid).  
 
I think it would be helpful to outline all the masters and the specific work that is required for 
each: 
1. Absolute Master/Thanatos: This is the first master that every single living thing will 
eventually have to submit to. The work that is demanded is literally a fight for 
existence itself. 
2. Primary Master/Eros: This is generated primarily by the one who gives life, namely 
the mother. The infant has to engage in the work of desire and fantasy that is gained 
from the first Other, the mother, whom the child is initially terrified of. However, this 
later turns into a working relationship as the infant’s desire is literally premised upon 
the primary master. 
3. Secondary Master/Logos: This is gained by an imposter, the ‘Name of the Father’, 
that frustrates the bond between the primary master and infant. The work is the 
ordering of Eros toward the outside world and establishing a reality principle. 
4. Tertiary Master/Nomos: This is the law of civilization, the order of society. Its 
conventions, rules and ethics cannot exist without the ordering feature of the superego 
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that is gained from the secondary master. Its demand for obedience to legislation via 
threat of imprisonment is the work the subject has to submit to. In the case of 
Protestant Rationalism it is the duty to work and contribution to society by submitting 
to the market via the ‘invisible hand’ and/or attempt to become one’s own master, by 
engaging in Praxis.  
5. Quaternary Master/Agorae: The marketplace of enterprise and organisations. This 
cannot function without the guiding force of Nomos as it would lead to a purely 
unregulated and chaotic system that generates monopolies which would become a 
new tertiary master itself. The work is the subject purchasing its products and 
attempting to seek recognition by collecting more ‘valuable’ commodities and 
therefore is aligned with narcissism and competitiveness. 
6. Quinary Master/Praxis: The place of employment. The subject either works for 
themselves and thus submits to the demands of the quaternary master, by attempting 
to achieve greater profit, or the employees that demand further recognition so that 
they can more efficiently work for the demands of the Agorae. That is to say that the 
employees may demand a higher salary so that they can gain an edge over others in 
their obedience to the quaternary master. The employees thus submit to the employer, 
which is actually a slave to the quaternary master: “But in transforming the World by 
this work, the Slave transforms himself, too, and thus creates the new objective 
conditions that permit him to take up once more the liberating Fight for recognition 
[By the quaternary master] that he refused in the beginning for fear of death. And thus 
in the long run, all slavish work realises not the Master’s will, but the will – at first 
unconscious – of the Slave, who – finally – succeeds where the Master- necessarily – 
fails. Therefore, it is indeed the originally dependent, serving, and slavish 
Consciousness that in the end realizes and reveals the ideal of autonomous Self-
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Consciousness and is thus its “truth”” (Kojève, 1969, p. 29-30). In other words the 
masters do not really ‘exist’ in the real world but are merely imago’s that the subject 
has gained through experience and all work in synthesis to create the individuals 
current Self-Consciousness.    
The Regulation of the Agorae: Keynes & Hayek 
The now infamous Wall Street stock exchange crash of 1929 devastated industry 
throughout the United States that was shortly followed by mass unemployment, loss of 
international trade, and most importantly an enormous alteration in the public attitude toward 
banks and financial system – something had to change.73 The British economist John 
Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) developed a procedure to deal with this currency problem, and 
published a series of highly influential works including ‘Treatise on Money’ (1930), ‘The 
Means to Prosperity’ (1933) and ‘The General Theory of Employment, Interest & Money’ 
(1936) that led to dramatic economic changes that are still felt today.74 To explain why, I 
need to briefly cover economic theory from the crash of 1929 to date. In doing so the reader 
will see the intrinsic development of capitalism as one whereby the regulation by Nomos, 
whose modern representation consistently emphasises libertarian economics as a defence 
against its own collapse, alternates.  
 The crash of 1929 left capitalism in total crisis. By 1933 over thirty million people in 
western countries were unemployed. Even though Keynes published his ‘General Theory of 
Employment, Interest & Money’ in 1936, it wasn’t until the British Government asked 
Keynes to assist in the post World War 2 economy that he became fully recognised. Keynes 
                                                          
73 For an excellent overview on the effects of the 1929 stock exchange crash see Green (1971, 
p. 189-228).  
74 Keynes has been considered the father of modern economics (Victor, 1972). 
Thistlethwaite: 178 
 
basic theory was that free competitive markets couldn’t ensure that employment would 
remain stable, and that active influence by the state would have to be implemented to ensure 
employment would remain sustainable: “In conditions of laissez-faire the avoidance of wide 
fluctuations in employment may, therefore, prove impossible without a far-reaching change 
in the psychology of investment markets such as there is no reason to expect. I conclude that 
the duty of ordering the current volume of investment cannot safely be left in private hands” 
(Keynes, 2003 [1936], p. 199-200). What this essentially meant is that the unregulated market 
was too dangerous to be left alone. Keynes also went on to say: “The authoritarian state 
systems [Nomos] of today seem to solve the problem of unemployment at the expense of 
efficiency and of freedom. It is certain that the world will not much longer tolerate the 
unemployment, which, apart from brief intervals of excitement, is associated—and, in my 
opinion, inevitably associated—with present-day capitalistic individualism. But it may be 
possible by a right analysis of the problem to cure the disease whilst preserving efficiency 
and freedom” (Keynes, 2003 [1936]: p. 240). 
 For thirty years after World War 2 Keynesian economics was at the forefront of 
capitalism’s development. Keynes essentially theorised that investment into the economy 
during a boom was dangerous as the interest that incurred would not be sustainable.75 To go 
further into the complexities of how Keynesian economics altered the economic landscape 
                                                          
75 A good example of this is the island story whereby a group of individuals living on an 
island use all their capital to build an enormous machine only to find out that once they had 
finished building it they could not turn it on because they had no capital left. Investing during 
a boom therefore would only cause a massive loss on the generation of future capital. Keynes 




would be beyond this paper, as it does not provide any detail that is necessary for my 
argument. However, in order to understand our current economic landscape the debate 
between the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek and Keynes in the early 1930’s must be 
briefly addressed.  
 Friedrich August von Hayek (1899 - 1992) was an Austrian born economist, 
philosopher and strong defender of what has been called classical liberalism. He published 
numerous works including ‘Profit, Interest, and Investment’ (1939), and ‘The Pure Theory of 
Capital’ (1941), however his most popular work ‘The Road to Serfdom’ (1944) warned of the 
dangers of socialism and governmental ‘meddling’ with economics: “In a directed economy, 
where the authority [Nomos] watches over the ends pursued, it is certain that it would use its 
powers to assist some ends and to prevent the realisation of others. Not our own view, but 
somebody else's, of what we ought to like or dislike would determine what we should get. 
And since the authority would have the power to thwart any efforts to elude its guidance, it 
would control what we consume almost as effectively as if it directly told us how to spend 
our income” (Hayek, 2006 [1944], p. 107). 
 Hayek never critiqued Keynes ‘General Theory’ (1936) and with great regret later on 
(Sanz-Bas, 2011). However, as the 20th century progressed, Hayek gained more and more 
influence specifically in the United States from his work ‘Road to Serfdom’ (1944).   
 Despite Hayek’s work being generally unnoticed in the UK and US during the mid-
1940’s it was the formation of the Mont Pélerin Society in 1947 that provided the catalyst for 
later neo-liberal policies, and its success was seen in influencing the award of the Nobel Prize 
for economics to Hayek in 1974. However, between the late 1940’s and mid 1970’s it was 
corporate funding and support from other neo-liberal think tanks such as the Adam Smith 
Institute and the Heritage Foundation that allowed Hayek to gain further influence in 
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universities and the media (Polanyi-Levitt, 2013, p. 5-15). 76  
The Dangers of Monopolising the Agorae 
What was to have an enormous impact on the Agorae was the World Wide Web that 
was invented by Sir Tim Berners-Lee in 1989. Some of the most influential organisations are 
now tech companies based in Silicon Valley including Google, Facebook, YouTube and 
Apple that seem to have an enormous, and dangerous, monopoly over information whereby 
most of these organisations have a greater value than some counties GDP. One of the big 
problems with the monopolisation of the web is its inevitable collusion with government 
which Berners-Lee outlines: “The web is now a public resource on which people, businesses, 
communities and governments depend. It is vital to democracy and now more critical to free 
expression than any other medium […] I believe that the future of the web is under threat 
from some governments that may abuse their powers, some businesses that may try to 
undermine the open market, and from criminal activity. In recent years we have seen a steady 
increase in censorship of the web by governments around the world. We’ve seen a 
proliferation of corporate walled gardens, excessively punitive laws pertaining to copyright 
and computer misuse, and attempts to undermine or disregard net neutrality” (Berners-Lee, 
2014).  
For Hayek (2006 [1944], p. 200) the most dangerous forms of monopoly come from 
two fronts, organised capital and organised labour, both of which if given too much power 
                                                          
76 An important point to be made here is that Hayek and Keynes were close friends however 
radically opposed each other’s economic principles. When Keynes died in 1946 Hayek 
mentioned that he was the greatest man he ever knew, and that the world would be lesser off 
without him (Wapshott, 2012, p. 206). 
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inevitably leads to totalitarianism. The actual development of monopolistic enterprise, 
contrary to popular belief, does not form from the competitive market but actually socialist 
interventions starting with the German socialist interventionists of the late nineteenth century 
(Ibid, p. 48-49).  
The monopolist organisation of the economy is supported by both organised capital 
and labour. Both these centralisations of power attempt to collude with Nomos for a reduction 
of competition within the Agorae and thus enable more power for themselves. This is why it 
is ironic that the propaganda from the left against the competitive market actually increases 
the likelihood of the development of super predator companies: “In some measure the 
monopolists have gained this support either by letting other groups participate in their gains 
or, and perhaps even more frequently, by persuading them that the formation of monopolies 
was in the public interest. But the change in public opinion which through its influence on 
legislation and judicature has been the most important factor to make this development 
possible, is more than anything the result of the propaganda against competition by the Left. 
Very frequently even measures aimed against the monopolists in fact serve only to strengthen 
the power of monopoly. Every raid on the gains of monopoly, be it in the interest of 
particular groups or of the state as a whole, tends to create new vested interests which will 
help to bolster up monopoly. A system in which large privileged groups profit from the gains 
of monopoly may be politically much more dangerous, and monopoly in such a system 
certainly is much more powerful, than in one where the profits go to a limited few” (Ibid, p. 
201-202).  
One of the most dangerous features of the development of monopolies within the 
Agorae, as pointed out by Adam Smith and Hayek, is the collusion with the state vis-à-vis 
Nomos. If the state works in collusion with the machinery of monopolies it becomes 
entangled as its representative: “The machinery of monopoly becomes identical with the 
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machinery of the state, and the state itself becomes more and more identified with the 
interests of those who run things than with the interests of the people in general” (Ibid, p. 
203). Therefore, Hayek’s solution is not to completely remove state intervention but to keep a 
very watchful eye on the development of monopolies and enforce strict price control that will 
limit extraordinary profits: “Only make the position of the monopolist once more that of the 
whipping boy of economic policy and you will be surprised how quickly most of the abler 
entrepreneurs will rediscover their taste for the bracing air of competition!” (Ibid, p. 204).  
The state should be very watchful of organised capital and labour which essentially 
attempt to destroy competition and thus the freedom of the individual. The market must be 
allowed to compete and offer as much opportunity for someone to become a quinary master 
themselves: “It is one of the saddest spectacles of our time to see a great democratic 
movement support a policy which must lead to the destruction of democracy and which 
meanwhile can benefit only a minority of the masses who support it. Yet it is this support 
from the Left of the tendencies towards monopoly which make them so irresistible and the 
prospects of the future so dark. So long as Labour continues to assist in the destruction of the 
only order under which at least some degree of independence and freedom has been secured 
to every worker, there is indeed little hope for the future. The Labour leaders who now 
proclaim so loudly that they have "done once and for all with the mad competitive system" 
are proclaiming the doom of the freedom of the individual. There is no other possibility than 
either the order governed by the impersonal discipline of the market or that directed by the 
will of a few individuals; and those who are out to destroy the first are wittingly or 
unwittingly helping to create the second. Even though some workmen will perhaps be better 
fed, and all will no doubt be more uniformly dressed in that new order, it is permissible to 
doubt whether the majority of English workmen will in the end thank the intellectuals among 
their leaders who have presented them with a socialist doctrine which endangers their 
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personal freedom” (Ibid, p. 205). Hayek was in favour of minor intervention by the state, 
however Friedman believed that even this was too much. 
According to Milton Friedman (1912-2006), the only way to prevent the development 
of monopolies is the complete divorce of the tertiary master from the Agorae and to allow it 
to experience full competition (Friedman, 2002 [1962]). Friedman argues that market 
freedom is inseparable to real freedom, and one only needs to take a look at the totalitarian 
disasters of the twentieth century for proof, whereby the state actively intervened in the 
economic sphere (Ibid, p. 10). The reason why market freedom is inseparable to real freedom 
is because the competiveness of the market regulates the “…concentration or dispersion of 
power” (Ibid, p. 9).  
As I mentioned in chapter 3, Dostoyevsky’s character in ‘Notes from Underground’ 
demonstrates one of the key features of human nature, as well as a major critique of 
utopianism: irrationality and spitefulness. Taking this into account, only the marketplace can 
offer a space for this never ending and alternating feature. That is to say that only the market 
is moveable to the changing needs of the Demos: “The liberal conceives of men as imperfect 
beings. He regards the problem of social organization to be as much a negative problem of 
preventing “bad” people from doing harm as of enabling “good” people to do good; and, of 
course, “bad” and “good” people may be the same people, depending on who is judging them 
[…] Fundamentally, there are only two ways of co-ordinating the economic activities of 
millions. One is central direction involving the use of coercion – the technique of the army 
and of the modern totalitarian state. The other is voluntary co-operation of individuals – the 
technique of the market place” (Friedman, 2002 [1962], p. 12-13). Despite Friedman’s 
unwavering support for the benefits and ‘freedom’ the market brings, is he right, along with 
the majority liberal viewpoint, that capitalism is solely about providing benefits to the Demos 
through voluntary exchange and produce? 
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According to Smith, the entire purpose of capitalism is to produce goods for 
consumption: “To maintain and augment the stock which may be reserved for immediate 
consumption, is the sole end and purpose both of the fixed and circulating capitals. It is this 
stock which feeds, clothes, and lodges the people” (Smith, 1976 [1776, II.i.26], p. 283). 
However, according to Clarke (2005), Smith is incorrect primarily due to what Marx called 
the “…absolute general law of capitalist accumulation” (Marx, 1909 [1867], p. 707).  
This law essentially is the process by which as wealth increases in the hands of a 
capitalist the need for labour will also increase. The reason why is that as the capitalist 
increases wealth they invest in new commodities, assets etc. that increase their wealth even 
more. However, by having more investments, which they will eventually want to sell at a 
profit, they will require more labour to produce them. The problem occurs when the capitalist 
has to compete with other quinary masters for market dominance. In order to have market 
dominance the capitalist must have large profits and therefore may reduce the price, but 
demand greater labour from the worker, of their product in order to keep costs down. They 
could also increase the price of the product but in doing so lose a competitive edge and will 
have to reduce the wages of the worker to maintain growth and profit. In the end it is the 
worker that always gets a bad deal. In summary, contrary to the liberal idea in the benefits of 
competition, capitalism does not fully serve a social good by means of providing necessary 
products to consumers, but simply floods the market with surplus unnecessary goods from 
many quinary masters with the aim of achieving dominance in the Agorae: “These means of 
overcoming competitive pressure lead to a constant increase in the quantity of commodities 
produced, the overproduction of which in turn intensifies the competitive pressure, which 
turns out to be merely the form in which overproduction confronts each individual capitalist. 
The market is, therefore, by no means the beneficent sphere in which social production is 
subordinated to social need as consumers exercise their freedom of choice; it is the arena in 
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which capitalists desperately seek to dispose of their surplus product at a profit […] The 
market is an instrument of ‘natural selection’ that judges not on the basis of an individual’s 
ability to contribute to society, but on the basis of the individual’s ability to contribute to the 
production of surplus value and the accumulation of capital. This is the moral law that is 
expressed in the platitudes of neo-liberalism” (Clarke, 2005, p. 54).77  
Despite the actual reality of the Agorae, according to Clarke and Marx, being simply a 
place where the quinary masters compete against each other, and not actually responding to 
the necessary needs of the Demos, neoliberalism is still the dominant force behind the market. 
That is to say that Nomos is still very reluctant to interfere with the process of free trade but 
did intervene in the crisis of 2008.       
Foundations of Contemporary Capitalism: Neoliberalism & the Great Recession 
The Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had a very personal attachment to Hayek’s 
Road to Serfdom.78 When it was published in 1944 Thatcher was 18 years old and it was a 
key work she read during her undergraduate degree at Oxford. Hayek’s works had an 
enormous impact on her political and economic policy: “Moore reports her recalling that she 
read “Hayek’s little masterpiece,” The Road to Serfdom, shortly after it was published in 
1944, while “in the 1970s she used to pull his The Constitution of Liberty out of her handbag, 
declaring ‘This is what we believe’” (Gray, 2013, p. 44). 
 Thatcher worked closely with the then US president Ronald Reagan, in office 1981 – 
                                                          
77 Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) believed that this process of constant innovation needed 
by the capitalist would eventually lead to its demise through what he called “Creative 
Destruction” (Schumpeter, 2003 [1942], p. 81-86).  
78 Margaret Thatcher was in office between 1979 - 1990 
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1989, and dramatically reworked the economic landscape promoting a free market and lifting 
previously established restrictions set by Keynesian economic theory. From there, the 
economic world of the west became consumed in Hayekian economics. 
The crash of 2008 led the economy of the western world into what some have now 
called ‘the great recession’. Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke argued that it was 
“…the worst financial crisis in modern history” (Bernanke as cited in Wessel, 2010). There 
are numerous statistics, however, arguably one of the most striking is that between October 
2007 and March 2009 the DOW JONES stock value fell by an enormous 11.2 trillion 
dollars.79 The resolving tactic of President Barack Obama was the ‘American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act 2009’. 
 This tactic was based on the Keynesian macroeconomic principle (Spending in bust, 
saving in boom), which aimed at stimulating the economy by injecting almost 1 trillion 
dollars into the public sector. Numerous economists including Joseph Stiglitz (2009, p. 24-
25) and Daron Acemoğlu (2009) supported the plan, however nobody more so than the Nobel 
Prize winner Paul Krugman, despite the fact that he argued the stimulus was not nearly big 
enough. An article in the New York Times by Krugman entitled ‘How did Economists get it 
so wrong’ (2009), claims that one of the biggest reasons for the 2008 crisis was that 
economists assumed that people were rational consumers: “They turned a blind eye to the 
limitations of human rationality that often lead to bubbles and busts; to the problems of 
institutions that run amok; to the imperfections of markets — especially financial markets — 
that can cause the economy’s operating system to undergo sudden, unpredictable crashes; and 
to the dangers created when regulators don’t believe in regulation” (Krugman, 2009). 
                                                          




Essentially the Demos were not rational in terms of their obedience to the quaternary master 
as they bought commodities, including housing, with loans that they could not pay back. The 
desire to consume, of the Demos, as dictated by the Agorae, essentially overran the barriers of 
a rational use of wealth. In other words the Demos were simply not living within their means.      
Many economists, according to Krugman, confess of being ‘new-Keynesians’ and still 
believe in active planning by the state, Nomos, in economic affairs, however they, the 
neoliberals, fail to see the limits of human rationality. The so called ‘freshwater economists’ 
who believe that people are generally rational and that markets can work perfectly, 
vehemently disagree with Keynes: “Such Keynesian thinking underlies the Obama 
administration’s economic policies — and the freshwater economists are furious. For 25 or so 
years they tolerated the Fed’s efforts to manage the economy, but a full-blown Keynesian 
resurgence was something entirely different. Back in 1980, Lucas, of the University of 
Chicago, wrote that Keynesian economics was so ludicrous that “at research seminars, people 
don’t take Keynesian theorizing seriously anymore; the audience starts to whisper and giggle 
to one another.” Admitting that Keynes was largely right, after all, would be too humiliating a 
comedown” (Krugman, 2009).   
Supporting the stimulus, Krugman suggests that what should be the focus of new 
economic theory is the inclusion of models that incorporate the irrationality of consumers, 
and a return to classic Keynesian economics: “So here’s what I think economists have to do. 
First, they have to face up to the inconvenient reality that financial markets fall far short of 
perfection that they are subject to extraordinary delusions and the madness of crowds. 
Second, they have to admit — and this will be very hard for the people who giggled and 
whispered over Keynes — that Keynesian economics remains the best framework we have 
for making sense of recessions and depressions. Third, they’ll have to do their best to 
incorporate the realities of finance into macroeconomics” (Krugman, 2009).  
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 However, according to John Cochrane, that Paul Krugman criticises, Krugman is 
incorrect on numerous points (Cochrane, 2011). One major point is that Krugman assumes 
that the case for a free market economy is solely based on the idea that they are ‘perfect’. 
Cochrane stresses that the main argument in support of a free market was always that a 
government-controlled economy has always been much worse, such as communism and the 
dangers outlined with monopolies. Additionally, when Krugman argues that the incorporation 
of behaviour models into economic theory would help us understand the current crisis, he 
fails to see how government control has failed just as badly as private investors. Therefore 
this behavioural view, according to Cochrane, is actually providing support against regulation 
than for it: “To Krugman, the crash was caused by ‘irrationality’. To Krugman, there is one 
magic cure-all for all economic problems: fiscal stimulus. It’s really a remarkably empty 
view of the world […] Krugman argues that ‘a more or less Keynesian view is the only 
plausible game in town’, and ‘Keynesian economics remains the best framework we have for 
making sense of recessions and depressions’. One thing is pretty clear by now, that when 
economics incorporates flaws and frictions, the result will not be to rehabilitate an 80-year-
old book. As Krugman bemoans, the ‘new Keynesians’ who did just what he asks by putting 
Keynes-inspired price-stickiness into logically coherent models, ended up with something 
that looked a lot more like monetarism. A science that moves forward almost never ends up 
back where it started: Einstein revised Newton, but did not send us back to Aristotle” 
(Cochrane, 2011, p. 3- 4). 
 From covering the two camps of Hayek and Keynes one thing is clear, the debate is 
still very much alive and has substantial hurdles to face.80 The economist James Galbraith, a 
                                                          
80 In the controversial recent academy award-winning documentary ‘Inside Job’ (2010), a 
curious chapter explored the educational conflict of interest with Harvard University in 
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post-Keynesian, has said in his work ‘The predator state: How conservatives abandoned the 
free market and why liberals should too’ (2008) that the US has become a ‘corporate 
republic’ and from what we discussed, is very much Hayekian. Galbraith says that from the 
1980’s, during the Reagan and Thatcher years, policy changed to incorporate “…promised 
prosperity without the trouble of planning for it, achieved through a simple three-step 
program: cut taxes, end inflation, and free the market” (Galbraith, 2008, p. 4) and that, 
“Everywhere you look, the public decision is made by the agent of a private party for the 
purpose of delivering private gain. This is not an accident: it is a system” (Galbraith, 2008, p. 
147). From what I have covered we can say without much doubt that in the 2010’s we are 
still very much within a Hayekian version of Agorae. 
It was the deregulation of the markets that Reagan and Thatcher opted for in the early 
80’s that claimed would usher in an era of plentitude and wealth. This was closely followed 
by more deregulation in 1999 with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act under President Bill 
Clinton. This act essentially removed the security and regulatory mechanisms of the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933. Glass-Steagall essentially prohibited banks from activities that used 
public money and therefore ushered in rigorous controls of financial sector trading. In fact, 
according to Democratic senator Elizabeth Warren, Glass-Steagall when implemented, led to 
50 years of stable economic growth with only a tiny amount of small banks going under: 
“Look at the history. From 1797 to 1933 the American banking system crashed about every 
15 years, in 1933 we put good reforms in place for which Glass-Steagall was the centerpiece 
and from 1933 to the early 1980’s, that’s a 50 year period, we didn’t have any of that, none, 
                                                          
promoting a Hayekian worldview. It demonstrated its previous president, Lawrence Summers 
(2001 to 2006), who was economic advisor to Obama and has subsequently returned to 
Harvard (Lowrey & Story, 2013) as a pioneer of de-regulation of derivatives.  
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we kept the system steady and secure and it was only when we started de-regulating you start 
hitting the S&L crisis and what did we do, we de-regulated some more and then you hit long 
term capital management at the end of the 90’s and what did we do as a country we needed to 
de-regulate more and then we hit the big crash in 2008” (Marr, 2013). 
Postmodernism as Late Capitalism 
 Fredric Jameson summarises in his work ‘The Seeds of Time’ (1994) that it is easier 
to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism (Jameson, 1994). 
Some works including Evan Calder William’s ‘Combined and Uneven Apocalypse’ (2011) 
has outlined this viewpoint in further detail: that the modern trend of zombies, viruses and 
labor pandemics paint a dark landscape of the public imagination in late capitalistic society 
(William, 2011). In other words, the deeper aspects of our imagination reveal a dystopic 
wasteland that we have gained from living under late capitalism. Indeed, what Box (2011) 
claims is essential in capitalistic society, and what Marcuse call’s ‘the warfare state’ 
(Marcuse, 2002 [1964], p. 21), is a permanent ontological existence of defense and 
aggression, or what Box calls ‘commercial militarism’ (Box, 2011, p. 178-179). This could 
arguably also represent the constant creative destruction as outlined by Schumpeter. A 
destructive force of brutal competitive warfare that the individual cannot escape: “It is hardly 
necessary to point out that competition of the kind we now have in mind acts not only when 
in being but also when it is merely an ever-present threat. It disciplines before it attacks. The 
businessman feels himself to be in a competitive situation even if he is alone…” 
(Schumpeter, 2003 [1942], p. 85).   
 Jameson focuses on what he calls the “Utopian problem”, which he describes as the 
inability for subjects to comprehend or even represent an alternative society to the one we 
currently inhabit of late capitalism. The Utopian problem is not a new one; it has been 
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redesigned under postmodern theory as not the physical mechanics of society, of literal 
capital, but of how the subject perceives this society. As Jameson states: “There is here the 
suggestion, not of outright censorship, but of an instinctive self-repression of real thought, of 
an all-too-knowing turning away from anything that might lead you to unpleasant truths and 
to ideas of action which either promise guilt or ask you to change your life. This is not, I 
think, a “vulgar Marxist" analysis.... On the contrary, it would seem to have its affinities with 
Freud's view of the patient he called the Rat Man, who had to make himself stupid, to stop 
himself from thinking, in order not to confront the unwanted and thereby unconscious 
realities of his own existence” (Jameson, 1998, p. 37). As I will show later, it is this 
resignation of conscience under the demands of the quinary master that contributes to 
depression.  
 Jameson argues that there have been numerous attempts to quell the hold that 
capitalism has on society. However, anti-capitalist thought and action seems to always result 
in a failure of practical implementation and totalitarianism. The Frankfurt school attempted a 
Marxist psychology addressing societal problems and psycho political issues and helped 
generate the term ‘late capitalism’, and it is through that school that many problems, 
including bureaucratic control and the concept of ‘state capitalism’ were critiqued (Jameson, 
1990).  
The culture of the times, Jameson argues, seen in the media, entertainment and 
celebrity, have been projected into a sphere whereby reality and fiction coincide, similar to 
Adorno’s ‘Culture Industry’, however remain semiautonomous to the imagination of the 
public: “With this fundamental historical difference that in the classical period reality 
persisted independently of that sentimental and romantic “cultural sphere,” whereas today it 
seems to have lost that separate mode of existence. Today, culture impacts back on reality in 
ways that make any independent and, as it were, non-or extracultural form of it problematic 
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so that the theorists finally unite their voices in a new doxa that the “referent” no longer 
exists” (Jameson, 1990b, p. 109). In other words, as outlined in chapter 3, the escape away 
from abstraction, which is the romantic ideal, has also been capitalised on, leading to a 
feeling of complete imprisonment. That is to say that the ‘cultural sphere’ no longer escapes 
the gaze of the Agorae whereby it totalises the individual. To further clarify, as the tertiary 
master interpellates the individuals Logos, and because the tertiary master reaches further 
synthesis with the Agorae, the subject comes to see the world of capitalism as ‘common 
sense’ with no realistic alternative.   
 Is Jameson here suggesting that in postmodern capitalist society reality is itself 
becoming a commodity, or being presented as such in the public imagination? With this 
being said, has ‘truth’ become just another relative term, one that exists only in the 
imagination? In attempting to answer this, Žižek (2006) refers to the Lacanian concept of the 
Big Other, and suggests that instead of presenting the ‘truth’ as a relativistic internal function, 
we externalize this anxiety to be solved for us by the Other. It is as if there is no autonomy 
even in thought, as thinking is externalized and done for us: “Such a displacement of our 
most intimate feelings and attitudes onto some figure of the Other is at the very core of 
Lacan’s notion of the big Other; it can affect not only feelings but also beliefs and knowledge 
- the Other can also believe and know for me” (Žižek, 2006, p. 27).  
This symbiosis of the subject’s desire pivoted upon the latent superstructure of the 
Agorae is central to my inquiry. Desire of the subject is, as outlined in chapter 1, not the 
property of the desirer but of the Other. The subject perceives himself not within his desire, 
but within the Phantasy inherent from one’s ‘grasp’ of what the other wants, Che vuoi? “The 
subject therefore, in so far as he desires, does not know where he is with respect to the 
unconscious articulation, namely to this sign, to this scansion that he repeats in so far as it is 
unconscious. Where is this subject as such? Is he at the point where he desires? He is not at 
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the point where he desires, he is somewhere in the phantasy” (Lacan, 1959 [3/06/1959], p. 7).    
 Jameson’s point however is interesting as he argues that the term ‘postmodernism’ 
shouldn’t be used at all, mainly because its inherent definition is essentially obscure and 
contradictory. Instead, Jameson views postmodernism as essentially a logic of late capitalism: 
“As for postmodernism itself, I have not tried to systematize a usage or to impose any 
conveniently coherent thumnail meaning, for the concept is not merely contested, it is also 
internally conflicted and contradictory. I will argue that, for good or ill, we cannot use it” 
(Jameson, 1991, p. xxii).  
 If we are to take this point, that postmodernism is essentially a form of capitalism; we 
can begin to theorize that a postmodern subject is, in essence, actually a capitalist subject. To 
provide further support to his argument, Jameson turns to Heidegger’s concept of ‘Der 
Ursprung des Kunstwerkes’ (1950), translated as ‘The Origin of the work of Art’, where 
works of art essentially represent the gap between the earth and world or, as Jameson says, 
should be viewed more as the gap between the meaninglessness of the body and the 
meaningfulness of history and society.    
 In using Heidegger, Jameson provides a cross comparison of two pieces of art, Van 
Gogh’s ‘A Pair of Boots’ (1887), and Andy Warhol’s ‘Diamond Dust Shoes’ (1980). What 
Jameson demonstrates is that both works essentially embody the zeitgeist of different 





























In Van Gogh’s painting, the boots represent labor on a much richer scale than 
Warhol’s shoes. They are worn down, dirty, represent a world of deep characterization and of 
historical verisimilitude. These boots represent for Jameson the high modernist world, a 
world rich in feeling and a complex mix of ‘intensities’. However, Warhol’s shoes 
deliberately convey the opposite: a shallow, materialistic, glossy object; a turn to 
exhibitionism rather than realism: “But there are some other significant differences between 
the high-modernist and the postmodernist moment, between the shoes of Van Gogh and the 
shoes of Andy Warhol, on which I must now briefly dwell. The first and most evident is the 
emergence of a new kind of flatness or depthlessness, a new kind of superficiality in the most 
literal sense, perhaps the supreme formal feature of all the postmodernisms to which we will 
have occasion to return in a number of other contexts” (Jameson, 1991, p. 9). 
Because the Agorae is deregulated by Nomos, under the banner of neoliberalism, its 
behaviour is one of extreme competitiveness. However, as mentioned earlier, this 
competitiveness is not simply aimed at catering for the demands of the Demos, but the 
production of an enormous amount of surplus products that the capitalist floods the market 
with in order to gain a monopoly. Mass over-production thus essentially transforms the world 
into a huge shopping mall, with stockpiles of products that will never be used. Thus, the 
tsunami of wasteful and superficial products dominate the Agorae.  
The immediate effects on the individual is to put them into a world similar to 
Huxley’s ‘Brave New World’ (1932); a world of endless entertainment, distraction and 
shallowness: “As the art and science of manipulation come to be better understood, the 
dictators of the future will doubtless learn to combine these techniques with the non-stop 
distractions which, in the West, are now threatening to drown in a sea of irrelevance the 
rational propaganda essential to the maintenance of individual liberty and the survival of 
democratic institutions” (Huxley, 1958, p. 14). In Huxley’s ‘Brave New World’, sexuality is 
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used as a form of distraction through ‘orgy-porgy’ and fundamental needs such as socialising 
are removed of their complex interpersonal factors such as difference, eccentricity and 
originality and replaced with superficial instant hits of sex, excitement and inebriation. These 
are presented as if via an economic imperative to prevent people from thinking too much or 
engaging in meaningful experience; meaning and the pursuit of ‘truth’ is therefore hidden and 
overwhelmed through mass consumerism. This is also why under Adorno’s ‘Culture 
Industry’ “Any logical connection calling for mental effort is painstakingly avoided” 
(Adorno, 2010 [1944], p. 137).  
Postmodernism as contemporary capitalism is so successful primarily because it is 
extremely malleable.81 Postmodernism shares a great many similarities with Huxley’s ‘Brave 
New World’ and will become more so the further the Agorae synthesises with Nomos. 
Edward Bernays (1891-1995), the nephew of Freud, believed that this synthesis was already 
in place in the 1920s as outlined in his work ‘Propaganda’ (1928): “The conscious and 
intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important 
element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society 
constitute an invisible government [Agorae], which is the true ruling power of our country. 
We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by 
                                                          
81 Contrary to what some believe to be more widely read, Orwell’s ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four’ 
(1949), Huxley’s vision seems to hold more gravitas, bearing more on some of the 
characteristics of modern day capitalist culture. Christopher Hitchens points out that although 
George Orwell’s dystopic vision still holds a lot of importance in viewing the role of 
government, Huxley’s genius was in the realisation that the Orwellian society could break but 




men we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way in which our democratic 
society is organized. Vast numbers of human beings must cooperate in this manner if they are 
to live together as a smoothly functioning society” (Bernays, 2004 [1928], p. 3). 
Jameson states that “…capitalism is at one and the same time the best thing that has 
ever happened to the human race, and the worst” (Jameson, 1991, p. 47). Capitalism has 
brought enormous benefits and has lifted many people out of poverty but has, with its 
postmodern characteristics, slowly removed any sense of grand narrative. That is to say that 
any sense of guiding myth has been incorporated into the production cycle and commodified 
(Ibid, p. 270). Furthermore, that “…the concept of the market lies in its “totalizing” 
structure…” (Ibid, p. 272). The fantasy of autonomy is swamped in the bureaucratisation of 
late capitalism which was once, under classical capitalism, clearly separate from the Agorae 
but now is synonymous with it. 
Neoliberalism does not care for politics, Nomos, except when it interferes with the 
Agorae (Ibid, p. 265). For Jameson the Agorae represents a new Hobbesian Leviathan: “The 
market is thus Leviathan in sheep’s clothing: its function is not to encourage and perpetuate 
freedom (let alone of a political variety) but rather to repress it; and about such visions, 
indeed, one may revive the slogans of the existential years – the fear of freedom, the flight 
from freedom” (Ibid, p. 273). In other words we may believe that we are free in 
contemporary capitalism but this is a deep illusion, a false self or abstraction, which contains 
us in a realm of universality which sole aim is to prevent us from conceiving a genuine 
freedom away from the commodification process.      
This new Leviathan of a postmodern Agorae aims to become more and more separate 
from the regulatory activity of Nomos. Thus the addition of new bureaucrats, in the Deleuzian 
sense (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004 [1988], p. 126), are the neoliberals that equate real freedom 
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with market freedom. However, what is important to note is that the Agorae is still 
subservient to the tertiary master. The quinary masters, which constitute the very fabric of the 
Agorae, are not given carte blanche. A quinary master cannot escape the law completely. One 
classic case of this was seen with Enron that gained a huge monopoly within the quaternary 
master but was still persecuted for massive fraud by Nomos despite that it was a public 
company (Li, 2010).    
Quinary Masters & Meritocratic Society 
“I believe that nature itself reveals that it’s a just thing for the better man and the more 
capable man to have a greater share than the worse man and the less capable man. Nature 
shows that this is so in many places; both among the other animals and in whole cities and 
races of men, it shows that this is what justice has been decided to be: that the superior rule 
the inferior and have a greater share than they” – Callicles (Plato, 1997d [483d], p. 828) 
 
The above quotation is taken from a section of the Platonic dialogue Gorgias in which 
Socrates engages with Callicles, a student of Gorgias, who subscribes to the idea that those 
who have ‘beneficial’ attributes should reap the world of its luxuries. In supporting the active 
life, rather than contemplative, Callicles is, I believe, supporting the idea of a pure 
meritocracy. However, Socrates eventually accuses Callicles of inconsistency by showing 
that he equates the terms better, superior, stronger, braver and intelligent as all the same thing 
and by offering no real definition (Plato, 1997d [488b – 492e], p. 831 – 836).       
As mentioned earlier by Clarke (2005, p. 54), neoliberalism tends to view and 
promote the Agorae as a space of naturalistic competition. The absurd requirements to be 
overly ‘acceptable’ or ‘reasonable’ in today’s capitalist culture are numerous. The 
psychoanalyst Paul Verhaeghe, in his recent work ‘What About Me: The Struggle for Identity 
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in a Market-Based Society’ (2014), says that society is being engineered through a form of 
Social Darwinism with its main mantra being forced on individuals to be more ‘reasonable’. 
However, what does that imply? 
As society is being engineered through a form of Social Darwinism, we can begin to 
see how via the long process and development of technology and capitalism since its early 
beginnings, as outlined by Max Weber, society has attempted to become a utopia of 
implemented reason under the banner of ‘progress’ and guidance under Protestant 
Rationalism, which in turn has led to a diminishment of what we might call the ‘individual’ 
and their unique subjective experience and perception toward the world. Despite the 
insistence on the importance of reason dating back to Greek antiquity, under Protestant 
Rationalism and the Enlightenment this became politicized and its definition became much 
narrower: “Aristotle and his contemporaries would have been amazed at such naïveté. 
Science is inherently value-laden because it involves looking for answers to fundamental 
questions about life. So it’s no coincidence that Aristotle elaborated his views on knowledge 
as subservient to morality. There’s no such thing as value-free knowledge, just as there’s no 
such thing as passion-free science. Yet this has been increasingly strongly denied in recent 
decades, as conceptions of science have got narrower and narrower” (Verhaeghe, 2014, p. 
68).  
This has not only been denied, but I will go so far as to say that it has been reversed: 
that morality has become subservient to science. Aristotle and his contemporaries would have 
been shocked primarily because society en masse had embraced and ignored a fundamental 
error, the naturalistic fallacy, which was elaborated upon within David Hume’s ‘A Treatise of 
Human Nature’ (1739) whereby “…morality is not an object of reason” (Hume, 1985 [1739], 
p. 520). To explain further, Hume states that any type of virtuous action, be it engaging in 
production or work, cannot exist without a prior motive (Ibid, p. 531). In observing the 
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majority of workers today, including employers, the demand for greater output and efficiency 
is growing whereby the more ‘virtuous’ one is, the more one submits to the motive of 
repression. In further clarification, the ‘virtuous’ subject is one that has given oneself up to 
the desire of their quinary, or in the case of an employer, quaternary masters. As stated 
earlier, the Praxis is therefore recognized by the quinary or quaternary master and is 
rewarded with acknowledgement vis-à-vis payment or praise. This motive is thus the very 
point of abstraction, as outlined in chapter 3, which aims to regulate and de-subjectivise the 
individual by turning them into a working object: “…they mutilate the labourer into a 
fragment of a man, degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, destroy every 
remnant of charm in his work and turn it into a hated toil; they estrange from him the 
intellectual potentialities of the labour-process in the same proportion as science is 
incorporated in it as an independent power; they distort the conditions under which he works, 
subject him during the labour process to a despotism the more hateful for its meanness; they 
transform his life-time into working-time, and drag his wife and child beneath the wheels of 
the Juggernaut of capital, But all methods for the production of surplus value are at the same 
time methods of accumulation ; and every extension of accumulation becomes again a means 
for the development of these methods” (Marx, 1909 [1867], p. 708).  
According to Verhaeghe, Social Darwinism uses the theory of evolution as a method 
of social engineering to create an ideal ‘model’ of society, which became known as the 
Eugenics movement. This movement had disastrous consequences and was utilised 
throughout the US and UK. In an interesting essay entitled ‘More Merciful and Not Less 
Effective”: Eugenics and American Economics in the Progressive Era’ (2003), by Thomas C. 
Leonard, Eugenics was utilised as a form of social control and had been used as a mediator in 
capitalist society: “A minority of the working poor, the “industrial residuum” as the Fabians 
called it, were regarded not as victims deserving public aid, but as threats needing public 
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restraint. This crude eugenic sorting of the industrial poor into worthy and unworthy 
categories was reinforced by economic theories of wage determination” (Leonard, 2003, p. 
700). Leonard goes on to quote two ‘Progressive Economists’, Beatrice Webb and her 
husband Sidney Webb (1st Baron of Passfield) who helped establish the London School of 
Economics. This is their definition of the unemployable: “…children, the aged, and the child-
bearing women . . . the sick and the crippled, the idiots and lunatics, the epileptic, the blind 
and the deaf and dumb, the criminals and the incorrigibly idle, and all those who are actually 
“morally deficient” . . . and [those] incapable of steady or continuous application, or who are 
so deficient in strength, speed or skill that they are incapable . . . of producing their 
maintenance at any occupation whatsoever” (Webb & Webb, 1920 [1897], p. 785). 
The Webb’s were also early members of the Fabian Society, the oldest British 
Political think-tank that is still up and running after being established in 1884.  Its official 
website quotes the Webb’s as its most significant members and developed “…the ideas that 
would come to characterise Fabian thinking and in developing the thorough research 
methodology that remains a feature of the Society to the present day” (The Fabian Society, 
2015). Based in London, this society aims at generating greater equality of power, wealth and 
opportunity, citizenship, liberty and human rights as well as multilateral international 
cooperation, has been called socialist and is closely aligned with the Labour Party. I do not 
want to drift too far into further economics, yet what is important is how Eugenics, or the 
appeal to nature had a direct influence on shaping the Agorae and therefore society. What is 
also interesting is that Hayek was a veteran member of the Fabians, which also has very close 
ties with the Mount Pelerin Society and Heritage Foundation that I discussed earlier 
(Murawiec, 1983; Thompson & Wolfe, 1981). 
A meritocratic society is one of the major outcomes of neoliberalism. Today we live 
in a constant state of evaluation, measurement, observation and demand to succeed, grow, 
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improve, develop, create and become wealthy all of which is generated under the aegis of 
competitiveness. Individual worth is measured in numbers, figures, graphs and performance, 
whereby all that is not quantifiable is considered worthless. Rousseau would be appalled at 
this shallow view of the human condition, because it attempts to standardize, suppress and 
coerce immense creative diversity under a single banner, what I call Protestant Rationalism. 
According to Verhaeghe, the society we live in, neoliberalism, is still very much 
governed by Social Darwinism, yet we have now replaced ‘genes’ with ‘talent’ (Verhaeghe, 
2014, p. 119). Human relations is big business in today’s culture, whereby employers 
commonly use rankings to govern employees. One of the major types of rankings is the 
20/70/10 rule that was adopted by Jack Welch, the previous CEO of General Electric, 
whereby he sacked ten percent of his company in one go (MacLennan, 2007, p. 28).82 
Assessing employees within a company is quite a complex task, yet with the introduction of 
objective performance measurements: earnings potential, calls made to clients, successful 
outcomes etc. a standardized model can be generated that employees must adhere to or risk 
dismissal or even workplace humiliation.83  
One dangerous consequence and example of a meritocratic society can be seen with 
emotional maintenance, which is now seen within businesses across the world as customer 
satisfaction training or more generally human resource development. This multi-billion dollar 
industry has exploded in recent years with companies such as Aon Corporation, Mercer, The 
Weissman Group and many others offering organizational change through the emotional 
                                                          
82 20% represent the high achievers, 70% representing the critical bulk and 10% the 
underachievers. 
83 Indeed, before sacking an employee Enron would post their picture, name and their failure 
on their public website (Verhaeghe, 2014, p. 122) 
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regulation of employees in accordance with company goals.84 With the development of 
capitalism, and with neoliberalism being the dominant ideology today, can we not argue that 
certain affects or emotional characteristics have been ‘favored’ or selected, whilst others have 
been prohibited based on their ‘perceived’ merit or utilization value?   
Is meritocracy the best we currently have? That is to say, having equality of 
opportunity, based on an individual’s merit, is much less oppressive than equality of outcome 
whereby companies selectively discriminate on the grounds that some people are ‘less 
capable’ and so should be given a greater chance of employment. In answering this I would 
agree that equality of opportunity is vastly superior and less oppressive, however the issue of 
what is ‘beneficial’ in terms of merit needs closer inspection.  
Ayn Rand’s Objectivism as Merit 
Verhaeghe states that under a pure meritocratic system “Society must not hinder me; 
on the contrary, it must give everyone equal opportunities, and ‘may the best man win’. By 
the same reasoning, care for individuals that have not made it is an anomaly. After all, they 
only have themselves to blame for their failure, so why should we help them?” (Verhaeghe, 
2014, p. 76). One of the biggest supporters for this type of thinking was Ayn Rand (1905-
1982), whose main philosophy is objectivism. 
Ayn Rand was and is a very polarizing figure. One can consider her to be almost the 
compete opposite of Hume, whereby her ethical standpoint is that morality, or virtuous 
action, is a product of reason: “The virtue of Rationality means the recognition and 
acceptance of reason as one’s only source of knowledge, one’s only judge of values and one’s 
                                                          
84 Emotional regulation has been defined as “…the process of regulating both feelings and 
expressions for organizational goals’ or social norms” (Grandey, 2000, p. 97). 
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only guide to action […] It means a commitment to the principle that all of one’s convictions, 
values, goals, desires and actions must be based on, derived from, chosen and validated by a 
process of thought—as precise and scrupulous a process of thought, directed by as ruthlessly 
strict an application of logic, as one’s fullest capacity permits” (Rand, 1992 [1964], p. 22). 
For Rand, in order to be a happy individual, one must aim to be a “Superman” (Rand, 
1999 [1997], p. 285), which is similar to the Nietzschean übermensch, but one that is super-
rational. However, Ryan (2003, p. 345) points out that for Nietzsche those that cannot 
become an übermensch are still human, but for Rand a person that does not achieve this 
super-rational existence is sub-human. 
It seems then that the ideal mode of existence for Rand is to become a somewhat 
highly efficient apathetic automaton, which should be constantly hounded by the dictates of 
reason whereby any inkling of conscience should be brutally suppressed and mocked: “The 
basic social principle of the Objectivist ethics is that just as life is an end in itself, so every 
living human being is an end in himself, not the means to the ends or the welfare of others—
and, therefore, that man must live for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor 
sacrificing others to himself. To live for his own sake means that the achievement of his own 
happiness is man’s highest moral purpose” (Rand, 1999 [1997], p. 23). For her, spontaneity 
of feeling that arises through the Logos should be constantly surveilled and censored: “Man’s 
emotional mechanism is like an electronic computer, which his mind has to program—and 
the programming consists of the values his mind chooses” (Ibid, p. 24).85 It is this very 
                                                          
85 This is similar to Kant’s notion of obedience to reason, as outlined in chapter 3, and using 
it to regulate desire (Kant, 2002 [1788, 25], p. 37).  
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process that I believe contributes to contemporary depression, which will be explored in the 
next chapter.  
Rand’s philosophy is akin to living through a reverse telescope whereby all mental 
phenomenon, including the fantasy of autonomy, should be rigorously organized, fixed and 
weighed down under the juggernaut of cold selfish rationalism. In this way she is similar to 
Descartes skepticism, Coleridge’s notion of fancy and Callicles pleonexia: “First of all, by 
the ones who are the superior I don’t mean cobblers or cooks, but those who are intelligent 
about the affairs of the city, about the way it’s to be well managed. And not only intelligent, 
but also brave, competent to accomplish whatever they have in mind, without slackening off 
because of softness of spirit” (Plato, 1997d [491a – 491b], p. 834). For her, there is no middle 
ground, there is no crossing the river and there is no greyness but a penetrating black and 
white world of either pure reason or pure irrationality. As Lamb outlined in chapter 3: 
“Between the affirmative and the negative there is no border-land with him [her]. You cannot 
hover with him [her] upon the confines of truth, or wander in the maze of a probable 
argument. He [She] always keeps the path. You cannot make excursions with him [her] – for 
he [she] sets you right” (Lamb, 1892 [1823], p. 123).  
One case example where Rand’s philosophy of objectivism was incorporated into a 
managerial system was Sears Holdings headed by the CEO Eddie Lampert. Lampert was an 
avid supporter of Rand’s philosophy and decided to run the company based on her ideas. He 
broke up the company into 30 individual units, quinary masters, and told them to compete 
against each other, in a ‘rationalistic’ and selfish manner, similar to the Agorae. Lampert 
believed that this would create an environment of great competition and mutual benefit for 
the entire company. What really happened was that each individual unit, with its own 
managerial system, ended up undercutting the others, underwent ravenous infighting and 




The debate surrounding how the Agorae should be managed is still very conflictual 
and complex with good points on either side. I believe that it is necessary to regulate the 
Agorae although by how much is still extremely debatable and complex. There are two 
extremes to this debate whereby Nomos should either seep its tentacles as far as possible into 
the workings of the quinary masters and Agorae, but in doing so run a huge risk of collusion, 
despotism and loss of competitiveness. On the other hand a full laissez faire Agorae can 
inevitably lead to monopolies that eventually try and collude with Nomos for further 
dominance giving them enormous power that even Smith foresaw.  
The idea of meritocracy is a necessary reality that the left seriously have to consider, 
as any alternative drifts dangerously close to some of the worst cases of an equality of 
outcome approach as seen with dekulakization. This alternative approach selectively 
discriminates against those that have genuine merits and favors those who are deemed more 
worthy of employment solely based on pathos. To exist in a society based on equality of 
outcome would be to seriously disrupt it and alienate highly skilled individuals that, arguably, 
would diminish the productivity and wealth of a country. However, when it comes to 
meritocracy, there should be consideration on what these merits are. To be a highly selfish 
and ‘rational’ employee may work well under certain quinary masters but not others. The 
skills to be a holiday rep is different than a financier, a tailor than an analyst. What becomes 
an issue therefore is where certain merits of rationalistic automation become too 
bureaucratized, that is to say that the managerial structure of a quinary master dehumanizes 
the employee and strips them of their secondary imagination and forces them to overly 
regulate, through cognition and objectification, their fantasy of subjectivity.  
Thistlethwaite: 207 
 
One should re-read Orwell’s ‘Road to Wigan Pier’ (1937) that still holds true, perhaps 
even more so today, for outlining the problems of socialist criticism. Today there seems to be 
a resurgence from the left against the ‘evils’ of capitalism. For Orwell, socialism had been 
perverted by certain members of the left that had failed to remember its basic meaning which 
is simply to be against tyranny and to support liberty, justice and common decency (Orwell, 
1958 [1937], p. 208, 246 & 248). The socialists of the 1930s, and I would think more so 
today, are not within the working classes but the middle (Ibid, p. 205). A real working class 
individual, which they claim to represent and support, not only feels alienated by them but 
does not understand their overly complex jargon that they continuously hide behind: “As for 
the philosophic side of Marxism, the pea-and-thimble trick with those three mysterious 
entities, thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, I have never met a working man who had the faintest 
interest in it” (Ibid, p. 209).  
The reason why socialism has such a bad name, Orwell says, is that it has tended to 
attract people that most of society perceive with distaste: “…there is the horrible—the really 
disquieting—prevalence of cranks wherever Socialists are gathered together. One sometimes 
gets the impression that the mere words “Socialism” and “Communism” draw towards them 
with magnetic force every fruit-juice drinker, nudist, sandal-wearer, sex-maniac, Quaker, 
“Nature Cure” quack, pacifist and feminist in England” (Ibid, p. 206). The modern left seem 
to see oppression where there is not any. Ideas of toxic masculinity, safe spaces on university 
campuses, microaggressions and cisgendered patriarchy are flooding universities and the 
public consciousness. Orwell pointed out in his time the remarkable similarities of 
communism with Roman Catholicism in their total paranoia of bourgeois oppression and sin 
respectively (Ibid, p. 212-214). Socialism also adopted, as well as today, this type of witch 
hunt: “Sometimes, when I listen to these people talking, and still more when I read their 
books, I get the impression that, to them, the whole Socialist movement is no more than a 
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kind of exciting heresy-hunt—a leaping to and fro of frenzied witchdoctors to the beat of 
tom-toms and the tune of “Fee, fi, fo, fum, I smell the blood of a right-wing deviationist!” 
(Ibid, p. 253). 
There is real oppression in the world, real inequality. To stand against economic 
injustice and workplace humiliation does not warrant that one has to become a full blown left 
wing activist. If someone feels entrapped within their quinary master they could change 
occupation, however this is sometimes deemed impossible by the subject primarily due to 
huge financial risk. This ‘fear of freedom’ is essentially a fear of the repercussions from the 
superego. That is to say that if the subject were to leave, or challenge, their quinary master, 
by undergoing the route 2-3, as outlined in the schema of abstraction, the demand by the 
given master to bring them to heel resurges with great force, which is very difficult to ignore.  
Under neoliberalism the character of the Agorae and quinary masters is becoming 
more technocratic whereby old merits and methods of labor are slowly being eradicated and 
replaced by automation and AI (Waytz & Norton, 2014). As mentioned earlier, as the Agorae 
developed, the demand for specific skills increased and therefore certain organisations gave 
increased funding to universities and libraries to produce more specialist workmen (Durant & 
Durant, 1967, p. 681). Today universities are becoming more and more like factories and 
businesses that aim not to educate in the classical manner but to simply produce efficient 
employees (Brown & Carasso, 2013 & McGettigan, 2013).  
However, some universities are also becoming hotbeds for anti-capitalist rhetoric 
whereby, according to a recent survey by Spiked (2017), 63.5% of 115 UK universities have 
hostile approaches to free speech, have outright banned right-wing newspapers, controversial 
speakers, adverts and some student societies.  
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Both left wing and capitalist activists go too far into the extremities of the Aristotelian 
virtues of liberality and righteous indignation and thus will always be at odds with each other. 
For the left envy the bourgeois and thus seek illiberalism, the bourgeois enjoy maliciously 
their ‘superiority’ and thus submerge within prodigality and pleonexia. There has to be an 
attempt at a synthesis, an aim at the golden mean where both parties can meet. Hitchens had 
this to say on the matter: “Marxism, I conceded, had its intellectual and philosophical and 
ethical glories, but they were in the past. Something of the heroic period might perhaps be 
retained, but the fact had to be faced: there was no longer any guide to the future. In addition, 
the very concept of a total solution had led to the most appalling human sacrifices, and to the 
invention of excuses for them […] There are days when I miss my old convictions as if they 
were an amputated limb. But in general I feel better, and no less radical, and you will feel 
better too, I guarantee, once you leave hold of the doctrinaire and allow your chainless mind 












Chapter 5: The Concept of Depression 
Introduction 
“Man is a rational animal – so at least I have been told. Throughout a long life, I have 
looked diligently for evidence in favour of this statement, but so far I have not had the good 
fortune to come across it, though I have searched in many countries spread over three 
continents” (Russell, 1950, p. 95). 
 
“Gorging himself in gloom: no love was left; 
All the earth was but one thought – and that was death”  
‘Darkness’ by Byron (2017 [1816]) 
 
 According to the World Health Organisation (WHO) depression affects around 350 
million people worldwide, is the leading cause of disability, contributes to 20 million suicides 
per year and on average is seen in 1 in 20 people (WHO, 2012). Depression can lead to 
suicide and is the second largest cause of death between 15-29 year olds (WHO, 2017). 
Depression, melancholia, chronic sadness etc. has a long and complicated history. It was 
Hippocrates in 5th century BC Greece that aimed to describe its characteristics using the four 
bodily fluids or humors: blood, yellow bile, black bile and phlegm.86  
 The term melancholy derives from the Greek melas (black) and Kholê (bile). 
Hippocrates associated this condition with the humor of black bile that characteristics 
                                                          
86 The theory of the four humors remained the dominant medical theory in the western world 
for over 2,000 years (Weiner, 2013, p. 344).  
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included despondency, sleeplessness, irritability, an imitation of earth and a coming to 
dominance of maturity (Barroso, 2003). However, what is interesting is that Aristotle 
believed melancholy was also characteristic of great men, even genius.87 In the Problemata 
(Problems) Aristotle says: “Why is it that all men who have become outstanding in 
philosophy, statesmanship, poetry or the arts are melancholic, and some to such an extent that 
they are infected by the diseases arising from black bile, as the story of Heracles among the 
heroes tells?” (Aristotle, 1937 [953a], p. 155). And, “Because it [Black bile] has an effect on 
character, just like wine according as it is mixed in our body in greater or less quantity it 
makes our dispositions of a particular kind…all melancholic persons are abnormal, not owing 
to disease but by nature” (Ibid [955b], p. 169).  
Aristotle suggested that black bile was affected with changes in temperature such that 
when heated it created bursts of creativity or recklessness and when cold the opposite i.e. 
despair. It is when bile was in a state of optimum performance that the individual was within 
a special highly intuitive and intelligent state – the individual represented the abnormal with 
the normal or a “eucrasia within an anomaly” (Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl, 1964, p. 40).  
Aristotle is suggesting that black bile has an effect on character similar to that of an 
intoxicant and that the behavioral outcome is varied dependent upon the affected individuals 
nature or natural temperament. This is why the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius was so 
fascinated with the inherent nature of man, such that those at solace with the world are in tune 
and at one with the natural way of things, contrary to those who exhibit irritability and 
discomfort as behaving unnaturally: “Nature gives all and takes all back. To her the man 
                                                          
87 Aristotle’s ‘Problems’ written around the 2nd century BC has been highly debated with 
regards to its authorship. Some now believe it was written by one of his followers, perhaps 
Theophrastus.   
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educated into humility says: ‘Give what you will; take back what you will.’ And he says this 
in no spirit of defiance, but simply as her loyal subject” (Aurelius, 2006 [161-180 AD], p. 
99). And, “The soul of a man harms itself, first and foremost, when it becomes (as far as it 
can) a separate growth, a sort of tumour on the universe: because to resent anything that 
happens is to separate oneself in revolt from Nature, which holds in collective embrace the 
particular natures of all other things” (Ibid, p. 14-15). 
  Could it be that this ‘nature’ is the fantasmatic subject in retrospect to conscience and 
Coleridge’s primary imagination whereby the ‘black bile’ we see today is the subtle ideology 
of the Aufklärer whose superegonic artificial values of protestant rationalism are imposed? 
For some who are consumed in the black bile of protestant rationalism become arrogant and 
compulsive, others become reckless and melancholic, some “…deem themselves most free” 
(Coleridge, 1971 [1817], p. 71) but engage in “Untenanting creation of its God!” (Ibid) by 
creating a horrifying nihilistic and artificial sphere devoid of the ‘silly’ and childish fantasy 
of primary imagination that’s nature is to “…spread her holy wings totally to fly the earth” 
(Lamb, 1892 [1823], p. 185).  
With the theory of the four humors, it was only during the renaissance that any form 
of further investigation was implemented. During this time it was the introduction of morality 
to the human subject, a view of possession or ‘sin’ that was causing the disturbances of the 
mind or ‘soul’ (Durant, 1953, p. 537). However, during the Enlightenment this was radically 
altered with the new formulations and ontological developments in how the mind was 
viewed. It was the Quakers in Pennsylvania that first established asylums for treating 
madness purely as a disease in the mid-18th century (Durant, 1953, p. 598). However, there 
still remained, in Europe, bizarre treatments for melancholy whereby a douche of cold water 
could regulate its severity and even marriage was thought of as a treatment for the generically 
insane (Ibid, p. 597-598).  
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Contrary to popular belief, it was actually Jean-Baptiste Pussin (1746-1811) who first 
removed the shackles of the insane at the Bicȇtre in 1797 as outlined in Philippe Pinel’s 
(1745-1826) ‘Treatise on Insanity’ (1806) (Schuster, Hoertel & Limosin, 2011). Pinel went 
on to do the same three years later at the Salȇtriere. It was here whereby treatment of the 
mentally ill became more humane, however according to Foucault the insane were now 
placed into a new confinement, a moral and societal one: “In the classical period, indigence, 
laziness, vice, and madness mingled in an equal guilt within unreason; madmen were caught 
in the great confinement of poverty and unemployment, but all had been promoted, in the 
proximity of transgression, to the essence of a Fall. Now madness belonged to social failure, 
which appeared without distinction as its cause, model, and limit” (Foucault, 1988 [1961], p. 
259). 
Foucault essentially argues that during the latter part of the 18th century an age of 
positivism, which I associate with the ideology of the Aufklärer and tertiary master, 
developed whereby reason would be politicized and used as a constant observer that aimed to 
“…watch out for and guard against the subterranean danger of unreason, that threatening 
space of an absolute freedom” (Ibid, p. 84).  
As outlined in the previous chapter, the character of meritocracy in contemporary life, 
especially within the workplace, seems to favour a form of emotional regulation. This 
emotional regulation is aligned with protestant rationalism such that individuals are required 
to submit themselves to the dictates of a neoliberal rationality which is constantly within the 
peripherals of consciousness. Kant’s notion of respect, an adherence to the demands of the 
superego, demands that one perform ones duty even if it is painful: “Consequently we can see 
a priori that the moral law as determining basis of the will, by infringing all our inclinations, 
must bring about a feeling that can be called pain; and here we have, then, the first and 
perhaps also the only case where we have been able to determine a priori from concepts the 
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relation of a cognition (here a cognition of a pure practical reason) to the feeling of pleasure 
or displeasure” (Kant, 2002 [1788, 73] p. 95-96). However, I believe it is primarily painful 
because conscience, and thus the fantasy of autonomy, is being suppressed as outlined by 
Fromm’s critique of Milgram’s experiment (Fromm, 1992 [1973], p. 75). Modern man 
therefore is constantly hounded by the incentives of pure practical reason “That rages round 
him like a wolf day & night without rest” (Blake, 1907 [1804], p. 45).    
  According to the psychoanalyst Darian Leader in his work ‘The New Black. 
Mourning, Melancholia and Depression’ (2009) “The more that society insists on the values 
of efficiency and economic productivity, the more depression will proliferate as a necessary 
consequence. In a similar way, the more modern society urges us to attain autonomy and 
independence in our search for fulfillment, the more resistance will take the form of the exact 
opposite of these values. It puts misery in the midst of plenty. Depression is thus a way of 
saying NO to what we are told to be” (Leader, 2009, p. 13). 
 This chapter aims to outline how contemporary methods of treating depression, the 
medical and cognitive, adopt a rationalistic superegonic style that standardises and 
manoeuvres individuals into the ‘Standard Route ’ of fancy as outlined in the schema of 
abstraction in chapter 3. The chapter will first cover the Weltschmerz as a case example for 
malaise under the regime of early protestant rationalism i.e. puritanism. The reader will come 
to see how the eradication of what Weber called the enchantment of the world (Weber, 1965 
[1920], p. 269-270) and its replacement of a worldly new objectivism, led to a bleak nihilistic 
landscape that created widespread melancholy. This can be used as a template for the dangers 
inherent in submitting to a regime of strong literalism, protestant rationalism and 
demythologization. As contemporary postmodern capitalism also seems to do away with 
grand narratives and floods the world with surplus artificial goods, the modern ethos becomes 
one with a severe lack of depth, superficiality and restraint in the Rousseauian sense. The 
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Weltschmerz therefore can be considered a response to the suppression of conscience and the 
fantasy of autonomy that’s necessary conditions require imaginative space, which is 
prohibited under protestant rationalism leading to a mechanical and regimented character of 
consciousness.  
 The second part of the chapter will cover contemporary methods of treating 
depression. The first will be the purely medical & psychiatric approach using the DSM V, 
followed by cognitivism. The reader will be presented with the argument that these 
practitioners merely act as bureaucrats in the Deleuzian sense, contemporary Aufklärer, a 
type of technician that maintains the dictates of the tertiary, quaternary and quinary masters 
but whose foundations stem from a protestant rationalistic conception of the Logos. The 
reader will come to see that their techne merely aims to guide and reinforce the subject back 
into the Standard Route . 
 The last section of the chapter is a defence of psychoanalysis. The reader will come to 
see that what separates contemporary practitioners from psychoanalysts is that 
psychoanalysis is inherently malleable toward historical change and does not necessarily 
enforce its dictates as its modus operandi. In other words, psychoanalysis allows for changes 
in its approach if the structure of Nomos changes. Essentially, it aims to be ideologically 
indifferent. Another fundamental difference is the method of free association that is 
antithetical to the approach of the contemporary Aufklärer whereby the subject is given 
greater freedom of expression which in turn allows the analyst to work at deeper levels of the 







“Screw the truth into their minds” 
Richard Baxter (1615-1691) (Baxter, 1806 [1657], p. 7). 
 
Life in England under the Puritans was very grim indeed. As stated in chapter 2, the 
new signified regime of protestant rationalism and its linkages to Calvinism brutally 
supressed the Demos. The sense of religious paranoia was so extreme that men would walk 
about the city of London groaning out loud of their impending and inevitable damnation to 
hell (Durant & Durant, 1961, p. 190). The list of prohibitions was extreme: “In this self-
imposed Terror "Merrie England" almost disappeared. The humanism of the Renaissance, the 
lusty naturalism of the Elizabethans, yielded to a sense of sin, a fear of divine vengeance, 
which looked upon most pleasures as wiles of Satan and challenges to God […] They 
condemned festival jollities, ringing bells, gathering around the Maypole, drinking healths, 
playing cards. They forbade all games whatever on the Sabbath; that day was to be kept for 
God, and it was no longer to bear the heathen name Sunday” (Ibid, p. 191).88   
 Work was considered an essential part of the Puritan ethic that demanded that the 
Demos fulfil ones duty to God through “…courage, self-reliance, prudence, thrift, and work 
[Whereby] Poverty, not wealth, was a sin; it revealed lack of personal character and divine 
grace” (Ibid, p. 192). 
 On the 30th of January 1649, people from all over the country descend on London to 
witness something truly extraordinary, the execution of King Charles 1st. It’s difficult to 
                                                          
88 This also included a restriction of celebrating Christmas which would now become a 
“…solemn day of fasting and atonement” (Durant & Durant, 1961, p. 191). One woman was 
sent to prison for eleven years for insisting that the Sabbath be on a Saturday (Ibid, p. 190).  
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contemplate yet alone imagine the sheer atmosphere of the event. It was a moment where 
traditions of old, that set life’s coordinates for generations, now lay shattered to be taken up 
by a new and bewildering system. 
 The death of Charles the 1st was followed approximately 150 years later by the 
execution of Louis XVI in 1793 by the French revolutionaries. There remained a difference, 
however, in that Charles 1st never abdicated or willingly gave up his throne, he believed 
without question his divine right to be seated there, whilst Louis XVI insisted on his 
innocence. The German Romantic poet and essayist Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) observed 
that “King Charles lost his crown only with his own head. He believed in this crown and in 
his absolute right; for these he fought like a lissom and daring knight. He died nobly proud, 
protesting against the illegality of his sentence, a true martyr to Royalty-by-the-grace-of-
God” (Heine, 1895 [1831], p. 69).   
What Heine is demonstrating is the passionate belief, the emotional conviction of 
innocence toward a power that transcends the social milieu inasmuch as it does not need or 
want evidence to ensure its existence. Charles Stuart embodied a form of truth: a historical 
tradition of values, morals and leadership that once lost from his execution left many of the 
British people confused and fearful.89  According to Ann Hughes “Common wisdom has it 
that the execution of Charles I on 30 January 1649 was a desperate, aberrant act by a small 
and reluctant minority of English parliamentarians – opposed by the right-thinking bulk of 
the population. One seventeen year-old boy in the crowd at Whitehall recorded that the 
execution was met with ‘such a groan as I have never heard before, and desire I may never 
                                                          
89 During Charles’s trial, four nobles even offered to take his place for execution (Durant & 
Durant, 1961, p. 220).  
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hear again’…his views echoed those of a Restoration Bishop who claimed no king ‘ever left 
the world with more sorrow: women miscarried, men fell into melancholy’” (Hughes, 2011). 
The reaction from Charles Stuart’s execution created widespread anxiety and 
discontent, or as Durant & Durant (1961, p. 220) stated led to a “…foreseeable revulsion of 
national feeling”, so much so that within a few years under the ‘Declaration of Breda’ (1660) 
Charles II was reinstated as King of England. It is of no surprise then why Thomas Hobbes 
wrote his 1651 magnum opus ‘Leviathan’ in support of the essential need for a supreme 
power governing all men. Indeed this work was the first major contribution to understanding 
the complex system of power politics since Machiavelli published his work ‘The Prince’ in 
1532 (Macpherson, 1968, p. 1).90  
Charles I inspired many artists such as Paul Rubens that seemed to deify the king 
even before he was executed. Some pieces of art including the ‘Emblem of the Royal Martyr 
King Charles I in his Sufferings’ (1649) by the English School, worked at demonstrating the 
importance of faith and martyrdom, however one such painting made Heine state  “What 
great world-pain [Weltschmerz] the artist has herein expressed with a few strokes of his 
brush! There, miserably bleeding, lies that splendour of royalty, once the consolation and 
flower of mankind. Life in England since that day has grown mournful and colourless: poetry 
has fled affrighted from that land which erstwhile she had decked with laughing colours. Ah! 
how deeply did I feel this when once, at midnight, I passed before that fatal window at 
Whitehall; when the damp, cold commonplace of the England of to-day froze me through and 
through” (Heine 1895 [1831], p. 68-69).  
                                                          
90 An excellent analysis of Hobbes’s philosophy and further reactions to his work can be 
found in Mintz (2010). 
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This painting was ‘Cromwell and Charles I’ (1831) by Paul Delaroche (See next 
image). The painting shows Oliver Cromwell standing over the coffin of the deceased 
Charles with a look upon his face that “… expresses neither astonishment nor stupefaction, 
nor agitation of any kind; on the contrary, the spectator is struck by the grim, horrible calm of 
this man. There he stands, a strong, self-reliant figure, "brutal as a fact," powerful without 
pathos, demoniacally natural, wonderfully commonplace, execrated yet honoured; and there 
he contemplates his work, like a wood-cutter who has just felled his oak. He has quietly cut 
down the great oak which till then had spread its branches so proudly over England and 
Scotland; the royal oak under whose shade so many fine generations of men had flourished, 
where under the Sprites of Poesie had oftentimes circled in their sweetest dances. Quietly he 
has felled it with his fatal axe, and there it lies prostrate with all its beautiful foliage, and with 




Cromwell and Charles I (1831) by Paul Delaroche 
 
What is Heine showing us? Is he stating that the resentment shown on Cromwell’s 
face is of a specific misery, of guilt, of depression? It is this specific state that Heine uses to 
help provide a basis for describing the Weltschmerz, an example with a well-defined 
historical underplay. As Rudnick argues “There is no doubt that Heine observes the depiction 
of cultural loss in Delaroche’s painting. This is a sensation of pain for which he used the term 
Weltschmerz, manifesting itself, typically, throughout the Romantic era and beyond, right 
into our own days, only, we do not want to face it openly. Deconstruction, New Age, the Cult 
of Fun, of other petty pleasures and avoidance of ultimates all turn away from facing up to 
gravitas, the serious aspects of living which have, overall, propelled humankind to the level 
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of cultural achievement without a major break in continuity. And yet, there are indicators in 
every generation that are perceived as detrimental to the future of humankind” (Rudnick, 
2000, p. 160).  
The romantic writer Jean Paul Friedrich Richter (1763-1825) coined the term 
Weltschmerz within his last work ‘Selina’ (1827), which was published shortly after his 
death. The work addressed factors surrounding the immortality of the soul and was 
considered more philosophical than his previous works that were generally fictional. Below is 
the first known usage, by Richter, of the term: “Nur sein Auge sah alle die tausend Qualen 
der Menschen bei ihren Untergängen. Diesen Weltschmerz kann er, so zu sagen, nur 
aushalten durch den Anblick der Seligkeit, die nachher vergütet” (Fink, 2012, p. 16).91 
Coming from the German word for world ‘Welt’ and grief ‘Schmerz’, Weltschmerz 
consists of a specific form of pessimism, melancholy or nihilistic attitude to the prevailing 
society and was quite prevalent throughout the Romantic period. There were many similar 
movements throughout Europe including the Mal du siècle (Malady of the century) and 
Strum und Drang (Storm and Stress). However, what is important to point out is how this 
develops in the first place. 
                                                          
91 “Only his eye saw all the thousand agonies of the people in their sunsets. This world pain 
he can, so to speak, only to endure the sight of bliss, which subsequently reimbursed.” – 
From google translate (02/06/2014). Additional translation: “Only his eyes saw all the 
torment of humanity in its decline. This Weltschmerz he can only bear, so to say, by 




Cromwell had killed Charles but in doing so he killed something else. By slaughtering 
the king upon the altar of progressive puritan rationalism he had demythologised the world 
even further. In other words, Cromwell killed an emblem of superstition and divinity that 
held tremendous symbolic magisterial value for the Demos. The slow Puritan purge 
tortuously removed all mysteriousness and ‘magic’ from the world whereby the “…coldly 
calculating state-grabbers have arisen temperate bacchantes [priests] of Reason who, in their 
logical madness, seek to argue out of the depths of our heart all the reverence which the old 
time Sacrament of Kinghood evokes” (Heine 1895 [1831], p. 70). In other words, the space 
for fantasy and imagination was swamped by the desire of the tertiary master leading to 
widespread discontent. 
Immediately after the execution of Charles the world became bleak, paranoid and 
dead. Butterfield notes that a vast majority of the English went into universal mourning but 
couldn’t publically express their sadness as Charles had been condemned a traitor, but would 
secretly read Royalist literature that expressed that the King’s soul still lived on with them: 
“The Royalist literature produced following the execution of Charles and its consumption by 
his subjects represented a form of mourning ritual; a method by which the people could 
comfort themselves in their trauma following the regicide, an event many had previously 
thought inexplicable […] Eikon Basilike, The Tablet or Moderation of Charles the First, 
Martyr, and The martyrdom of King Charles, or his conformity with Christ in his suffering 
provided for those needs, by representing Charles as being among his subjects in spirit if not 
in person, and the promise that there would be a return to normalcy with the Restoration of 
Charles’s son to the throne” (Butterfield, 2014, p. 16).  
The Puritans had a long lasting effect upon the British consciousness. Indeed the 
execution of Charles led to the establishment of modern democracy. The Puritans essentially 
“…defended and transmitted to us parliamentary government and trial by jury. To them, in 
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part, England owes the solid sobriety of the British character, the stability of the British 
family, and the integrity of Britain's official life” (Durant & Durant, 1961, p. 192). The 
extraordinary speed by witch protestant rationalism transformed London and eventually 
contributed to the industrial revolution was impressive. However, London became an overly 
crowded, smog infested and machine like metropolis that would later make Heine state “Send 
a philosopher to London, but no poet!” (Heine, 1887 [1831], p. 46).  
Heine believed, when he visited London, that it was immensely impressive with its 
sheer size, productivity and dominance but that something was missing: “This downright 
earnestness of all things, this colossal uniformity, this machine-like movement, this 
moroseness even in pleasure, this exaggerated London, smothers the imagination and rends 
the heart” (Ibid, p. 47). In other words, London had, even though becoming the most 
powerful city on earth that was analogous to the “…right hand of the world [Whereby] the 
Exchange to Downing Street is the world’s radical artery” (Ibid, p. 46-47), lost a certain 
beauty. 
The tertiary master of the Puritanical and Protestant Rationalism is an extreme 
example of what contemporary postmodern capitalism is in keeping with the Weber 
hypothesis of the ‘Religious Foundations of Worldly Asceticism’. First, it totalised 
everything and seeped its influence into every dimension of life. Second, it launched assaults 
against the traditions of old i.e. Catholicism and Monarchy. Third, it reinforced a work ethic 
and meritocratic system that equated self-reliance and prudence with saintliness. And finally, 
it praised wealth and condemned poverty.  
Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) identified four characteristics of religious structure in 
Capitalism and its connection with despair, what I would call Weltschmerz. The first is that it 
acts as a cult, what he describes as perhaps the most extreme, as it has no true ‘dogma’, and 
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that utilitarianism has been painted as a religion. The second is that it permeates civilization 
in such a way that it is a permanent state of affairs, there is no ‘weekday’ as he claims – there 
is no respite. The third is that it engenders blame; it is a blaming cult not a redeeming one 
whereby the guilt experienced lies in not knowing how to relieve it. Finally, capitalism acts 
by suppressing God, which must be concealed whereby capitalism “…becomes celebrated 
before an immature deity, [while] every image, every idea of it injures the secret of its 
maturity” (Benjamin, 2005 [1921], p. 259-260).  
What is interesting is that Benjamin argued, although not very convincingly, that 
Freudian psychoanalysis is fundamentally capitalist by stating that the sinful imagination is 
analogous to capital to which the unconscious pays interest (Ibid, p. 260). In actual fact 
psychoanalysis aims at liberating the imagination through free association whereas 
contemporary and mainstream approaches deem it not only ‘sinful’ but irrational, and must 
be censored or at least regulated for societal interests.   
The execution of Charles was quite literally a symbolic representation of beheading 
something that could transcend, and lay outside, the confines of protestant rationalism despite 
him being a protestant. He symbolised that traitorous being that stands outside and does not 
yield to the signified regime, an emblem of the Deleuzian prophet which the Demos looked 
upon with awe, adulation and divinity. A representative and Emblem of Eros. The execution 
was not only a regicide but a sacrilegious act against the divine right of kings; a cleansing of 
the earthly objective world from the meddlesomeness of transcendence: “Therein lies the 
historical enormity of capitalism: religion is no longer the reform of being, but rather its 
obliteration. From this expansion of despair in the religious state of the world, healing is 
expected. God’s transcendence has fallen, but, he is not dead. He is drawn into the fate of 
man. This passage of “planetary man” [Planeten Mensch] through the house of despair is, in 
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the absolute loneliness of his path, the ethos Nietzsche describes. This man is the 
Übermensch, the first who knowingly begins to realize the capitalist religion” (Ibid). 
Weltschmerz therefore was a mourning of a lost divinity, a longing for a lost 
enchanted world that could offer a path to salvation away from the grim and mechanical 
‘house of despair’. The world had transformed from translucence to opaqueness which 
pushed people into “…the avoidance of all feudalistic, sensuous ostentation of wealth, not the 
ascetic death-in-life of the cloister, but an alert, rationally controlled patterning of life, and 
the avoidance of all surrender to the beauty of the world, to art, or to one’s own moods and 
emotions. The clear and uniform goal of this asceticism was the disciplining and methodical 
organization of the whole pattern of life” (Weber, 1965 [1920], p. 183).  
Mainstream views toward depression – DSM V 
“Several times patients have been brought to me, whose deep dejection, poverty of 
expression, and anxious tension tempt to the assumption of a circular [pathological] 
depression, while it came out afterwards, that they were cases of moodiness, which had for 
their cause serious delinquencies and threatened legal proceedings” (Kraepelin, 1917). 
 
“When we get fed up with the superego in capitalist discourse, we react with anxiety and 
become depressed” (Rasmussen, 2012, p. 146). 
 
The DSM, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, is currently on its 
5th edition, which was released in 2013. Starting back in 1952, the DSM aimed at trying to 
codify mental illness and has grown considerably since then. It was the DSM III (1980) that 
represented a major nosological shift as it broke with psychoanalysis and attempted to 
become atheoretical (Demazeux & Singy, 2015: p. xiv-xv; Lamb, Pies & Zisook, 2010). 
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However, by attempting to become atheoretical, the DSM now replaces clinical experience 
and insight with a standardizing criteria. Similar to the Aufklärer attempting to create an 
Encyclopédie, the DSM represents for some not only the ‘bible’ of psychiatry but a tower of 
Babel, building a work that is essentially imperfect and unachievable (Demazeux & Singy, 
2015, p. xvii).92      
According to Demazeux and Singy (2015) there are two major critiques of the DSM; 
the epistemological and sociological. The epistemological consequences are of specific 
importance as I believe it represents an almost identical approach to the cognitive modus 
operandi of attempting to catalogue and codify a ‘pure system of thought’. On the other hand, 
the sociological critique looked at the harmful effects on psychiatric practice, specifically on 
the understanding and experience of patients with their illness. Despite the enormous amount 
of literature critiquing the DSM, I will specifically focus on its epistemological base 
regarding depression. 
The DSM V Removal of Bereavement Exclusion 
The DSM V (2013) lists 8 different types of depression: Disruptive Mood 
Dysregulation Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), Persistent Depressive Disorder 
(Dysthymia), Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder, Substance/Medication Induced Depressive 
Disorder, Depressive Disorder due to another medical condition, Other Specified Depressive 
Disorder and Unspecified Depressive Disorder (APA, 2013, p. 155 – 188).  
 There are 9 features/symptoms for MDD, however the DSM states that “The essential 
feature of a major depressive episode is a period of at least 2 weeks during which there is 
either depressed mood or the loss of interest or pleasure in nearly all activities” (APA, 2013, 
                                                          
92 Denis Diderot’s Encyclopédie (1751) can represent this type of project, whereby he 
attempted to create a dictionary of the arts and sciences.  
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p. 163). These specific symptoms include a depressed mood (sadness, feeling empty etc.), 
loss of pleasure in activities that were once considered pleasurable, weight loss/gain, sleep 
problems, psychomotor retardation/agitation, loss of energy, feelings of worthlessness and 
guilt, difficulty in concentration and recurring thoughts of suicide and death (Ibid, p. 160 – 
161). What is important to note however is that responses to a loss (financial problems, death 
of a loved one etc.) should also be considered, based on clinical expertise and judgement, and 
that “In grief, self-esteem is generally preserved, whereas in MDE [Major depressive 
episode] feelings of worthlessness and self-loathing are common. If self-derogatory ideation 
is present in grief, it typically involves perceived failing via-à-vis the deceased” (Ibid, p. 
161). This is similar to Freud’s conception of melancholia that will be covered later. 
However, what the DSM V has essentially done is incorporate the core characteristic 
that contributes to the etiology of depression, pathological grief, and to codify it. A lot of the 
codification of depression within the DSM seems to objectify subjective experiences that 
should be understood more in relational and psychosocial terms. This concern was expressed 
by the British Psychological Society (2011) with the up-and-coming DSM version: “We 
believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational context of problems 
and the undeniable social causation of many such problems […] We note that, in this context, 
sadness and unhappiness which are deserving of help and intervention – are not best 
considered illnesses. We also note that, by regarding them as such, there is a danger of 
misunderstanding their nature and cause and applying inappropriate medical remedies” (BPS, 
2011, p. 12). In viewing depression as a ‘disease’, with very specific and discrete symptoms, 
what the DSM is attempting to do is homogenize it. The DSM, similar to CBT, adopts the 
approach that depression arises from within the individual and therefore exists in a vacuum; 
depression is therefore viewed asocially.     
For Rasmussen (2012, p. 142-143) the medical approaches, as well as CBT, can be 
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considered superegonic in nature. In other words they act as bureaucrats or priests in the 
Deleuzian sense that attempt to maintain the smooth functioning of, and adherence to, the 
desire of the tertiary master, in this case contemporary protestant rationalism: “The demands 
for well-being also come from superego-therapies. Hence, we see that the very demand of the 
Other (the therapist), whose responsibility it is to cure us from depression, is an important 
source of depression” (Ibid). 
The DSM requires little interpretative or clinical skill (Jacobs, 2009, p, 83). The role 
of the diagnostician is to collect and piece together the signs and symptoms of the patient and 
attempt to form them into a coherent whole. Once this ‘whole’ is reached, and its 
representative pathology is allocated, the ‘clinical entity’ is born (Ibid, p. 84). However, the 
puzzle pieces, the diagnostician has to locate and work with, are not strictly objective 
elements, as seen with definitive material diseases, such as herpes or malaria, and therefore 
“Major depressive disorder no more depends on physical evidence than sarcasm or irony 
depend on physical evidence” (Ibid).  
 By categorising these symptoms into an encyclopedia, what the DSM does is 
essentially provide a detailed dictionary definition of depression, however this does not 
provide the essential ‘meaning’ and experience of it. Any deviation from the literal definition 
of ‘good mood’, as well as viewing depression as a disease, warrants the diagnostician to 
render the person depressed, despite the fact that people diagnosed with the same illness do 
not experience it the same way (Ibid, p. 86).  
 The only elements that the diagnostician has to work with are speech and behaviour. 
The ignorance inherent with the diagnostician is the removal of historical context and 
underlying meaning the person with depression has. As Jacobs (2009, p. 88) points out “The 
historical view of a person’s difficulties eliminates the distinction between signal and noise 
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that is inherent in a clinical entity view of diagnosis because in an historical framework 
everything a person says and does contributes to understanding a person.” This error, of 
attempting to create a pure, discrete and homogenous clinical entity, has repeatedly met with 
failure (Wakefield et al, 2007; Livesley, 2003; Widiger & Coker, 2003; Beutler & Malik, 
2002).  
In book one of Plato’s Republic, Socrates outlines his views on appropriate techne 
working in unison with aretē.93 In his dialogue with Thrasymachus, Socrates argues that the 
correct techne aims at working with itself that is contrary to a craftsman that only works for 
their own power. In other words, a doctor must have a conception of what is deemed a model 
of health, that is to say, that it is not sufficient to simply know a blemish or illness but that the 
good craftsman has to have a preconception of what an ideal is and helps or crafts the patient 
back to this ‘perfect’ state: “Surely, then, no doctor, insofar as he is a doctor, seeks or orders 
what is advantageous to himself, but what is advantageous to his patient? We agreed that a 
doctor in the precise sense is a ruler of bodies, not a money-maker […] So, then, 
Thrasymachus, no one in any position of rule, insofar as he is a ruler, seeks or orders what is 
advantageous to himself, but what is advantageous to his subject, that on which he practices 
his craft. It is to his subject and what is advantageous and proper to it that he looks, and 
everything he says and does he says and does for it.” (Plato, 1997e [342c – 342e], p. 987).  
The question remains: is there an aretē of the soul? And if there is, does the medical 
practitioner realize this and aim to guide them back into this state through their techne, or are 
they merely adopting the virtues of Nomos and thus, reduce them back into a state that 
                                                          
93 Techne is defined as “ART, SKILL; especially: the principles or methods employed in 
making something or attaining an objective” (Merriam Webster, 2017d). Aretē can be 
considered excellence or goodness or the pure virtue of a thing (Plato, 1997e, p. 980). 
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originally caused their angst? 
Eric Laurent’s work ‘Lost in Cognition’ (2014) highlights how the DSM acts as a 
managerial system by stating that it is primarily used for social engineering, categorisation 
and gathering data that could be used for mapping the mind, which would be very useful for 
marketers and thus the Agorae and Praxis: “…it has proven itself to be a mighty instrument 
for population management, assigning subjects to tick-boxes that can be processed ever-more 
efficiently by administrative language, then widening the administrative use of these 
categories beyond the healthcare field to include the spheres of insurance, social rights, and 
law” (Laurent, 2014, p. 145).    
Szasz’s Myth of Mental Illness 
The American psychoanalyst Thomas Szasz (1920 – 2012) seminal work ‘The Myth 
of Mental Illness’ (1961) presents one of the best arguments for the idea of social coercion 
within psychiatry, as well as psychoanalysis. For Szasz, mental illness should not be 
considered an illness similar to a physical disease, but that it is unique inasmuch as its genesis 
lies in some form of voluntary action by the patient, that is to say “…viewed as occurrences 
that do not merely happen to a person but rather are brought about by him (perhaps 
unconsciously or unwittingly)” (Szasz, 1974 [1961], p. 56). Szasz’s main point is that mental 
illness is really a ‘Problem in living’: “I have argued that, today, the notion of a person 
"having a mental illness" is scientifically crippling. It provides professional assent to a 
popular rationalization—namely, that problems in living experienced and expressed in terms 
of so-called psychiatric symptoms are basically similar to bodily diseases” (Ibid, p. 262).  
 For Socrates, the soul is in aretē when the “…mind grows wings, since its memory 
always keeps it as close as possible to those realities by being close to which the gods are 
divine. A man who uses reminders of these things correctly is always at the highest, most 
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perfect level of initiation, and he is the only one who is perfect as perfect can be. He stands 
outside human concerns and draws close to the divine; ordinary people think he is disturbed 
and rebuke him for this, unaware that he is possessed by god” (Plato, 1997b [249c – 249d], p. 
527). Despite this being very poetic, and lacking in definitional and technical terminology, I 
associate this ‘God’ with that of Coleridge’s analogy, who is the creative tenant within the 
“gross and visible sphere” (Coleridge, 1971 [1817], p. 71) that provides the “living power 
and prime agent of all human perception, and as a representation in the finite mind of the 
eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM” (Ibid, p. 167), in other words, the fantasy of 
autonomy whose emblem is Eros. 
 Contrary to Socrates, rhetoricians or psychiatrists tend to hold to the notion that the 
aretē of the mind is one that conforms to the conventions or rules of society. Szasz argues 
that there are three types of psychiatric intervention that the contemporary practitioner 
initiates. Firstly, they act as a type of theoretical objective ethicist, second they attempt to 
apply this ‘ethic’ as a type of “social repairman” (Szasz, 1974 [1961], p. 260) and finally as a 
“…social engineer or controller of social deviance. In this role, the psychiatrist acts as priest 
[Deleuzian Bureaucrat] and policeman, arbitrator and judge, parent and warden: he coerces 
and manipulates, punishes and rewards, and otherwise influences and compels people, often 
by relying on the police power of the state, to play, or to cease to play, certain games” (Ibid).          
The DSM shares a similar epistemological framework to that of CBT. By 
medicalizing, codifying and objectifying affective states, the DSM works only with the 
clinical subject’s ego. Words and symptoms are deemed opaque whereby they lose their 
historical and interpretative importance, essentially viewing them as mere signified elements 





Cognitive Behavioural Therapy as Amputating Eros 
 
“Sweet is the lore which Nature brings; 
Our meddling intellect 
Mis-shapes the beauteous form of things:- 
We murder to dissect.” 
  (Wordsworth, 1919 [1798], p. 54) 
“What a thing is Man, this lauded demi-god! Does he not lack the very powers he has most 
need of? And if he should soar in joy, or sink in sorrow, is he not halted and returned to his 
cold, dull consciousness at the very moment he was longing to be lost in the vastness of 
infinity?”  
(Goethe, 1989 [1774], p. 105) 
 It was Hamann that accused Kant of misusing language by wrenching it away from 
the bedrock of faith and establishing the concept of ‘pure reason’ outside of tradition. The 
contemporary Aufklärer, cognitivists, I argue, essentially commit the same error by 
attempting to create a ‘pure system of thought’ that’s epistemological aim is to homogenise 
human experience as well as standardise suffering as being the outcome of a deviation away 
from the desire of the tertiary master vis-à-vis the sin of irrationality. Aaron Beck, the 
founder of cognitive therapy, based a lot of his ideas on psychoanalytic theory, however he 
eventually broke ranks and developed his own cognitive model. However, Beck’s model was 
deemed very suspect by the European psychoanalytic community, for many reasons, but one 
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of which was its association with the prevailing ego-psychology in the US during the 1950s 
and 1960s.94   
Ego-psychology was a lot more different than orthodox psychoanalysis. For one, it 
represented a major revision of Freud’s work by massively understating the role of the 
unconscious and placing too much emphasis on the strength of the ego, thus leading to a 
managerial model of the self. Another major concern was that with the managerialisation of 
the self, there developed a paradigm that was concerned with a conformist mode of 
adaptation, such that ‘healthy thinking’, rationality and rationalism, became associated with 
the ideal subject in neo-liberal society. Arguably, the biggest critic of this development was 
Jacques Lacan, which according to Nobus (2000, p. 62-63), essentially reiterated Freud’s 
concern that analysts should never act like educators who mould their patients into their, the 
analyst’s, own ideals: “We refused most emphatically to turn a patient who puts himself into 
our hands in search of help into our private property, to decide his fate for him, to force our 
own ideals upon him, and with the pride of a Creator to form him in our own image and see 
that it is good…In my opinion, this is after all only to use violence, even though it is overlaid 
with the most honourable motives” (Freud, 1919, p. 164-165).  Lacan’s critique of the ego-
psychology movement was aptly demonstrated in his lecture ‘The Place, Origin and End of 
My Teaching’ (1967) whereby he said the following: “And do you know what the ultimate 
goal is? Gaining what they [Ego-Psychologists] pompously call a strong ego, ego strength in 
the midst of all the scientific instances that go with it. And they succeed. They make good 
employees. That’s what the strong ego is. You obviously have to have a resistant ego to be a 
good employee” (Lacan, 2008 [1967], p. 19).  
                                                          
94 To present a history on the development of psychoanalysis throughout the US and Europe 
would go beyond this paper. For further information see Zaretsky (2004).  
Thistlethwaite: 234 
 
Beck believed that depression is essentially internalised anger (Padesky, 2004, p. 6). 
He theorised that this could be demonstrated by analysing the dream content of depressed 
patients and hypothesising that there would contain certain masochistic features (Beck & 
Hurvich, 1959). However, it was here that Beck broke with orthodox psychoanalysis by 
negating the principle that the manifest content of dreams is homogenous, as David Ferro 
(2016) states, “…that neither Freud nor any other analyst of note ever claimed that dreams 
could be interpreted in an ad hoc, experimental context outside of an analysis. To attempt to 
interpret the dreams of others – even if one rejects psychoanalysis – involves ascribing a 
meaning to their language as if it were transparent and self-evident” (Ferro, 2016). Thus, for 
Beck, symptoms and symbols all represent units of significance (Ibid) and it is here that we 
can begin to see a certain form of standardisation.    
Beck’s conception of a ‘good life’ is primarily a rational, scientific and pragmatic one 
(Rosner, 2012, p. 3). The principles of CBT (Cognitive Behavioural Therapy) aim at pushing 
patients into a mode of living that is conformist and efficient by continuously implying that 
the subject becomes hyper-aware of their thought processes, cognition, which must be 
managed and coerced into certain adaptive systems. This is most apparent in Beck’s recent 
work on the ‘Generic Cognitive Model’ (GCM).  
One of the central tenets of the GCM is to provide clinicians with a tool for a broad 
clinical utility, which means allowing the clinician to make quick conceptualizations of a 
patient’s mental arena (Beck & Haigh, 2014, p. 15). From identifying certain ‘systems of 
thought’ the therapist can then apply interventions through psychoeducation, exactly what 
Freud warned about, otherwise known as cognitive restructuring (Ibid, p. 16) whereby the 
patient could even create a pie-chart to examine their own thoughts (Beck, 1995). According 
to Beck & Haigh (2014), problems arising in mental life are primarily caused by 
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accentuations of normal adaptive functioning and one element of the GCM that helps 
emphasise this is the concept of the schema.  
The ‘cognitive schema’, originally devised in Beck (1967), is essentially an internally 
stored blueprint that contains ideas, stimuli and experiences. Beck later described it as the 
“specific rules that govern information processing and behaviour” (Beck et al., 1990, p. 8). It 
is here that we can begin to see one of the ‘castles in the sky’, as these mental structures, I 
believe, share numerous similarities with Kant’s concept of pure reason, as being an 
extension of it, and therefore a ‘pure system of thought’. Kant, arguably, would call this 
system an organon of pure reason: “An organon of pure reason would be the sum total of the 
principles by which all pure a priori knowledge can be acquired and actually established. 
Exhaustive application of such an organon would give us a system of pure reason” (Kant, 
2007 [1781, A11] p. 51). However, this system “Is not meant to expand our knowledge but 
only to correct it, and to become the touchstone of the value, or lack of value, of all a priori 
knowledge” (Ibid, [A13] p. 53). To contemporise Hamann’s critique of Kant, what Beck and 
the other contemporary Aufklärer do is misuse language and set up barriers preventing the 
truth behind these mental structures to be revealed. This truth is the continual ‘miracle’ of 
creation, as outlined by Hamann, Hume and Coleridge, embodied within faith/Eros. 
Therefore the cognitive schema shares the same systemic problem that pure reason has: 
“Metaphysics misuses the signs of language and figures of speech by transforming them into 
nothing but hieroglyphs and types of ideal relations, and by means of this learned nonsense 
works the straightforwardness [Biderkeit] of language into such a senseless, rutted, unsteady, 
indeterminate something = x, that nothing remains but a windy soughing, a magical play of 
shadows…” (Hamann, 1949 – 1957b, p.  285).  
For Beck, the schema becomes problematic when it has a so-called negative bias. 
That is to say that it becomes biased when the schema focuses too much on the ‘negative’ and 
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not the adaptive mode of functioning (Beck & Haigh, 2014, p. 4). Beck’s cognitive triad 
(Beck, 1967) helps to provide an example of this. 
According to Beck (1967, p. 288-289), affects and schemas are very closely linked 
and therefore, to follow the patients affect is essentially to identify and follow the schema. 
This is again reminiscent of Kant who postulated that subjective concepts could be 
understood objectively: “There arises, therefore, a difficulty here, such as we did not meet 
with in the field of sensibility, namely, how subjective conditions of thought can have 
objective validity, that is, become conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects” 
(Kant, 2007 [1781, A89] p. 116).  
The three elements that form the triad schema are the self, world and future. 
According to Beck (1967), a depressed person has a negative bias within his/her triad such 
that they could deem their self as worthless, the world as persecutory and the future hopeless. 
This creates a system of irrationality which contributes to the severity of the depression as 
well as being a core process in its development. In order to help the patient with these 
‘negative systems/schemas’, CBT provides a method of ‘correction’ through 
psychoeducation.  
According to Dowd (2004, p. 420), some techniques used in psychoeducation include 
the following: Evaluating automatic thoughts, identifying underlying beliefs, restructuring 
beliefs, modifying images, labelling distortions, cognitive rehearsal, self-instruction, thought 
stopping, using flash cards/posters, historical exploration and review of the evidence, role 
playing, imagining feared consequences, problem-solving and examining the 
advantages/disadvantages. These methods I believe are very suspect as they reveal a type of 
social engineering. To clarify, the ‘maladaptive lifestyle’ does not conform to the given ‘ideal 
personality’ in neo-liberal meritocratic society and therefore these methods are employed to 
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psychically push people back into conformity without taking into consideration that perhaps 
this ‘ideal personality’, linked with protestant rationalism, is the very thing that creates their 
disillusionment. Arguably therefore, CBT practitioners deem mental illness to be somewhat 
like a computer virus which affects the software (Schemas) and therefore an anti-virus needs 
to be administered (psycho-education). However, what represents this ideal mode of 
existence? That is to say, what is the ideal character that the Aufklärer attempt to coerce in 
contemporary society and what are the ethical consequences? 
The Neoliberal Self as the Aufklärer Ideal 
With the waning of Keynesian economics and the establishment of a neoliberal 
society, headed by the Chicago school and Hayek, came forth a highly complex world, a 
world interconnected through network capitalism and the ideals of globalisation, governed by 
the supreme agency of the agorae, reason and the notion that people are also innately rational 
beings. According to the psychoanalyst Susie Orbach (2001) “As politicians hand over their 
responsibilities to the markets then individuals in society absorb the values promoted by 
corporate culture: the acquisitive, anything goes, monopolising (pace niche marketing) 
culture.”      
The self in contemporary society is essentially fragmented, split and disorganised and, 
under the banner of postmodernism, individuals battle their alienation by identifying with 
brands (Orbach, 2001). By continuously managing and surveying ourselves in neoliberal 
society, the “Warfare State” (Marcuse, 2002 [1964], p. 21), we exist in a never-ending state 
of anxiety and “commercial militarism” (Box, 2011, p. 178-179), which is not only deemed 
pathological, by neoliberal ideology, but also prescribed (Hickinbottom-Brawn, 2013). This 
development exploded during the 1970s and 1980s with psychotherapies aligning with the 
ideology of neoliberalism, including positive psychology and CBT (Rose, 1999), and 
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therefore, according to Sugarman (2015, p. 108 - 109), CBT is conducted without due 
attention to its socio-political implications.     
Neoliberalism is closely aligned with the ideology of enterprise and that it 
“…conflates economic and moral behaviour, reconceiving morality in terms of rational 
deliberation over profitability, costs, risks, and consequences. Moral agency takes an 
economic form. In neoliberalism, the moral agent is the entrepreneurial subject” (Sugarman, 
2015, p. 114). It would seem therefore that cognitivists are, in essence, technicians of 
neoliberal ethics and therefore also succumb to the Althusserian label of being agents of 
repression and enforcers of the Ideological State Apparatus. Cognitivists will often deny that 
their approach is political and that their given paradigm is closely linked to a specific 
Weltanschauung. Indeed they tend to obscure the questioning of their psychopolitical 
standpoint by hiding under the veneer of scientism (Prilleltensky, 1994, p. 967).   
Ego Management: The desire of the Agorae through Praxis 
 Since the 1980s and the advent of neoliberalism, the Agorae became a more discrete 
entity. However, with this separation, what exactly is the current desire of the quaternary and 
quinary masters? As previously stated, the desire of Nomos insists on a form of enkrateia that 
is simply defined as “…self-mastery with regard to corporeal pleasures and desires” (Dorian, 
2007, p. 120). However, the free market essentially prescribes its opposite i.e. akrasia that is 
loosely defined as a weakness of the will or lack of willpower (Stroud, 2014). As such the 
market insists we succumb to our desires. 
 The current zeitgeist constitutes what Dardot & Laval (2014a) call an ‘Apparatus of 
Efficiency’ which “…furnished economic activity with the requisite “human resources”; it 
has continually produced the bodies and souls apt to function in the great circuit of 
production and consumption” (Ibid). What emerges is what they call a new subject or neo-
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subject whose psychic functioning aims at seeking greater self-perfection in the face of 
competition: “…individuals should work for enterprises as if they were working for 
themselves, thereby abolishing any sense of alienation and even any distance between 
individuals and the enterprises employing them. Each individual must work at their own 
efficiency, at intensifying their own effort, as if this self-conduct derived from them, as if it 
was commanded from within by the imperious order of their own desire, which there is no 
question of resisting” (Ibid).  
 This sounds somewhat like an elaboration of Smith’s invisible hand whereby the 
individual in working for themselves are actually contributing and reinforcing the functioning 
of the Agorae. However, despite the subject being hoodwinked into thinking that overt 
bureaucracy no longer exists, what has happened is an evolution of ego-management under 
the veneer of freedom, self-exploration and progress: “We have not emerged from the “iron 
cage” of the capitalist economy to which Weber referred. Rather, in some respects it would 
have to be said that everyone is enjoined to construct their own […] His or her own expert, 
own employer, own inventor, and own entrepreneur: neoliberal rationality encourages the ego 
to act to strengthen itself so as to survive competition. All its activities must be compared 
with a form of production, an investment, and a cost calculation. The economy becomes a 
personal discipline” (Ibid). 
The neo-subject is both an entrepreneur who is dictated to work but also to consume. 
As Jameson pointed out that postmodernism removes symbolic narratives that were prevalent 
in earlier forms of capitalism, what results from this, in the imaginary axis, is an excess of 
pleasure or enjoyment: “The new subject is requested to produce “ever more” and enjoy 
“ever more,” and thus to be directly connected to a “surplus-enjoyment” that has become 
systemic […] The main thing to grasp here is that the boundlessness of self-pleasure is the 
exact opposite in the imaginary order of de-symbolization. The sense of self is supplied in 
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excess, rapidity, the raw sensations supplied by commotion. This unquestionably exposes 
neo-subjects to depression and dependency” (Dardot & Laval, 2014b). What this essentially 
means is that today, more and more insistence is placed on the individual to ‘break down 
barriers’, ‘be yourself’, ‘be creative’, ‘think outside of the box’, ‘surpass yourself’ and so on. 
What results is an obsession with self-evaluation and performance whereby “…the 
performance/pleasure apparatus is appointed into diversified mechanisms of control, 
evaluation, and incentivization and pertains to all the cogs of production, all modes of 
consumption, and all forms of social relations” (Ibid).95  
The neo-subject of today is caught in a living contradiction. They must seek ever 
greater perfection and break down barriers as dictated by Praxis, whose rationale is to 
achieve greater competition within the Agorae, which is primarily concerned with surplus 
enjoyment. The entire ‘Key Performance Indicator’ (KPI) culture, embedded into 
organisations, works from the premise that company goals are an individual’s goal. Mary 
Gober International is one such business that promotes this type of organisational philosophy: 
“Our belief is that “everything you think, feel, say and do is a service (helps) or a disservice 
(hindrance) to yourself and everyone around you.” We have been able to prove that 
equipping people with skills to ensure everything is a service improves organisational 
performance” (MGI, 2018). They do this “[b]y implementing tailored, blended training 
programmes [to] equip people with the capability to take more ownership, be more resilient 
and communicate positively in a solution-oriented manner” (Ibid). Reading between the lines, 
                                                          
95 As stated in chapter 3: “Whoever sang or danced best, whoever was the handsomest, the 
strongest, the most dexterous, or the most eloquent, came to be of most consideration; and 
this was the first step towards inequality, and at the same time towards vice” (Rousseau, 
1923c [1755], p. 212-213). 
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what this ‘very positive’ sounding strategy means is that “[t]he new subject is the person of 
competition and performance. The self-entrepreneur is a being made to “succeed,” to “win” 
[…] [Therefore] Oscillating between depression and perversion, neo-subjects are condemned 
to a double life: a master of performances to be admired and an object of enjoyment to be 
disposed of” (Dardot & Laval, 2014b). Not only is the subject dictated to emotionally 
regulate themselves to achieve greater self-perfection, they are also faced with the insistence 
to be happy.  
William Davies The Happiness Industry (2015) argues that within contemporary 
consumerism and the modern market, subjects are being coerced to become ‘happiness 
machines’. Praxis promotes self-exploration and the breakdown of barriers within the 
subject, which they (managers) acquire from the desire of the postmodern Agorae to achieve 
surplus value: “…the production of surplus value and the accumulation of capital […] is the 
moral law that is expressed in the platitudes of neo-liberalism” (Clarke, 2005, p. 54). The 
outcome of surplus-enjoyment is a form of subjective exhaustion such that the Demos suffers 
from some form of continual hangover that’s only antidote is, once again, intoxication from 
surplus produce: “The murky grey area separating workplace disaffection from a clinical 
disorder has required managers, and the human resources profession especially, to equip 
themselves with various new ways of intervening in the minds, bodies and behaviours of their 
workforce. The term most commonly used to describe the goal of these new interventions is 
‘well-being’, which encompasses the happiness and health experienced by 
employees” (Davies, 2015, p. 117).  
This ‘well-being’ and ‘happiness’ culture, combined with the “…order of de-
symbolization” (Dardot & Laval, 2014b), inevitably leads the neo-subject to bouts of 
depression, addiction and despair: “Subjects experience the need to ‘have a good time’, to 
enjoy themselves, as a kind of duty, and, consequently, feel guilty for failing to be happy. 
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The superego controls the zone in which these two opposites overlap – in which the 
command to enjoy doing your duty coincides with the duty to enjoy yourself” (Žižek, 1999). 
Psychoanalysis no longer works to liberate the individual from the restraints of repressive 
Victorian culture and its suppression of ‘enjoying oneself’ through libidinal transgressions. 
On the other hand, it deals with its opposite: excess enjoyment: “What psychoanalysis [today] 
properly concerns itself with are the unexpected consequences of the disintegration of the 
structures that have traditionally regulated libidinal life. Why does the decline of paternal 
authority and fixed social and gender roles generate new guilts and anxieties, instead of 
opening up a brave new world in which we can enjoy shifting and reshaping our multiple 
identities?” (Ibid).  
As the desire of Praxis faces the problem of exhaustion from its subjects, human 
resources employ ego-management and psychotherapy techniques that aim at “…propping up 
the well- being of individuals, in order to keep their enthusiasm for service-based jobs as high 
as possible” (Davies, 2015, p. 138). Keeping in mind the extremely prevalent KPI culture, 
what occurs is a blending with the methodology of managerial/occupational psychotherapy: 
“…we train our selves to be more suspicious of our thoughts, or more tolerant of our 
feelings, with the encouragement of cognitive behavioural therapy […] …we even engage in 
quantified self- monitoring of our own accord, volunteering information on our behaviours, 
nutrition and moods to databases, maybe out of sheer desperation to be part of some- thing 
larger than just ourselves. Once we are split down the middle in this way, a relationship – 
perhaps a friendship? – with oneself becomes possible, which when taken too literally breeds 
loneliness and/or narcissism” (Ibid, p. 274). By splitting ourselves down the middle, acting as 
agents of our own destiny and being an ever present watchman, what develops is an eternal 
repetition compulsion or feedback loop that shows no hope of escape “….beyond that of 
consumption” (Ibid, p. 113). This is exactly the point made by Marcuse in his One 
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Dimensional Man (1964), which according to Box (2011, p. 171) is especially poignant 
today: “The people are led to find in the productive apparatus the effective agent of thought 
and action to which their personal thought and action can and must be surrended. And in this 
transfer, the apparatus also assumes the role of a moral agent. Conscience is absolved by 
reification, by the general necessity of things” (Marcuse, 2002 [1964], p. 82).     
      Of the key features that maintains the present zeitgeist, of a giant shopping mall, is 
behavioural control under the aegis of science – namely a ‘science of happiness’, or what 
Marcuse (2002 [1964], p. 25) calls “scientific management”, which constantly tracks our 
mood and aims to quantify subjective ‘well-being’ that ends up removing the subjective 
element altogether (Davies, 2015, p. 246). This, in turn, transforms society into a giant 
laboratory: “The unspoken precondition of this utopian vision is that society 
becomes designed and governed as a vast laboratory, which we inhabit almost constantly in 
our day-to-day lives” (Ibid, p. 238). Thus, in some way, neo-subjects inhabit a dystopian 
mixture of Zamyatin’s ‘We’ and Huxley’s ‘Brave New World’. Eric Laurent supplants 
laboratory with the clinic such that “[t]hese makeshift throw-togethers [CBT & the DSM] 
that maintain on the horizon a description of pathology in terms of “excess of personality” 
remind us that the pathology of excess is particularly in step with the way that our era is 
experiencing the drive as mediated by the superego […] Limitlessness is thus the index of a 
world falling under the superego’s sway. The subject finds himself all on his own having to 
cope with this “push towards jouissance”. The extension of the clinic of addictions vouches 






Cognitivism & Scientism 
According to Proctor (2008, p. 231), the fundamental cause for psychological distress 
is powerlessness. The power of CBT relies on an appeal to science and it advices patients on 
how to overcome their predicament by adopting ‘objective’ advice. The patient must 
therefore surrender themselves to the authority of the CBT practitioner and any resistance to 
this process is seen as an opportunity for correction through psychoeducation (Ibid, p. 234 – 
235). By imposing a socially conformist ideology on clients (Spinelli, 1994, p. 249), is the 
CBT practitioner, in reference to powerlessness, enforcing the very thing that is contributing 
to their distress? To clarify, what CBT attempts to do is present itself as a discourse whereby 
the patient can re-establish their subjective freedom by prescribing certain psychological 
tools, which they can use to ‘take back control’ of their lives, however these tools work at 
trying to ‘correct’ thinking and therefore act as tools for normalisation and thus is antithetical 
to subjectivity (Proctor, 2008, p. 236).   
For Proctor there is no suggestion anywhere on how the CBT community avoids 
subjugating a patient’s autonomy (Ibid, p. 241). CBT practitioners tend to deal with this issue 
by clouding the problem under the virtue of beneficence, which is to say that a patient’s 
choice, even at odds to the practitioner, must be corrected for the greater good.96 The patient 
must become submissive to the veneer of science embodied by the practitioner and submit to 
their advice, even if they fundamentally disagree with the process. However, as Proctor 
(2008, p. 243) says “There is a danger that in challenging the ‘realism’ of client’s thoughts 
that the material realities of power are ignored and deemed ‘unrealistic’. The focus of CBT is 
                                                          
96 As Blake said of the Aufklärer, even though he didn’t use that term: “He smiles with 
condescension: he talks of benevolence & virtue: And those who act with benevolence & 
virtue they murder time on time” (Blake, 1907 [1804], p. 45).  
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on changing the thinking of the individual, which has the danger of ignoring the social 
structural positions and the material realities of oppression and power in peoples’ lives”. 
Another fact is that a sudden change of symptom can lead to a ripple effect across the 
subjects entire personality, which CBT often ignores (Laurent, 2014, p. 51) and that both 
CBT and the DSM are essentially “…destroying classical psychopathology” (Ibid, p. 57).    
Beck et al (1979) states that the relationship between the patient and the practitioner 
should be one of ‘collaborative empiricism’. However, one of the fundamental problems 
inherent with this approach is to omit the principles that science cannot produce ethical 
answers because it is inherently ethically neutral (Russell, 2015 [1945], p. 494) and that one 
runs into serious problems when attempting to generate an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ as emphasized 
by Hume whereby “An active principle [primary imagination] can never be founded on an 
inactive [Logos]; and if reason be inactive in itself, it must remain so in all its shapes and 
appearances, whether it exerts itself in natural or moral subjects, whether it considers the 
powers of external bodies, or the actions of rational beings” (Hume, 1985 [1738], p. 509).  
The way CBT addresses the issue of depression is questionable on two fronts. Firstly, 
how its methodology acts as a form of psychological coercion by attempting to mold a 
patients ‘maladaptive experience’ into a conformist mode of existence. This is questionable 
because it fails to take into account each patients unique relationship with their given neurosis 
and attempts to standardize their suffering as being the cause of irrationality. The patient 
may, in reality, actually be acting in a moral way due to their given psychosocial existence 
and is actually “…feeling guilty about behaving morally” (Sagan, 1988, p. 18). Therefore, the 
CBT technician may attempt to ‘educate’ the subject into believing that their crisis of 
conscience was irrational. The second is its association with prevailing neoliberal ethics 
whereby its aim is to align the patient’s cognition back into a form of ideological complicity. 
This ideologically complicit self is objective, rational, pragmatic and scientific and is at odds 
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with the spontaneous activity of the subject. The failed attempt at stylizing the self, based on 
recent psychological models, into a strict, robotic, closed, ridged and static intrapersonal 
existence is supported by recent research (Science, 2015) that showed poor levels of 
replicability whereby out of 98 recent published psychological papers only 39/100 replication 
attempts showed a repeated statistical significance, and according to Baker (2015) “Two 
thirds of it [psychological literature] should probably be distrusted.” Additionally, a recent 
meta-analysis of 70 studies investigating the effects of CBT on the treatment of depression, 
found that between the late 1970s and 2014, remission rates have gone from an average of 
64.5% to 46.94% whereby “…modern CBT clinical trials seemingly provided less relief from 
depressive symptoms as compared with the seminal trails” (Johnsen & Friborg, 2015, p. 747).     
CBT practitioners can be considered contemporary Aufklärer because they share 
numerous similar characteristics including, an epistemological framework of positivism and 
rationalism, an unquestioning reliance on, and prescription of rationality, and finally a 
preoccupation with cognition, pragmatics and objectivity over sentiment, intuition and 












“How unfortunate I am! My feet, which I had denigrated, could have saved me, whereas my 
antlers, on which I prided myself, have caused my death” Fable 102 (Aesop, 1998 [4th 
Century BC], p. 80).97 
Myths and fables are extremely useful as they can elucidate profound concepts that 
are difficult, if not impossible, to unpack quantitatively with the same immediate impact or 
meaning. The fable outlined above I believe can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, the feet 
represents the “motor of the dream” (Lacan, 1959 [26/11/1958], p. 2), the living component 
of history, the pleasure principle of Eros in the great unfolding of mental life and 
civilization.98 On the other hand, the antlers can stand for the given dominant epistemological 
paradigm that manifests itself as Nomos, the ‘pride of civilization’, rationalism, the collective 
desire of the Aufklärer, organic narcissism and the imaginary mirror that “…reveals the 
object [Mirror], not the subject. The object, and not the subject, is what shows itself to him in 
and by - or better, as the act of knowing” (Kojève, 1969, p. 3).  
One great advantage of the psychoanalytic approach, over the more medicalized 
paradigms, is that it views the subject as a whole individual. That is to say, at least with 
                                                          
97 One of Aesop’s fables titled ‘The Stag at the Spring and the Lion’. The story goes that a 
stag visits a spring to drink and, on seeing his reflection, becomes engrossed in the beauty of 
his antlers but despises his feet. As a lion approaches the stag sprints away and is able to 
outrun the lion. However, as the stag enters a wooded area his antlers get caught in the 
branches and is eaten.   
98 As Lacan (1976, p. 15) observed “What is called a neurotic symptom is simply something 
that allows [the neurotic] to live.”             
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orthodox psychoanalysis, the psychoanalyst conceptualizes the individual in terms of all their 
structural components of id, ego and superego. By doing so, the analyst has to take into 
account the individual’s social existence, history, thoughts, dreams, relationships, language, 
sexuality and all the complex features that unify to form subjective experience. This is similar 
to the maxim by Hamann, which Goethe outlines as “‘Everything that one sets out to 
perform, whether by deed, by word, or otherwise, must spring from all one’s united powers; 
everything taken in isolation is worthless.’ A magnificent maxim! but hard to follow” 
(Goethe, 1890 [1811], p. 108).  However, the scientism inherent in the medicalized 
approaches deliberately abstracts and dissects mental life and examines them ahistorically 
and without context. The medicalized approaches to neurosis therefore act at trying to 
‘normalize’ subjects by unpacking their mental life, the ego only, correct it using an 
Encyclopédie, and feed it back to them in its ‘altered state’.99 However, by ontologically 
amputating mental life, the Aufklärer leave something behind. This vast reservoir, that is not 
directly present to an individual’s consciousness awareness, encompasses that which is not 
within the purview of protestant rationalism, and therefore is but one thing – the unconscious.  
 Freud clearly outlined in ‘Civilization and its Discontents’ (1930) that civilization 
creates discontent and that “The life imposed on us is too hard for us to bear” (Freud, 2002 
[1930], p. 13). For Freud, the pleasure principle, which Freud first described in the 
‘Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning’ (1911), is “The governing 
purpose […] [Whereby] our waking tendency to tear ourselves away from distressing 
impressions are remnants of the dominance of this principle and proofs of its power” (Freud, 
2005c [1911], p. 510). However, in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1920) Freud does 
                                                          
99 Lacan (1976, p. 15) also makes this controversial observation “I do not think that one can 
really say that neurotics are mentally ill. Neurotic is what most people are.”   
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explain that it is misleading to think of this principle as dominant in mental life. The reason 
why is that if it were so, then everyone would be constantly consumed in pleasure, which is 
not so: “The most that can be said, therefore, is that there exists in the mind a strong tendency 
towards the pleasure principle, but that that tendency is opposed by certain other forces or 
circumstances, so that the final outcome cannot always be in harmony with the tendency 
towards pleasure” (Freud, 2005d [1920], p. 220).  
As outlined in chapter 3, Coleridge’s esemplastic imagination is that force that can 
destabilize elements and reunify them into one. It is aligned with the fantasy of subjectivity 
and is akin to the pleasure principle and thus is the ‘creative God’ and “…prime agent of all 
human perception, and as a representation in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in 
the infinite I AM” (Coleridge, 1971 [1817], p. 167).  In other words, Eros: “In this way the 
libido of our sexual instincts would coincide with the Eros of the poets and philosophers 
which holds all living things together” (Freud, 2005d [1920], p. 256).  
Freud outlined that the pleasure principle is “…at odds with the whole world [And] It 
is quite incapable of being realized; all the institutions of the universe are opposed to it; one 
is inclined to say that the intension that man should be ‘happy’ has no part in the plan of 
‘creation’” (Freud, 2002 [1930], p. 14). As mentioned in chapter 3, this is usually the case as 
with the Standard Route . However, as previously stated, the Standard Route  can be 
bypassed by conscience and thus Eros, on occasion, can transcend the demands of the 
superego. 
For Freud, in his ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917), depression is essentially 
pathological grief: “In mourning, the world has become poor and empty, in melancholia 
[depression] it is the ego that has become so” (Freud, 2005b [1917], p. 205 – 206). Many 
depressed people are consumed with constant thoughts of death, and in very rare cases can 
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actually believe that they have died as seen with Cotard’s Syndrome (Debruyne et al, 2011). 
The Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual, PDM, lists the following internal experience of 
Introjective Depressive Disorders: “…harsh, punitive, unrelenting self-criticism; feelings of 
inferiority, worthlessness and guilt; a sense of having failed to live up to expectations and 
standards; fears of loss of approval, recognition, and love from important others; and fears of 
the loss of acceptance of assertive strivings. Self-esteem suffers badly under such onslaughts 
of self-criticism and fear. Cognitive patterns may include rationalized conviction of guilt, 
fantasies of loss of approval, recognition and love; inability to make decisions; low self-
regard; suicidal ideas; and impaired memory…” (PDM Task Force, 2006, p. 111). Reading 
this list one is inclined to say that it is characteristic of the repercussions of the superego. For 
the superego acts as the enforcer of the desire of the tertiary master, Nomos, as well as its 
punisher if the subject fails to obey.  
The reality principle is aligned with the superego inasmuch that it safeguards the 
pleasure principle, or in other words manages Eros. It is reinforced through education, which 
Freud describes as “…an incitement to the conquest of the pleasure principle, and to its 
replacement by the reality principle [And] …makes use of an offer of love as a reward from 
the educators…” (Freud, 2005c [1911], p. 514). In other words, the desire of the educators, as 
agents of Nomos, recognize the subject through praise and thus obedience to the superego is 
deemed by the subject as a method of attaining recognition in the Kojèveian sense. This in 
turn allows one characteristic of the superego to be aligned with attaining rewards/recognition 
by channeling the desire of Nomos: “This is how we usually perceive the Freudian superego, 
the cruel and sadistic ethical agency that bombards us with impossible demands and then 
gleefully observes our failure to meet them […] to enjoy is not a matter of following one’s 
spontaneous tendencies; it is rather something we do as a kind of weird and twisted ethical 
duty” (Žižek, 2006, p. 79). To clarify, the pleasure principle is not lost when undergoing 
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interpellation through education, but is coerced into the desire of Nomos and thus loses its 
spontaneous element. In other words, Eros is channelled into ‘pro-social’ goals such that, 
using the schema of abstraction, the Standard Route  is deemed by the subject as desirable 
and that one will achieve pleasure, praise and recognition for doing so. For example, under 
contemporary capitalism the agorae demands that I consume and is dictated to me by the 
‘law of desire’. However, in doing so I am mocked by the superego and thus punished for 
betraying the desire to ‘control oneself’. In other words, the superego does not only appear 
when one does an ‘immoral’ act, but is constantly surveilling our thoughts from the 
peripherals of our conscious awareness ready to pounce on any ‘dirty’ or prohibited thought 
by installing guilt, similar to Kant’s respect as outlined in chapter 3. One is therefore tricked 
by the superego for believing that one should enjoy ones ethical duty, as dictated by Nomos, 
as a type of masochism. The energy for the superego comes from a diverted pleasure 
principle into the desire of Nomos.  
As previously mentioned, Freud in his ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917) equated 
depression with pathological mourning. In using the execution of Charles 1st as an example, 
the Demos essentially were heavily invested in the loved object, represented by the King. 
However, many still succumbed to the Standard Route  as dictated by the strict adherence to 
societal conventions set by the puritans (See figure 1). 
   








Figure 1: Eros and the Standard Route  
Once Charles was executed, the loved object did not disappear immediately as “An 
understandable tendency arises to counter this – it may be generally observed that people are 
reluctant to abandon a libido position, even if a substitute is already beckoning. This tendency 
can become so intense that it leads to a person turning away from reality and holding on to 











Figure 2: The Process of Mourning 
In referring to figure 2: 
1. The loved object is lost, but has not yet fully expired from the psyche. The subject 
engages in reality testing and comes to the conclusion that the object is no longer 
there, but leaves a trace as a potential ‘hallucinatory wish psychosis’. This experience 
of seeing the deceased, one could even say ghosts, is surprisingly common amongst 
the elderly who have lost a loved one (Grimby, 1993). 
2. This is the painful process whereby the lost emblem is slowly detached from the 
libido and is replaced with a substitute (3). The memory of the original object remains 
but it is adjusted whereby “…the ego is left free and uninhibited once again after the 
mourning-work [2] is completed” (Freud, 2005b [1917], p. 205) 
3. The substitute object, which, once established, repeats figure 1. 
 
In melancholia, however, the lost object is not parted with entirely. The subject may 
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know exactly who they have lost, the King, but not the essential essence that went with it 
(Freud, 2005b [1917], p. 205). In other words, the Demos that mourned, simply detached the 
investment and replaced it with another. However, the Demos that became melancholic failed 
to part with the essential feature the King represented vis-à-vis his transcendent quality. As 
the King represented an object that could escape the clutches of protestant rationalism, his 
death manifested itself as a victory of the tertiary master, which utilized the absolute master, 
to abolish any sense of escape. In turn, the ego becomes a nihilistic prison with only the 
process of the Standard Route left vis-à-vis the ethical duty and punishing aspects of the 
superego. It must be stressed that “The ego is not master in its own house” (Freud, 1955 
[1917], p. 143), meaning that there is no autonomy of the subject, except a fantasmatic one. 
However, when undergoing the Standard Route, as outlined in figure 1, the subject feels a 
sense of working equilibrium, meaning that, even though their thoughts are constantly in 
conflict, are still able to function as an interpellated subject. That is to say that they can 
successfully navigate the repertoire of the desire of the other, in this case engaging in slavish 
work set by the desire of Nomos without too much exhaustion.   
This new nihilistic ego is now consumed in condemnation but actually comes to great 
insight whereby the subject can perceive the ills of the world head on, as well as understand 
its hidden oppressive workings: “…he describes himself as a petty, egoistic, insincere and 
dependent person, who has only ever striven to conceal [False Self] the weakness of his 
nature, he may as far as we know have come quite close to self-knowledge, and we can only 
wonder why one must become ill in order to have access to such truth” (Freud, 2005b [1917], 
p. 206). 
The object that is not parted with, in this case the transcendent object of the King, is 
turned inward only to face the onslaught of the superego i.e. the desire of Nomos. In other 
words, the self-reproaches seen in the melancholic are essentially attacks by the superego 
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against the lost object of transcendence which the subject had enormous investment in (Ibid, 
p. 208).   
   
Figure 3: The Process of Melancholia 
Referring to figure 3: 
1. The shadow of the object falls upon the ego/imaginary axis whereby the libido 
regresses into the ego (Ibid, p. 217).   
2. The Standard Route  works in reverse and severely condemns the object. The 
empirical object of fantasmatic autonomy is thus severely censored and restrained, 
essentially leading to a feeling of complete entrapment. This can also lead to a type of 
masochistic pleasure (Freud, 2005b [1917], p. 211) as the subject yields to the desire 
of the tertiary master by being recognized by it. The fantasy of autonomy, or primary 
imagination, is halted and subsumes the character of the lost object. Thus, the subject 
mistakenly deems the attacks by the superego as an attack on the very empirical 
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object of subjective fantasy. The raw pleasure principle is still at work but is 
suppressed by the superego, displaced pleasure principle, leading to tremendous 
tension and frustration that can, with some depressed people, be momentarily 
alleviated through mania: “Thus, for example: if a poor devil is suddenly relieved of 
his chronic concern about his daily bread by winning a large amount of money; if a 
long and strenuous struggle is finally crowned by success, if a person suddenly 
becomes capable of abandoning some pressing compulsion, a false position that he 
has had to maintain for a long time, and so on. All such situations are marked by a 
lightened mood, the signs of discharge of joyful emotion, and the intensified readiness 
for all kinds of actions, just like mania, and in complete contrast to the depression and 
inhibition of melancholia” (Freud, 2005b [1917], p. 214). This could be considered an 
explosion of Eros, which is why many manic individuals share similarities with the 
romantic ideal, although in an extreme form including: “…fantasies of invincibility 
and exceptional talent, a sense of capacity to succeed at any task regardless of 
preparation or training, wishes for fame or adoration; and difficulty thinking clearly, 
logically, and linearly. Individuals may fear that they cannot hold onto their thoughts, 
which seem flighty and ungraspable” (PDM Task Force, 2006, p. 114). Essentially 
mania suffers the same fate as Icarus that flew too close to the sun due to his extreme 
hubris.   
3. The primary imagination lies in waiting and is frustrated that it cannot progress into 
the imaginary as it has been ‘untenanted’, in other words repressed by the desire of 
the tertiary master. The empirical object of autonomy thus looks through the “…open 
wound, drawing investment energies to itself from all sides (energies which we have, 
in the case of transference neuroses, called ‘counter-investments’), and draining the 
ego to the point of complete impoverishment” (Freud, 2005b [1917], p. 212). 
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Depression results therefore from this ambivalent stance whereby the object is both 
loved by Eros, and condemned by Nomos whereby one attempts to “…free the libido 
from the object, the other to maintain the existing libido position against the 
onslaught” (Ibid, p. 216) respectfully. In other words Nomos desires to torture the 
‘treasonous’ object indefinitely, whereby Eros simply wants to put it out of its misery 
by detaching itself from it and finding a substitute whereby the primary imagination 
can once again take “…flight into the ego [where] love escapes abolition” (Ibid).           
 
In summary, the fantasy of autonomy, that attached itself to a transcendent object, is 
clipped of its wings when yielding to the desire of the tertiary master. In turn, this leads to a 
bleak and desolate ego that has been drained of life, Eros, which contributes to a feeling of 
nihilism and imprisonment. As Leader states “In mourning, we grieve the dead; in 
melancholia, we die with them” (Leader, 2009, p. 8).  
Psychoanalytic Treatment 
“This is in truth the subjective conflict, in which it is only a question of the vicissitudes of 
subjectivity, in so far as the ‘I’ wins and loses against the ‘ego’ at the whim of the religious 
catechizing or of the indoctrinating Aufklärung…” (Lacan, 2009 [1977], p. 60) 
  
There are many different schools of psychoanalysis; from the purely orthodox to 
Kleinian, from Bionian to Lacanian, whereby there is no widely accepted model for human 
development in the psychoanalytic community (Fink, 2007, p. 212). However, according to 
Fink, there should be a specific modus operandi for psychoanalytic treatment, namely how 
the analyst acts toward the patient. 
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Psychoanalysis is massively different in terms of its approach to treatment compared 
to CBT, general psychiatry or mainstream psychotherapy. For one, it should refrain from 
what Fink calls the “Tyranny of norms” (Ibid, p. 207). Most mainstream approaches to the 
treatment of ‘illness’ attempt to re-normalise the subject back into social conformity which is 
not only unhelpful, but can be dangerous. For who defines this ‘normality’ in the first place – 
the Aufklärer? Is there even such a thing as ‘normal behaviour’ as if human beings have a 
default setting: “The analyst would do far better, I think, to keep her eyes and ears glued to 
the trail of the repressed than to fix them on any such elusive ideal as that of normality” (Ibid, 
p. 215). 
As I have outlined, mainly in chapter 1, autonomy is a deep illusion. Autonomy is 
simply a product of the phantasmagoria generated by the desire/s of the masters, whereby 
subjectivity is mistaken as having agency which in actual fact is a conduit for these desires of 
the other. However, at the most elementary level of the subject lies a void, what Ruti (2012) 
calls the singularity, which is the void of the other, essentially the enigma that can never be 
signified and thus presents itself as a void. This terrifying knowledge is too much for the 
subject to bear and thus can only respond by developing, what Lacan calls, the “fundamental 
fantasy” (Lacan, 1961 [11/01/1961], p. 87). The subject is therefore trapped and completely 
submerged in fantasy and is the puppet of the master/s desire. Therefore what mainstream 
psychotherapists do is simply to reinforce a certain ‘pathway of desire’, namely the desire of 
the tertiary master, back into ‘normality’: “The use of terms like rationality and normality is 
one of the biggest shams – indeed, one of the biggest rationalizations – in current 
psychotherapeutic discourse” (Fink, 2007, p. 215-216).  
The psychotherapist therefore acts like a representative of Nomos that listens to the 
patients discourse and identifies any detour away from the desire of Nomos, which is a desire 
to conform to the prevailing status quo – to work, be rational, productive and not to be or act 
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in any way that upsets its smooth functioning, in essence, to reinforce the ego and the 
Standard Route : “Indeed, we might hypothesize that in many cases the stronger one’s ego, 
the less able one is to know the repressed within oneself and therefore the less able one is to 
distinguish whether what one “sees” is coming from oneself or from other people” (Ibid, p. 
227). In other words, the stronger the subject’s ego, the more the subject is hoodwinked by 
the desire of Nomos as being one’s own desire and thus become a subject that “…deems 
themselves most free [But are in truth] almighty slaves” (Coleridge, 1971 [1817], p. 71). This 
subject is thus consumed in repetition compulsion, which they are not aware of, and simply 
repeat again and again the pathways of desire. 
However, the position of the psychoanalyst is not to reinforce normativity or any form 
of desire, but to radically shake up the analysand’s phantasmagoria to such an extent that they 
can perceive their repetitive compulsion and, in doing so, new paths of desire that the subject 
didn’t even know existed. That is to say that the subject perceives a new phantasmagoria, but 
one full of different possibilities, which allows for less suffering whereby they will “…know 
far more about [their] own psychical reality than [they] did at the outset. In the best of cases, 
[they] will realize by then that [they have] no business attempting to impose [their] own 
notions of reality on others” (Fink, 2007, p. 228). Lacan in Seminar 2 also highlights this 
point: “It doesn’t mean persuading him, which leads pretty quickly to suggestion. It doesn't 
mean reinforcing, as they say, the ego of the subject, or to make an ally of its healthy part. It 
doesn't mean convincing. What it means is, at every instant of the analytic relation, knowing 
at what level the answer should be pitched […] …it concerns his history in as much as he 
fails to recognise [méconnait] it, and that is what his entire behaviour really does express in 
spite of himself in so far as he tries obscurely to recognise it. His life is oriented according to 
a problematic which isn't that of his actual experience, but that of his destiny…” (Lacan, 
1991 [1954], p. 42-43).  
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To further clarify, Freud stressed that one should not think in terms of curing people, 
but rather transform their neurotic state into one whereby suffering could be more 
experienced differently: “No doubt fate would find it easier than I do to relieve you of your 
illness. But you will be able to convince yourself that much will be gained if we succeed in 
transforming your hysterical misery into common unhappiness. With a mental life that has 
been restored to health you will be better armed against that unhappiness” (Freud, 1955b 
[1895], p. 305). 
Of course, this process of shaking up the analysand’s phantasmagoria can take years 
of analysis to achieve. The way the analyst does this is to simply act as a facilitator of free 
association. What this essentially means is that the analyst should attempt to get the patient 
not to necessarily think, but to run free with their desire and, by doing so, will eventually 
come to certain epiphanies about their own psychic and social configuration: “Rather than 
propose an A or B, or even an A, B, or C, to choose from, we generally do best to avoid 
putting words in the analysand’s mouth […] The more open-ended the question, the more 
unexpected, unpredictable, and often more productive the answer” (Ibid, p. 33). The analyst 
should also heed the great importance in responding to questions or statements with silence. 
By providing silence, the analysand re-experiences the void of the other and thus has to 
reconstitute their fantasy. In doing so, the analyst is representing themselves as a person with 
no desire and thus the analysand feels, over time, that they can fantasise with less censorship 
primarily because the analyst is not judgemental: “Psychoanalysis harnesses this kind of 
excitement (libidinal energy) generated by the analytic situation and the case of mistaken 
identity that it fosters; it does not try to neutralize or dissipate it as certain other forms of 
treatment do” (Ibid, p. 138).  
In summary, the analyst realises that the analysand’s network of desire, or 
phantasmagoria, is causing them neurotic symptoms, which they engage with in repetition 
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compulsion, but does not under any circumstances try and guide the analysand back into a 
certain pathway of desire, namely that of Nomos. In other words, the analyst simply tags 
along with the analysand in their fantasy and attempts to get them to freely associate whereby 
they will, in turn, come to their own discoveries. In some way, Eros is encouraged in analysis 
as well as the other desires of the masters, but through the process of transference, and by 
having an Other that does not coerce or implement any form of censorship, the subject may 
eventually come to see their own strings from their puppet masters vis-à-vis the desires of the 
others/masters.  
Once this happens, the analyst should encourage a type of self observance, not to 
eradicate desire, which would be impossible, but to simply become aware of one’s own 
supremely individual phantasmagoria. In this way the analysand moves from one state to a 
more self-aware existence whereby the ideal is for the analysand to have intimate knowledge 
of their processes of desire and increase the volume of their inner voice or daemon in the 
Socratic sense: “I have a divine or spiritual sign which Meletus has ridiculed in his 
deposition. This began when I was a child. It is a voice, and whenever it speaks it turns me 
away from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me to do anything. This is 
what has prevented me from taking part in public affairs, and I think it was quite right to 
prevent me” (Plato, 1997f [31d], p. 29). Perhaps that little voice was Socrates conscience, the 
handmaiden of Eros.  
Conclusion 
The conclusion taken from the dialogue Gorgias is that the rhetorician is a necessary 
one, although their techne is subservient to the true knower. Contemporary psychotherapy is 
necessary as it is primarily cost effective and simply does not have time to wander about the 
labyrinths of an analysand’s fantasy in order to make monumental and profound changes. The 
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psychotherapist takes the analysand by the hand and simply tries to persuade them back into 
their societal existence through psychoeducation. This does tend to alleviate the severity of 
neurotic symptoms but, on occasion, they come back with a vengeance. I would like to offer 
the reader an allegory. 
An actor decides to take part in a stage play. The actor knows their lines and practices 
them in private and is ready to go to rehearsal. On the stage everything is going well, our 
actor remembers his lines and the other actors play their part with great charisma whereby 
everything runs smoothly. However, later on our actor forgets his lines and loses his 
character. The other actors look on with scorn and giggle amongst themselves. Our actor is 
asked to step down and take a seat on the front row, all the while being humiliated and 
laughed at by the rest of the cast. The rehearsal continues but with glances of condemnation 
directed to our actor. The play’s director decides to sit with the actor and go over his failures 
and his lines. The director tries to persuade the actor to go back on stage anew and to ignore 
the fellow actors. After a while, the actor stands up and, instead of walking back on stage, 
leaves the theatre quietly whispering to himself “Perhaps a different play”.   
Using this allegory one can see how the stage can represent Nomos or Praxis. The 
actor has to adopt a false self, in the Winnicottian sense, as well as learn the Standard Route . 
In the beginning everything is working fine as the ego of the actor is strong whereby he really 
feels himself in character, essentially deceived by not being able “…to know the repressed 
within oneself and therefore the less able one is to distinguish whether what one “sees” is 
coming from oneself or from other people” (Fink, 2007, p. 227). However, the actor slowly 
reveals too much of his spontaneous nature. In other words, he starts to feel phoney and is 
distracted by his conscience and so he steps out of character and his mind goes blank 
“…unaware that he is possessed by god” (Plato, 1997b [249c – 249d], p. 527). In other words 
he succumbs to the “…strong tendency towards the pleasure principle” (Freud, 2005d [1920], 
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p. 220). The other actors suddenly realise this and pounce, condemn and banish this 
meddlesomeness of transcendence and kick him off the stage, in other words the libido 
regresses into the ego (Freud, 2005b [1917], p. 217). The subject now has a front row seat to 
the processes of the superego and therefore “…he may as far as we know have come quite 
close to self-knowledge” (Ibid, p. 206).  
The actor feels ashamed for not living up to the demands of the tertiary master. The 
director, psychotherapist, then starts the process of psychoeducation by evaluating automatic 
thoughts, identifying underlying beliefs, restructuring beliefs, modifying images and labelling 
distortions etc. (Dowd, 2004, p. 420). The actor now feels a sense of renewed confidence 
with his ‘fixed’ ego and is about to return to the stage but something happens, a little voice 
“…turns me away from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me to do 
anything” (Plato, 1997f [31d], p. 29). For the actor remembers the quote by Shakespeare that 
“All the world’s a stage, and all the men and women merely players” (Shakespeare, 1919 
[1623], p. 37). In other words, the actor realises that he is caught within a certain pathway of 
desire and simply moves to another stage with different possibilities for “There is a world 
elsewhere” (Shakespeare, 1922 [1608], p. 141).    
One should not take from this the idea that anyone who is dissatisfied with their 
current predicament should simply leave. Indeed, as stated before, the 
rhetorician/psychotherapist is necessary to maintain the very functioning of the state, which is 
to assist Nomos, as Gorgias himself states: “…suppose that if a person who has become an 
orator [Patient] goes on with this ability and this craft to commit wrongdoing, we shouldn’t 
hate his teacher [Psychotherapist] and exile him from our cities. For while the teacher 
imparted it to be used justly, the pupil is making the opposite use of it. So it’s the misuser 
whom it’s just to hate and exile or put to death, not the teacher” (Plato, 1997d [457b-457c], p. 
802). To clarify, the orator, psychotherapist, teaches the patient certain valuable skills and 
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persuades them that by adopting these skills one will become more healthy, rational and 
skilled i.e. a stronger ego. Once the patient returns to the stage, if they misuse this newly 
acquired skill by potentially dogmatically teaching others of the benefits of a strong ego and 
the downside of irrationality, the blame should be placed on them, not the teacher. However, 
referring back to the fable of the stag and lion, this ego is the primary cause of the subject’s 
misfortune as it simply adopts a slavish consciousness to the desire of the tertiary master. It is 
consumed in self-flattery a “…mischievous, deceptive, disgraceful and ill-bred thing, one that 
perpetrates deception by means of shaping and coloring, smoothing out and dressing up, so as 
to make people assume an alien beauty and neglect their own” (Plato, 1997d [465b], p. 809). 
The errors of the Aufklärer, outlined in chapter 3, are that they misuse language by assuming 
that reason exists a priori to language. From this they begin to equate reason with goodness 
and goodness with duty and are therefore very much in tune with protestant rationalism.  
Socrates eventually states that rhetoric is simply a routine and knack (Plato, 1997d 
[463b], p. 807). For Socrates, rhetoricians need to have virtue behind them. Psychoanalysts 
know that the very concept of virtue is extremely malleable and thus steer clear of it: “Strict 
adherence to norms and to a teleological view of how all human beings should develop in 
order to reach some specified normal end state will not, in my view, help guide the 
practitioner’s work but will simply further enforce the tyranny of norms. A far more useful 
guide for the perplexed clinician is to focus on the origins, workings, and consequences of 
repression in each individual case” (Fink, 2007, p. 216). The Aufklärer assume that a good 
life is a rational, scientific and pragmatic one (Rosner, 2012, p. 3). This abstracts the 
individual, and places them in the moral deontological world of Kant whereby one should 
submit to the law despite it being painful (Kant, 2002 [1788, 73] p. 95-96).  
Psychoanalysis favours the contemplative over the active life. Callicles tries to 
persuade Socrates to stop all this ‘silly’ philosophising and to simply go out into the world: 
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“Listen to me, my good man, and stop this refuting. “Practice the sweet music of an active 
life and do it where you’ll get a reputation for being intelligent. Leave these subtleties to 
others”—whether we should call them just silly or outright nonsense—“which will cause you 
to live in empty houses,” and envy not those men who refute such trivia, but those who have 
life and renown, and many other good things as well” (Plato, 1997d [486c – 486d], p. 830). 
However, Socrates ends up showing Callicles that the contemplative life is far superior to the 
active by arguing that one would be consumed in desire and pleonexia with no self-control if 
one were to heed his advice. For oratory only acts as a mouthpiece for the political order: 
“Through routine and knack it merely preserves the memory of what customarily happens, 















Chapter 6: The Computerised Ego 
Introduction 
“SOCRATES: And so, Theaetetus, if ever in the future you should attempt to conceive or 
should succeed in conceiving other theories, they will be better ones as the result of this 
inquiry. And if you remain barren, your companions will find you gentler and less tiresome; 
you will be modest and not think you know what you don’t know. This is all my art can 
achieve—nothing more. I do not know any of the things that other men know—the great and 
inspired men of today and yesterday” – Theaetetus (Plato, 1997h [210b-210c], p. 233-234).   
 
As stated in chapter 3, the Romantics had a very suspicious and hostile approach to 
those that claimed to explain away the structure of reality, especially metaphysical reality. 
The Romantics accused the Aufklärer of a brutal rape of nature by siphoning, cutting, 
abstracting, removing and wrenching away the fabric of incomprehensible majesty and 
mystery of life and replacing it with a shallow, standardizing, dead, cold and, most 
importantly, artificial system.  
Who might we call the modern day Aufklärer, and more importantly who would the 
Romantics attack today? Over the past 60 years the academic world has experienced the full 
force of the cognitive revolution and has become, by far, the most empirically investigated as 
well as one of the most popular forms of psychotherapy (Hofmann, 2014; Kramer, Bernstein 
& Phares, 2014). As mentioned in chapter 5, the propagation of this model is aligned with 
Nomos and thus, if identified with, can lead to a diminishment of fantasmatic autonomy and 
potential Weltschmerz. Thus, the cognitive model is philosophically questionable on the 
grounds that it is merely an extension of protestant rationalistic ethics which they tend to 
deny (Prilleltensky, 1994, p. 967).   
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The Romantics would arguably view cognitivism as a horrifying abstracting system 
that distorts and makes a mockery of the human condition by insisting on social conformity 
and a reduction of individualism, as Isaiah Berlin indicated: “What romanticism did was to 
undermine the notion that in matters of value, politics, morals, aesthetics there are such things 
as objective criteria which operate between human beings, such that anyone who does not use 
these criteria is simply either a liar or a madman, which is true of mathematics or of physics” 
(Berlin, 2000, p. 140).  
This short and final chapter will briefly discuss the potential logical outcome of 
protestant rationalism as being one focused on computation. The cognitive epistemological 
foundations will be discussed and shown to adopt a paradigm that views the human mind in 
computational terms. By having this approach, one potential problem is the digitalization of 
the Logos whereby the fantasmatic configurations of subjectivity are equated more and more 
with that of a computer leading to a further diminishment of the creative component of Eros. 
The first section will provide an outline on the origins of cognitive psychology and 
show how much it relies on the epistemological paradigms of neuralism and 
computationalism. Two thinkers that support this approach, Dennett and Searle, will be 
critiqued and shown to essentially adopt the dualist perspective, which they deny. Therefore, 
cognitivists rely on a hysteron proteron approach such that they create machines via an 
extension of mathematical knowledge, however, this mathematical knowledge is outside the 
purview of human creation and therefore to apply these machines, and to assume the premise 
of the metaphor that the mind is like a computer, is to commit a circulus in probando.  
The final section will focus on the work of Gödel, specifically his ‘Gibbs Lecture’ 
(1951), whereby he argues that the mind does not function like a computer, and his ‘Is 
Mathematics Syntax of Language?’ (1953). The reader will be shown how Gödel eventually 
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came to accept the Platonist view of mathematics, which if shown to be correct will have 
truly biblical consequences on philosophy, as well as the mind-body problem. However, the 
chapter will end with an aporia whereby the notion of what the Logos is will perhaps forever 
remain unsolvable.          
Computationalism & Cognitivism 
Up until the 1950s, beginning in the 1920s, American psychology was dominated by 
behaviorism. Arguably, the three most important figures were Edward Thorndike (1874-
1949), John Broadus Watson (1878 – 1958) and Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904 – 1990) that 
argued that human behavior and thought were largely caused by conditioned, learnt, 
responses to environmental stimuli: “As a science of behavior adopts the strategy of physics 
and biology, the autonomous agent to which behaviour has traditionally been attributed is 
replaced by the environment – the environment in which the species evolved and in which the 
behaviour of the individual is shaped and maintained” (Skinner, 1971, p. 180).100  
Around the end of the 1940s there emerged a new theory based on viewing the role of 
communication in computational terms. One seminal paper which began the movement of 
‘Information Theory’ was Claude Elwood Shannon’s ‘A Mathematical Theory of 
Communication’ (1948).  
                                                          
100 Skinner never abandoned his view despite the works of Chomsky showing the 
fallaciousness of his theory. “The questions to which Skinner has addressed his speculations 
are hopelessly premature. It is futile to inquire into the causation of verbal behaviour until 
much more is known about the specific character of this behaviour; and there is little point in 
speculating about the process of acquisition without much better understanding of what is 
acquired” (Chomsky, 1959, p. 57-58). 
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Shannon argued that information can be processed via a series of commands or stages which 
produces certain communicative outcomes. Could this algorithmic processing also apply to 
human perception or even memory? This question led to the ‘Information Processing’ 
approach whereby information, including human thought, could be viewed computationally 
and is still the dominant idea within cognitive psychology today (Smith, 2001, p. 2,140) 
whereby “At the heart of this revolution lies the claim that the mind is a computational 
system” (Casey & Moran, 1989, p. 143). This ‘Information Processing’ approach, combined 
with the works of Alan Turning, contributed to later developments that aimed at combining 
mathematics with information theory and had a direct influence on the genesis of 
cognitivism. George Miller’s seminal article ‘The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus 
Two’ (1956) and more importantly his collaborated work ‘Plans and the Structure of 
Behavior’ (1960) where two such milestones in this genesis.  
‘Plans and the Structure of Behaviour’ combined computer modeling and information 
processing to help emphasize how the mind could be viewed in more mechanistic terms and 
remains one of the cornerstones of contemporary cognitive psychology (Smith, 2001, p. 2 & 
141). Essentially, Miller attempted to view the mind as a computer: “Our present interest is in 
the use of computers as automata to illustrate the operation of various psychological theories” 
(Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960, p. 49-50).  
Miller (2003) argues that the term ‘cognitive science’ originated in 1956. During 
September 1956, a conference was held at MIT organized by the ‘Special Interest Group in 
Information Theory’ and, on its second day, a series of speeches were given by IBM, 
Chomsky and others whereby “I [Miller] left the symposium with a conviction, more intuitive 
than rational, that experimental psychology, theoretical linguistics, and the computer 
simulation of cognitive processes were all pieces from a larger whole and that the future 
would see a progressive elaboration and coordination of their shared concerns” (Miller, 2003, 
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p. 143).  
From the 1950s onward, the cognitive approach exploded and its development is only 
hindered with the development of technology such that new computer designs lead to more 
complex theories. The invention of the transistor in 1947 wasn’t utilized in computation until 
much later, but allowed computers to be built in smaller and smaller ways. In the early 1970s 
the invention of the MRI scanner allowed cognitive scientists to directly see live activity in 
the brain and therefore generate experiments looking at how information is processed 
computationally: “…it is not going too far to say that cognitive scientists view the mind as a 
machine or mechanism whose workings they are trying to understand” (Friedenberg & 
Silverman, 2006, p. 3).  
By applying a strictly objective and scientific approach to the human mind, and 
equating it to a computer, cognitivists must adopt certain maxims. One major maxim is 
universality, whereby they seek results that can be applied to as many people as possible. By 
adopting this, are they not alluding to the questionable ethical problem of standardization 
such that individuality is stripped away or simply ignored? This again is indicative of Hume’s 
law: “An active principle can never be founded on an inactive; and if reason be inactive in 
itself, it must remain so in all its shapes and appearances, whether it exerts itself in natural or 
moral subjects, whether it considers the powers of external bodies, or the actions of rational 
beings” (Hume, 1985 [1738], p. 509). Two of the figureheads for this paradigm of thought 







Dennett, Searle & Neuralism 
McLaren’s work ‘Monist Models of Mind and Biological Psychiatry’ (2010), argues 
that two philosophical figureheads that support contemporary Cognitivism and biological 
psychiatry are Dan Dennett’s ‘Functionalism’ and John Searle’s ‘Natural Biologism’ in 
explaining consciousness (McLaren, 2010, p. 122).  
Both Dennett and Searle’s views are the objects of attack in McLaren’s (2010) paper. 
One of Dennett’s most influential works, ‘Consciousness Explained’ (1993), outlined his 
theory of ‘Functionalism’ as a response to the difficulties of what he called ‘contradictions’ 
and problems of dualism whereby he sees it as “…crude magical thinking that violates the 
fundamental laws of the universe, creating endless logical problems while solving none” 
(McLaren, 2010, p. 124). Dennett concludes that dualism is antiscientific and that as long as 
it exists we will never understand consciousness; therefore “Somehow, the brain must be the 
mind” (Dennett, 1993, p. 41).  
Essentially ‘Functionalism’ is Dennetts notion that consciousness is merely a machine 
that does something, it exists as a function of the brain and to question what it is constructed 
of or the size of it is irrelevant – it is, and only is, the operational activity of a machine 
(McLaren 2010, p. 124): “Human consciousness is itself a huge complex…that can best be 
understood as the operation of a “von Neumannesque” virtual machine implemented in the 
parallel architecture of a brain that was not designed for any such activities. The power of this 
virtual machine vastly enhances the underlying powers of the organic hardware on which it 
runs” (Dennett, 1993, p. 210). 
In reading this, are we to assume that software and hardware are one and the same thing? Is 
Dennett really saying that the words, images and sentences apparent on a computer screen 
have physical representations in a computer’s hardware? Does a thought have weight? 
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According to McLaren, Dennett has accidentally adopted the very thing he is trying to negate, 
dualism. As Dennett views the mind as a virtual machine, he is really saying that it is separate 
and therefore adopts a dual aspect approach to the mind-body problem which he knows but 
does not overly admit (McLaren, 2010, p. 129). Dennett claims that our ‘selves’ could be 
stored as ‘pure information’ very similar to how information is stored on a computer 
(Dennett, 1993, p. 430), but then again this is not a physical thing but ‘something else’ which 
he doesn’t pay full due diligence to, therefore Dennett is actually a closet dualist (McLaren, 
2010, p. 130). This has led to some of his biggest critics to call his work ‘Consciousness 
explained away’ (Carruthers, 2005, p. 32).   
John Searle’s view of ‘Biological Naturalism’ is a bit more conventional than 
Dennett’s view according to McLaren (2010, p. 126). Searle doesn’t present a favorable view 
of Dennett’s conception of consciousness as functionalism discounts the ‘agent’ of 
consciousness that experiences it subjectively. To view consciousness in a nonsubjective 
manner is to examine it as something it is not and therefore it cannot be taken seriously. 
However, Searle also rejects the idea of dualism whereby he states: “Dualism in any form 
makes the status and existence of consciousness utterly mysterious” (Searle, 1999, p. 47). 
Searle’s solution to this is to again argue that consciousness is a “…biological phenomenon 
like any other” (Searle, 1999, p. 51) which derives from a particular functional process of the 
brain that can overlap each other. However, once again, Searle unintentionally adopts a 
dualistic perspective on the mind-body problem: “Searle’s underlying, visceral antipathy to 
dualism blinds him to the very obvious fact that an ontologically separate and irreducible 
state can coexist in natural harmony with an entirely separate state, if and only if it is an 
informational state generated by a physical machine” (McLaren, 2010, p. 130). 
Searle makes another major error according to McLaren, which is of special interest 
to my critique of cognitivism in general, that of conflating and equating brain processes with 
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its output. Searle fails to see that a machine is completely separate from a thing it produces 
and that a brain can and does produce an informational, or from a Lacanian perspective 
fantasmatic, space that is separate. McLarens paper is significant and has drastic implications 
on biological psychiatry and cognitivism because the bedrock of assuming that brain 
processes or chemical imbalances can fully explain mental phenomenon are very limited.  
McLaren (2010, p. 131) makes use of Alan Turning’s observation that “An 
informational space can be lifted to unimaginable levels of complexity without further 
modification of the physical machine that generated it” (Turing, 1936). However I believe we 
can go one step further by using Gödel. However, in order to understand the discoveries of 
Gödel it is important to briefly define axioms. 
Axioms 
“Its all over”101 
 
 Were the Romantics actually justified in their claim that formal systems could never 
yield a complete understanding of nature and reality? Were they justified in the dismay and 
disgust directed toward rationalism? Within this section I will present to the reader that 
during the latter half of the 19th century and early 20th century, discoveries in mathematics 
actually help support the idea that any ‘system’, ‘code’ or ‘rule’ applied to the understanding 
of reality is, at its core, essentially unidentifiable and impossible to concretely label down, 
therefore giving support to the Romantic sermon of the impossibility of true concrete 
                                                          
101 John von Neumann’s response on hearing Kurt Gödel’s conference on Incompleteness 




 Many philosophers or even mathematicians still accept the notion that an axiom is 
that unique thing, concept, thought or idea that is self-evident. That is to say that the ‘thing’ 
requires no further reasoning to make it any clearer. A good example is x=x, a triangle has 
three sides, the concept of a unit and many others. Merriam Webster (2015) gives these three 
definitions: 
1. A maxim that is accepted based on intrinsic merit 
2. An accepted statement considered true as the basis for an inference 
3. Established principle, rule or self-evident truth 
 
 However, these definitions are lacking in that they don’t fully unpack what the 
definition, or why, these ‘self-evident’ truths appear so obvious. The great problem with these 
definitions is that they are flatly incorrect. Indeed the Latin root does not mean ‘that which is 
self-evident’ but ‘what is assumed to be’ (Brown, 2007, p. 98).103 It was during the late 
                                                          
102 The very premise upon which everyone basis their entire edifice of knowledge on is their 
‘God’ as Hardenberg (Novalis) points out that “Science is the – projection, grasped in signs, 
of the essence and qualities of A Whole […] Wherever man sets his reality, whatever he fixes 
[The fancy of Coleridge], is his God, his world, His All” (Hardenberg, 1981, p. 228 & 233).    
103 One only needs to see the cult of Pythagoras (Pythagoreanism) that literally worshiped 
mathematics as a religion as the axioms upon which it was based seemed to have a divine 
quality that couldn’t be questioned (Pythagoreanism, 2015). Interesting, although debated, 
Hippasus, a student of Pythagoras, demonstrated the existence of irrational numbers that 
angered Pythagoras so much, as he destabilised the sanctity of natural numbers, that 
Pythagoras had him drowned (Martínez, 2012, p. 21-22). 
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nineteenth century that the very definition of axioms became heavily criticized by physicists, 
as well as mathematicians, as they began to question the grounding of mathematical concepts 
in the study of the universe. For example, Einstein’s theory of general relativity demonstrated 
that the very concept of time was not something independent and continuous but something 
that was relative depending on numerous interconnecting variables including gravity.  
 In light of huge developments in physics during the latter half of the 20th century, the 
concept of the axiom, or even truth, has undergone some very strange transformations. 
Quantum physics, headed up by the Niels Bohr, Erwin Schrödinger and others, showed that 
not only can something be present and not present at the same time, but both, and therefore 
puts into great doubt the very notion of the dichotomy of true and false. Indeed Richard 
Feynman said once back in 1965 “I can safely say that nobody understands quantum 
mechanics” (Feynman, 1985 [1965], p. 129). 
Gödel 
It was Cantor that demonstrated the absurdity of infinity and how contradictory and 
confusing it can seem to our basic intuition. At least 2,500 years before Cantor, the idea of 
infinity was a deeply confused idea. This was resolved by Cantor who introduced the notion 
that there were not only different kinds of infinity but, bizarrely, different sizes of it 
(Trzesicki, 2015, pp. 184-185). This had such a devastating effect on mathematics at the time 
because it suggested that the axiom, say of a concept, could not only be broken down into 
numerous other sub-units but that this could be done ad infinitum. The despair of the 
mathematical world was in realizing that not only did their entire system rest on a bottomless 
pit, but also the ‘inherent truth’ of its claims could not be formally defined, thus dismantling 
the very concept of mathematical proof. This was by no means the final nail in the coffin as 
this very problem was further demonstrated, elaborated and proven by, whom Robert 
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Oppenheimer said, was “…the greatest logician since Aristotle” (Wang, 2001, p. 37-38), Kurt 
Gödel.  
The Austrian-American mathematician Kurt Friedrich Gödel (1906 – 1978) is now 
widely accepted to be the greatest logician of the twentieth century. The American theoretical 
physicist John Wheeler said that comparing him to Aristotle would be a downgrade and even 
Einstein considered him to be a man of huge genius (Wang, 2001, p. 2). His most influential 
work, ‘On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related 
Systems’ (1931), was written when he was just 24 years old and had a devastating and 
immeasurable impact on the foundation of mathematics as well as philosophy. Within this 
work he single handedly proved that no formal system, say of mathematics, could be both 
consistent and complete at the same time, ever. The reason why was that by agreeing on a set 
of axiomatic truths one will inevitably come to a point whereby a contradiction occurs. If this 
contradiction is then added, as an additional rule, to the set of axioms, once again, a 
contradiction will reveal itself; Gödel summarizes: “…the theorem says that for any well-
defined system of axioms and rules, in particular, the proposition stating their consistency (or 
rather the equivalent number-theoretical proposition) is undemonstrable from these axioms 
and rules, provided these axioms and rules are consistent and suffice to derive a certain 
portion of the finisistic arithmetic of integers. It is this theorem which makes the 
incompletability of mathematics particularly evident. For, it makes it impossible that 
someone should set up a certain well-defined system of axioms and rules and consistently 
make the following assertion about it: All of these axioms and rules I perceive (with 
mathematical certitude) to be correct, and moreover I believe that they contain all of 
mathematics. If someone makes such a statement he contradicts himself” (Gödel, 1995a 
[1951, p. 10], p. 308-309).  In essence this meant that the foundation of mathematics, based 
on axioms, could never be considered a purely grounded or complete theory.  
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Gödel’s logical workings resulting in his theories are immensely rigorous and complex and 
one would be required to have at least a degree in mathematics to even begin to decipher 
them with due diligence, however their general conclusions are surprisingly simple but 
massively profound.  
Gödel’s Critique of the Principia Mathematica 
In the summer of 1930 Gödel had already arrived at the conclusion that there exists an 
undefinability of truth for arithmetic. Referring to the concept of real and natural numbers, 
Gödel wanted to find if they could be ‘proven’ using the rules of arithmetic whereby “…I 
represented real numbers by predicates in number theory [which express properties of natural 
numbers] and found that I had to use the concept of truth [for number theory] to verify the 
axioms of analysis […] I quickly discovered that the concept of arithmetic truth cannot be 
defined in arithmetic” (Gödel in Wang, 2001, p. 82).   
Gödel was attempting to test the ultimate reliability and provability of mathematical 
concepts. Around the same time many mathematicians and philosophers were contemplating 
the same problem and culminated in one of the most famous works on the issue by Alfred 
Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, the ‘Principia Mathematica’ (1910-13). 
This enormous work aimed at defining the basic rules of logic, axioms, and their 
relation to understanding the truth claims of mathematics (Irvine, 2015). However, Gödel was 
perplexed at some of the underlying assertions that were made, for example the section ‘A 
Definition of the Simplest Kind of Truth and Falsehood’ in which the very foundation, 
premise, of the hierarchy began for the development of the work. According to Floyd & 
Kanamori (2014, p. 7) the central idea of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem  “…is the formal 
definability of provability, which through the arithmetization of syntax leads to an 
unprovable formula based on the coded predication that the nth formula in one free variable 
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with the numeral n is provable.” 
In layman’s terms what this essentially states is that any formal system cannot prove 
its own terms using its own system, such that I cannot prove the existence of the number 1 
using numbers, or even logic, because in order to define a number I need to have a set of 
logical axioms. These axioms cannot be proven using axioms as there is always an 
assumption, one could say faith, that these are themselves self-demonstrable, in other words, 
one cannot prove the certainty of axioms using axioms. This is why Gödel says that as soon 
as we begin to attach a deeper meaning to symbols, such as a logic symbol or the 
mathematical notion of plus (+), we run into very serious difficulties; it is as though we have 
reached the very limit of human comprehension. Gödel explained further in his lecture ‘The 
Present Situation in the Foundations of Mathematics’ (1933), whereby he attacks Russell’s 
statement that “ [referring to a fundamental axiom] has to presupposed as known” (Floyd & 
Kanamori, 2014, p. 12): “...this process of definition presupposes that the totality of all 
properties exists somehow independently of our knowledge and definitions, and that our 
definitions merely serve to pick out certain of these previously existing properties. If we 
assume this, the method of non-predictive definition is perfectly all right…But the situation 
becomes entirely different if we regard the properties as generated by our definitions. For it is 
certainly a vicious circle to generate an object by reference to a totality in which this very 
object is supposed to be present already […] The result of the preceding discussion is that our 
axioms, if interpreted as meaningful statements, necessarily presuppose a kind of Platonism, 
which cannot satisfy any critical mind and which does not even produce the conviction that 
they are consistent” (Gödel as cited in Floyd & Kanamori, 2014: p. 12). 
In other words, Gödel turned math on itself by attempting to use it to understand its 
own foundations, but in the end simply yielded a circulus in probando. By digging deeper 
and deeper into the workings of a definition one simply reaches a type of Platonic wall that 
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prevents one from reaching the outside of the cave. This weird world is essentially the world 
of the alogon which simply means that which cannot be spoken of or exists outside of Logos, 
or the arreton which means incomprehensible (Plontnitsky, 2000, p. 147).         
The ‘Principia Mathematica’ is very exhaustive, however relies on a flaw: that axioms 
do not need to be proved. This was the main factor that attracted Gödel’s eye and he not only 
revealed this major error but also demonstrated that axioms can never be proven to be true as 
they already are the most fundamental unit of truth we can comprehend. Gödel was 
concerned with Russell and Whiteheads use and reliance on the 5 Peano Axioms, developed 
by the Italian mathematician Giuseppe Peano in 1889, which were designed to provide 
rigorous proof for the basis of natural numbers (Peano axioms, 2016). The system of 
inference and working through of the ‘Principia Mathematica’ and ‘Zermelo-Fraenkel’ 
“…are so extensive that all methods of proof used in mathematics today have been 
formalized in them, i.e. reduced to a few axioms and rules of inference.104 It may therefore be 
surmised that these axioms and rules of inference are also sufficient to decide all 
mathematical questions which can in any way at all be expressed formally in the systems 
concerned. It is shown […] that in both the systems mentioned there are in fact relatively 
simple problems in the theory of ordinary whole numbers which cannot be decided from the 
axioms” (Gödel, 1992, p. 37-38) and, “The addition of the Peano axioms, like all the other 
changes made in the system PM [Principia Mathematica], serves only to simplify the proof 
and can in principle be dispensed with” (Ibid, p. 41).  
This work did great damage to Russell’s work as Gödel quite literally pulled the 
carpet away from the bedrock of the ‘Principia’. Russell almost certainly read Gödel’s 
critique however the literature surrounding his response is surprisingly limited. Russell’s 
                                                          
104 Zermelo-Fraenkel was another system similar to the Principia. 
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autobiography gave a hint at the quiet disdain he had for Gödel: “Gödel turned out to be an 
unadulterated Platonist, and apparently believed that an eternal “not” [The abyss behind 
axioms] was laid up in heaven, where virtuous logicians might hope to meet it hereafter” 
(Russell as cited in Parsons, 1995, p. 44). 
 Gödel’s response to this was in identifying Russell’s hypocrisy in overlooking the ‘not’ 
here down on earth even when he made the specious assertion that “Logic, I should maintain, 
must no more admit a unicorn than zoology; for logic is concerned with the real world just as 
truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general features” (Russell, 1920 [1919], p. 
169). However, the problem with logic is that its system cannot always be expressed in the 
real world, for example irrational numbers. 
 The discovery of irrational numbers, according to Plontnitsky (2000, p. 147), was a 
type of ancient Gödelian critique. The problem is that the square of -1, i, can only be 
represented in two dimensional space and thus exists in a type of virtual reality that cannot be 
extrapolated into the real world, and yet it still exists. Leibnitz called imaginary numbers a 
type of “…hermaphrodite between existence and non-existence” (Leibnitz as cited in 
Plontnitsky, 2000, p. 153) and it is here whereby we run into problems in assuming that a 
physical machine can yield a human mind; for how are we to build a computer with irrational 
functions?          
Gödel on Computation: Gibbs Lecture (1951) 
The foundations of computation consist of simple commands such as on/off or 
correct/incorrect that is expressed in the most elemental mathematical notation, binary code. 
Simple computers are essentially ‘logic machines’ that follow a series of commands such as 
“If 01 then 01101” etc. Mathematicians, rely on there being a fundamental concept of 
true/false or correct/incorrect. Let’s for the sake of argument express this true/false 
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dichotomy in binary terms such that everything that is deemed ‘correct’ will be given the 
number 1, and ‘incorrect’ 0. For mathematics to be consistent and complete there must be a 
starting point, the axiom of truth that we’ll call (1) in which all the following system of math 
is to blossom – the axiom could be considered the seed and the entire edifice of pure 
mathematics is the flower. What Gödel realized was that there eventually came a point where, 
despite staying extremely strict to the logic, something cannot be demonstrated to be true (1) 
or false (0).   
‘This statement is false’ 
If we were to code this command into a system of numbers and then place them into a 
computer and ask it if the statement is true (1) or false (0) what would happen?105 In simple 
terms the computer would crash, as it would generate an infinite number of 1s and 0s 
(010101010…∞). The reason for this is as follows: 
a) If the computer gave the answer 1 this is a contradiction because the essence of the 
message indicates that it is false (0) i.e. incorrect. 
b) If the computer gave the answer 0 this is also incorrect because it is indeed correct, 
that the statement is false, and therefore would have to resort back to giving it a value 
of 1. 
 
Gödel spent much of his later life devoted to philosophy specifically the works of 
Leibniz, Husserl’s phenomenology and Platonism. However Gödel’s work on computabilism, 
                                                          
105 Gödel originally didn’t use this phrase; instead he used ‘This statement is unproveable’. 
Gödel devised an innovative way of allocating certain statements to numbers (Gödel 
numbers) however it goes beyond the scope of this paper to explain the details of this.   
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neuralism and factualism is paramount. Computabilism means viewing the brain and mind as 
functioning like a computer. Neuralism is similar, however it is the belief that the brain or, 
more specifically, neurons can explain mental phenomena – Gödel was strongly against both 
and discussed this at length within his Gibbs Lecture (1951): “Either…the human mind (even 
within the realm of pure mathematics) infinitely surpasses the powers of any machine, or else 
there exist absolutely unsolvable Diophantine problems” (Godel, 1995a [1951, p. 13], p. 
310). Gödel even goes on to say that this is an established mathematical fact (Ibid).   
Gödel’s inconsistency theories really damaged the idea that the human mind works 
like a machine as machines work on a finite set of rules that we have set and generated for the 
computer to function. Using these rules, we could call them computational axioms, shows 
that under certain circumstances the computer will eventually crash as it comes across a 
paradox. The human mind cannot crash, as the mind is not based on fixed finite rules but a 
creative activity or consciousness that can be considered infinite in nature and this is why 
Gödel suggested that: “When one speaks of mind one does not mean a machine (in any 
general sense) but a machine that recognizes itself as right” (Godel, 1951 as cited in Wang, 
2001, p. 189).  
Unfortunately this again shows Gödel’s theory at work, as we, with minds, know we 
are right but we cannot prove it using our own minds and it is this very thing that makes our 
mind separate from mechanistic factors. A computer relies on rules to govern its processes, 
but it does not ‘know’ them in the same way we ‘know’ the existence of our minds; we have 
made computers based off our platonic conceptualisation of mathematics and logic but we 
cannot ‘know’ our own processing rules and therefore we do not function as a machine: 
“Either subjective mathematics surpasses the capability of all computers, or else objective 
mathematics surpasses subjective mathematics, or both alternatives may be true” (Gödel, 
1951 as cited in Wang, 2001, p. 186). 
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What is astonishing here is that Gödel went on to say that if the first notion is true then the 
human mind cannot be reduced to the brain, therefore indicating that neuralism and 
computabilism is false, or the second is true and therefore mathematics is not our creation and 
therefore we cannot fully comprehend it. This is why Wang (2001: p. 186) says that either 
physicalism is false or Platonism in mathematics is true, or both. 
Gödel said that parallelism is the prejudice of our time (Wang, 2001, p. 190) and that, 
according to Wang (2001, p. 190) “…[the] belief in parallelism today is one aspect of the 
prevalence of scientism, which, as we know, is largely a consequence of the spectacular 
success and, therewith, dominant position of science and technology in our time”. Gödel 
essentially believed that the mind was a ‘thing’ or ‘spirit’ attached to a brain. The brain 
worked under the rules of finality and could be considered a special type of machine, 
however the mind, even though being able to access the workings of the brain from time to 
time, rested on an infinitely various creative component that escapes finite definition. Thus, 
attempting to equate mind as machine is a purely fallacious and unethical procedure: 
“Attempted proofs for the equivalence of minds and machines are fallacious. One example is 
Turing’s alleged proof that every mental procedure for producing an infinite series of integers 
is equivalent to a mechanical procedure…However this argument is inconclusive, because it 
depends on the supposition that a finite mind is capable of only a finite number of 
distinguishable states” (Gödel, 1951 as cited in Wang, 2001, p. 197). 
Gödel disagreed with materialistic philosophy: “Corresponding to the disjunctive 
form of the main theorem about the incompletability of mathematics, the philosophical 
implications prima facie will be disjunctive too; however, under either alternative they are 
very decidedly opposed to materialistic philosophy […] the working of the mind cannot be 
reduced to the working of the brain, which to all appearances is a finite machine with a finite 
number of parts, namely, the neurons and their connections. So apparently one is driven to 
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take some vitalistic viewpoint” (Gödel, 1995a [1951, p. 15], p. 311).106 Gödel was very much 
more intrigued with the philosophy of Plato and argued that it should be taught a lot more to 
mathematicians. When Gödel started studying logic he said it consisted of a 50/50 split of 
philosophy and math but today it has become 99% math and 1% philosophy, even though the 
1% is bad philosophy (Wang, 2001, p. 82). Gödel also emphasized that a great 
misunderstanding of his theory arouse from an anti-Platonic prejudice within established 
academia (Ibid, p. 83). 
Is Mathematics Syntax of Language? (1953) 
There are two major schools of mathematics. Firstly, formalism that argues that 
“…mathematics is not a body of propositions representing an abstract sector of reality but is 
much more akin to a game, bringing with it no more commitment to an ontology of objects or 
properties than ludo or chess” (Weir, 2015). This is the viewpoint shared by Wittgenstein, 
such that language is an essential component in the construction of mathematical truths 
generated by games: “The philosophy of logic speaks of sentences and words in exactly the 
sense in which we speak of them in ordinary life” (Wittgenstein, 2003 [1953, 108 & 109], p. 
40). The second is much more bizarre and has truly profound consequences, Platonism, 
whereby “…there are abstract mathematical objects whose existence is independent of us and 
our language, thought, and practices. Just as electrons and planets exist independently of us, 
so do numbers and sets. And just as statements about electrons and planets are made true or 
false by the objects with which they are concerned and these objects' perfectly objective 
                                                          
106 Vitalism is described as “…a doctrine that the functions of a living organism are due 
to a vital principle distinct from physicochemical forces [Or] a doctrine that the 
processes of life are not explicable by the laws of physics and chemistry alone and 
that life is in some part self-determining” (Merriam Webster, 2017e).  
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properties, so are statements about numbers and sets. Mathematical truths are therefore 
discovered, not invented” (Linnebo, 2013), and this is what Gödel believed was most likely 
correct.     
Gödel seems to reject the idea of rationalism, which deems mathematics as somewhat 
imprinted on our minds prior to experience, and that we essentially discover some secret 
ability within ourselves subjectivity, through a priori knowledge, which is not objective in 
the real sense. This is one criticism by Gödel toward Kant: “I do not believe that any Kantian 
or positivistic argument or the antinomies of set theory or quantum mechanics has proved that 
the concept of objective being (no matter whether for things or abstract entities) is senseless 
or contradictory. When I say that one can (or should) develop a theory of classes as 
objectively existing entities, I do indeed mean by that existence in the sense of ontological 
metaphysics, by which, however, I do not want to say that abstract entities are present in 
nature. They seem rather to form a second plane of reality, which confronts us just as 
objectively and independently of our thinking as nature” (Gödel, 1954 as cited in Parsons, 
2010, p. 167-168). What this essentially means is that mathematics, like the natural world 
around us, the things in-themselves, are very similar, but exist in a separate world similar to 
the Platonic forms and thus they have objective existence. However, these mathematical 
objects can only be perceived and described and are not created or subject to change (Gödel, 
1995a [1951, p. 30], p. 320). To further clarify, as stated earlier, mathematics cannot be 
extrapolated into the real world inasmuch as irrational numbers do not have a physical 






Figure 1: ‘Penrose’s Three Worlds’ (Penrose, 2004, p. 17) 
 
I have used this image from Penrose’s ‘Road to Reality’ (2004) to help clarify, as well as 
show, the consequences of mathematical Platonism. Each of the three worlds are completely 
separate from one another, the same way that a rock exists separately from my mind, but can 
be perceived by it. As mathematical objects have irrational numbers, they cannot be part of 
the physical world and therefore have their own realm. Gödel argues many points on why 
mathematics is not the syntax of language. 
1. Mathematical concepts, especially abstract ones, cannot be replaced by linguistic ones 
as the possible considerations on how syntax works is finite (Gödel, 1995b [1953, 
§25], p. 344). For example, how would someone be able to create a syntactical 
representation of Π?  
2. If number 1 is ignored, how is it possible to understand if a system is consistent? In 
other words, if syntax is accepted as a founding principle, how would you know if this 
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was itself consistent i.e. wouldn’t language just end up being a chaotic mess? (Gödel, 
1995b [1953, §29], p. 346). 
3. As words are merely symbols that have no inherent content i.e. can have multiple 
meanings, how is it possible for mathematics to have a sense of obviousness like 
physical objects if it is just a syntactical construct? (Gödel, 1995b [1953, §31], p. 
346). 
4. If the obviousness of mathematical truth is removed, then they can easily be open for 
disproof and we have got nowhere: “If mathematical intuition is accepted at its face 
value, the existence of a content of mathematics evidently is admitted. If it is rejected, 
mathematical axioms become open to disproof and for this reason have content” 
(Gödel, 1995b [1953, §33], p. 348).  
5. To analyse away, through language, the facts of axioms, always fails because if logic 
is reduced to syntax “…one needs axioms of the same power about the primitive 
terms of syntax or about abstract or tranfinite concepts to be used in the syntactical 
considerations” (Gödel, 1995b [1953, §35], p. 350). 
 
As just stated, Gödel thinks that the mathematical world has to exist as a separate realm 
with its own objects. In some way, even though he disagrees with empiricism as an 
epistemological model that has the idea of formalism within it, it can be rescued inasmuch 
that, even though mathematics is not generated by language, the senses can grasp this 
mathematical world the same way as an empiricist would say we gain knowledge about the 
physical world. However “…while through sense perception we know particular objects and 
their properties and relations, with mathematical reason we perceive the most general 
(namely the “formal”) concepts and their relations, which are separated from space-time 
[Physical] reality insofar as the latter is completely determined by the totality of particulars 
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without any reference to the formal concepts” (Gödel, 1995b [1953, §42], p. 354). That is to 
say that the physical and platonic worlds have profound differences, but they can be observed 
in the same way by our mental world (Gödel, 1995b [1953, §45], p. 356): “The same 
conviction undoubtedly disposed him against any form of physicalism or materialism in 
metaphysics, as well as against empiricism in epistemology” (Parsons, 2010, p. 168). 
Lacan and Cybernetics 
 For Lacan, the symbolic axis works very much like a machine: “The machine is the 
structure detached from the activity of the subject. The symbolic world is the world of the 
machine” (Lacan, 1991 [08/12/1954], p. 47). However, what separates the human from the 
machine is precisely the imaginary order that provides some form of Gestalt, that is to say 
self-consciousness or perceptual consciousness whereby Lacan establishes an  “…opposition 
between perceptual consciousness and the ego and then opposes both to the realm of the 
symbolic and the world of machines” (Johnston, 2008, p. 71).  
The world of the symbolic is structured like a language, but mainly follows the symbolic 
law that the subject, as void, is an element of and therefore is “…on several levels, caught up 
in crisscrossing networks” (Lacan, 1991 [27/04/1955], p. 193). As meaning is expressed as a 
signified image in the object of self-consciousness/imaginary/ego, this presupposes a signifier 
or syntax despite them being separate from semantics (Johnston, 2008, p. 94).  In using 
binary operations, Lacan showed how the symbolic law functions by highlighting the 
similarities of syntax to a cybernetic circuit. However, as Johnston insists, Lacan is careful 
not to fully equate the two despite them being very similar (Ibid).  
In order to understand grammar, Johnston suggests that we need a “…certain kind of 
machine in the head…” (Ibid, p. 95). In his seminal lecture ‘Psychoanalysis and cybernetics, 
or on the nature of language’ (1955), Lacan uses the analogy of a door to represent how logic 
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gates function at the level of the symbolic and how certain binary functions have a limit that 
eventually assume the appearance of “..an order which subsists in its rigour, independently of 
all subjectivity” (Lacan, 1991 [22/06/1955], p. 304). However, as this system is without 
subjectivity, how are we as humans able to be subjective? The simple answer is that we have 
an imaginary function, which is to say that the existence of our non-being i.e. the void of the 
subject, disturbs the symbolic order: “The machine is simply the succession of little 0s and 
1s, so that the question as to whether it is human or not is obviously entirely settled – it isn’t. 
Except, there’s also the question of knowing whether the human, in the sense in which you 
understand it, is as human as all that” (Lacan, 1991 [29/06/1955], p. 319).  
The major error, Lacan would arguably say, is that CBT practitioners reverse the 
symbolic and imaginary registers or negate the imaginary altogether. That is to say that as the 
symbolic functions like a machine, cognitivists assume that the imaginary also partakes of 
this order and, in doing so, negate the subject: “Is this imaginary homogeneous with the 
symbolic? No” (Lacan, 1991 [22/06/1955], p. 306).107 To further elaborate, by focusing on 
simple cognitive processes, the CBT practitioner is in actual fact abstracting or negating the 
subject: “Though much attention is given to problem solving, decision making, searches, 
goals, logical operations, languages, and representation, these are processes without an 
identifiable subject” (Johnston, 2008, p. 297).   
As I previously argued, AI and the cognitive paradigm are merely evolutions and 
extensions of rationalism, which Johnston also confirms (Ibid, p. 313-314). How the subject 
                                                          
107 Lacan highlighted this danger when discussing psychosis in seminar 3: “Thus to 
authenticate everything of the order of the imaginary in the subject is properly speaking to 




interacts with the symbolic and how this is grounded in the first place is simply a “...relation 
of non-being to being” (Lacan, 1991 [22/06/1955], p. 308). In summary, Lacan points out 
that without the imaginary ego interfering with the symbolic, communication within the 
unconscious would not be apparent (Lacan, 1991 [09/02/1955], p. 120).  
These binary operations of the symbolic order are not strictly speaking the same as the 
syntactical rules of natural language (Johnston, 2008, p. 95). In referring back to Gödel and 
Turing, what seems to be the case is that the binary operations of the symbolic allow for the 
emergence of a higher order that escapes logical formulation.108 To clarify, as Gödel 
demonstrated that the human mind is not a simple machine, what separates us is the 
imaginary order: “The one thing which cybernetics clearly highlights is the radical difference 
between the symbolic and the imaginary orders. A cybernetician recently admitted to me the 
extreme difficulty one has, whatever is said about it, in translating cybernetically the 
functions of Gestalt, that is the coaptation of good forms. And what is good form in living 
nature is bad form in the symbolic” (Lacan, 1991 [22/06/1955], p. 306). In other words, the 
void of the subject, and its association with the real, will always escape symbolic inscription 
and thus the imaginary fantasy acts as a manifestation of this ignorance experienced as 
subjective autonomy that is the defining apparatus that separates us from simple machines.   
In referring back to ego-management in chapter 5, neo-subjects are caught in a 
feedback loop of ‘well-being’ with the aim of succumbing to the desire of the Agorae through 
Praxis. Lydia Liu in her work The Freudian Robot (2010) suggests that nowadays this 
feedback loop works at trying to cybernetically structure the unconscious through human-
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machine interactions, which only reinforces repetition compulsion (Liu, 2010, p. 2) or what I 
call the standard route. What is important to highlight is the fact that the imaginary axis can 
cross over the symbolic as evidenced “…by figures of writing, verbal image, metaphor, the 
conceit, or analogy” (Liu, 2010, p. 217). A physical machine therefore can represent an 
imaginary construction/representation of the symbolic law par excellence: “The science of 
what is found at the same place [the real or object’s in-themselves] is substituted for by the 
science of the combination of places as such. It arises in [and from] an ordered register [the 
symbolic] which assuredly assumes the notion of the turn, that is, the notion of scansion […] 
The more or less confused, accidental traversal of the world of symbols is organised around 
the correlation of absence and presence. And the search for the laws of presence and absence 
will tend towards the establishing of the binary order which leads to what we call 
cybernetics” (Lacan, 1991 [22/06/1955], p. 299 - 300). In other words, the physical world we 
inhabit is flooded by our creations that stem from our imaginary interaction with the symbolic 
order, which is governed by the desire of the hierarchy of masters, and one such creation, the 
computer, is our attempt at a pure creation/representation of the symbolic law: “…essentially 
the power of the machine is only the stored-up and projected power of man” (Marcuse, 2002 
[1964], p. 6).       
A ‘Freudian Robot’ is therefore “…any networked being that embodies the feedback 
loop of human-machine simulacra and cannot free her/him/itself from the cybernetic 
unconscious…” (Liu, 2010, p. 2). As the world becomes more digitised, as evidenced with 
the massive increase in cyber addiction, what occurs is a feedback loop whereby the psyche 
submits more and more to artificiality: “Democracy drifts into technocracy, and language is 
impoverished and reduced to mere instrument […] …objective reason degenerates into 
subjective reason and into formalism in the machinery of modern capitalist production” (Ibid, 
p. 249). Another way to think about it is that the more the imaginary partakes from the 
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feedback loop the more the void of the subject slips away and is delegated to the whim of a 
machine. The gap separating the symbolic law and the imaginary axis is becoming more 
blurred so much so that individuals cannot tell if they are having a conversation with an AI or 
human being as seen with the recent development of Google Duplex: “…the system makes 
the conversational experience as natural as possible, allowing people to speak normally, like 
they would to another person, without having to adapt to a machine” (Leviathan & Matias, 
2018).     
Conclusion 
If Platonism in mathematics is true then there are massive philosophical consequences. 
For one, this would mean that the notion of a complete physical reality is insufficient such 
that there would now exist a world that can supersede physical reality and contain objects that 
are outside the realm of naturalistic study (Linnebo, 2013). Platonism also has religious 
consequences and Gödel did once attempt an ontological proof for God’s existence (Gödel, 
1995c [1970], p. 403-404). 
The mind in cognitive science is viewed as an automaton. Automatons are rule bound 
machines that cannot know anything other than their rules. Robots cannot think in abstraction 
unless they have a program to do so. Humans on the other hand have both and therefore are 
not machines. The Aufklärer tend to live in a world of absolute literalism. For them, the 
world of thought, consumed in rules that are maintained by the super-ego, is merely an 
extension from unknowable metaphysical processes and is the end point of all discord.  
Gödel does acknowledge that there are other alternatives to Platonism, namely 
Aristotelian realism and psychologism (Gödel, 1995a [1951, 35-37], p. 322). In order for 
Platonism to be established as the correct model of mathematics both of these other 
alternatives would have to be shown to be incorrect, which would require an enormous 
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amount of work and may, in principle, be impossible. However, Aristotelian realism shares 
the same problem as not being able to incorporate irrational numbers into physical reality 
insofar that this approach deems mathematics to be just like any other science, however are of 
the same world. On the other hand, psychologism, is similar to formalism, but holds to the 
idea that mathematics is essentially the rules that equate to psychological laws (Gödel, 1995a 
[1951, 36], p. 322). However, if this was correct then “…we would have no mathematical 
knowledge whatsoever. We would not know, for example, that 2+2=4, but only that our mind 
is so constituted as to hold this to be true, and there would then be no reason whatsoever why, 
by some other train of thought, we should not arrive at the opposite conclusion with the same 
degree of certainty” (Gödel, 1995a [1951, 36-37], p. 322). Therefore, it seems that “…the 
Platonistic view is the only one tenable. Thereby I mean the view that mathematics describes 
a non-sensual reality, which exists independently both of the acts and the dispositions of the 
human mind and is only perceived, and probably perceived very incompletely, by the human 
mind” (Gödel, 1995a [1951, 38], p. 322-323).     
Cognitive psychologists seem to lean, at least, toward the idea that psychologism is 
the correct model. As mentioned throughout this work, what this means is that they tend to 
hold a very abstract notion of the human mind whereby they hastily generalize logical rules 
to psychological phenomenon. In other words, by accepting the Platonic view of 
mathematics, cognitivists and neuralists can only, at best, describe the sensory processes of 
how we perceive the non-senusal world of mathematics and/or physical reality. Thus, by 
doing so, they only view a small portion of the mind and tend to overlook the rest, primarily 
because it transcends the workings of a machine and thus cannot fit within a mathematical 
model or at least any type of formal system, which, as Gödel, argues cannot be both complete 
and consistent at the same time. 
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However, there are problems with the theory of forms despite it not being fully related 
to the idea of Platonism in mathematics (Linnebo, 2013). This is outlined in one of the most 
confusing Platonic dialogues, namely the Parmenides (Plato, 1997i, p. 359-397). This is the 
only dialogue in which Socrates loses the argument. In it, Parmenides presents some 
devastating criticisms of the forms one of which is where he asks Socrates: “Things in us do 
not have their power in relation to forms, nor do they have theirs in relation to us; but, I 
repeat, forms are what they are of themselves and in relation to themselves, and things that 
belong to us are, in the same way, what they are in relation to themselves. You do understand 
what I mean?” (Ibid, [133e-134a], p. 368). Socrates agrees, that the forms, one could say the 
Platonic world exists separately from us, and our world exists separately from the Platonic 
world. However, Parmenides says “But wouldn’t knowledge that belongs to us be of the truth 
that belongs to our world? And wouldn’t it follow that each particular knowledge that 
belongs to us is in turn knowledge of some particular thing in our world? […]   But, as you 
agree, we neither have the forms themselves nor can they belong to us […] So none of the 
forms is known by us, because we don’t partake of knowledge itself” (Ibid, [134a-134b], p. 
368). In essence, how can we grasp the external or mathematical world except through our 
own private notion of truth? In some way, however, I would answer this by presenting the 
following hypothesis: that our mental world is governed by the principle I outlined in chapter 
3, namely that language predates reason and thus remains empirical. However, because we 
are born into the physical world as well as the Platonic mathematical world, we can only gain 
knowledge and thus ground our understanding by discovering them the same way we 
discover the world. Thus during the mirror stage, the subject comes to grasp themselves as an 
object, but that this also coincides with the first discovery of the externality of the platonic 
and physical realm. 
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It must be stressed that Gödel did not subscribe to the potential left wing 
interpretation that “…in conformity with the ideas prevailing in today’s philosophy, it is 
acknowledged that the truth of the axioms from which mathematics starts out cannot be 
justified or recognized in any way, and therefore the drawing of consequences from them has 
meaning only in a hypothetical sense, whereby this drawing of consequences itself (in order 
to satisfy even further the spirit of the time) is construed as a mere games with symbols 
according to certain rules, likewise not [supported by] insight” (Gödel, 1995d [1961, p. 5], p. 
379). That is to say that some people in contemporary society believe that there is no such 
thing as fundamental truth and even that it is itself oppressive (Stark, 2017)!   
In summary, mathematics works but has limitations. Accepting the Platonic view of 
mathematics is still open for debate, but as it stands, this magical, abstract mathematical 
world will arguably always be out of our comprehension, but we can still perceive it and 
create technical wonders. However, these wonders cannot be applied or equated with the 












How should one view human consciousness? I believe that it can be viewed 
somewhat like a raging furnace that has to be managed. If left alone without oversight, the 
fires of Eros can literally burn down the entire house leading to insanity. Additionally, if over 
managed, it would be akin to pouring concrete over the flames leading to death and nihilism. 
As Pascal states in his Pensées: “Two extremes: to exclude reason, to admit reason only” 
(Pascal, 1988 [1669, 253], p. 220).    
 Human consciousness is constructed via a highly elaborate phantasmagoria of “little 
witnesses” (Deleuze, 2001a [1968], p. 78), whose genesis stems from the recognition and 
interaction of the hierarchy of masters. The fuel that supplies the fire of fantasy is thus Eros, 
which is gained from an interaction with the primary master. This in turn has to be structured 
by Logos, is seized upon by Nomos/Agorae and finally put to work through Praxis. Self-
consciousness, on the other hand, is simply the mirror image, the shadow in Plato’s cave, the 
“…gross and visible sphere” (Coleridge, 1971 [1817], p. 71) that is but the signified object of 
the unconscious i.e. an “unconscious representation” (Lacan, 2017 [1938], p. 14).    
Desire, as Spinoza highlighted, is the very essence of man. However, what this work 
reinforced is the Lacanian and Kojèvean position that this desire is strictly dependent on the 
other. These others can be representatives of or share characteristics with a given master, i.e. 
a lover or friend (the primary master), an army officer or policeman (the secondary), a priest, 
politician or lawyer (the tertiary), a shopkeeper or celebrity (the quaternary) and a boss (the 
quinary). Self-consciousness, as argued, is an empirical object inasmuch as the subject has to 
“…create something transcendent” (Lacan, 1953, p. 19) that can help organise the extremely 
chaotic functions of the unconscious as well as unify the “…functioning of the organism” 
(Tausk, 1991 [1919], p. 208). The feeling of subjectivity itself is but an elaborate fantasy and 
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manifestation of ignorance, namely the ignorance of never knowing what the other/s desires, 
and acts as a dizzying black hole that “…the subject is free to fill in with his (ultimately 
failed) endeavours to symbolize it” (Žižek, 2011 [2001], p. 58).  
 The tertiary master’s modus operandi is to maintain the established order of society 
and is therefore always playing a game of Whack-A-Mole, which is continuously on the 
lookout for Eros when it rears its head as it “…is capable of calling into question the 
established order of society” (Deleuze, 2000 [1977], p. 118).         
 What this work demonstrated is that if one over identifies with the desire of a 
particular tertiary master the result can lead to a form of nihilism. In the case of the Puritans, 
this signifying regime/tertiary master acted as a Medusa whose “faciality” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2004 [1988], p. 127) froze the process of the subject as a “pure becoming” (Deleuze 
& Parnet, 2007 [1977], p. ix) leading to a bleak, dead and paranoid world. In similar fashion, 
the Aufklärer, Kant especially, attempted to torturously suspend the fantasy of subjectivity 
away into a static epistemological space which “…exclude[s] all ‘subjectivism’” (Lacan, 
2009 [1957], p. 182).  
 On the other hand, Romanticism attempted to reunite the subject with Eros. In 
response to the Aufklärer, who “Unweave a rainbow” (Keats, 2012 [1820], p. 24) and 
“…destroy imagination” (Blake, 1907 [1804], p. 45), the Romantics brought to the fore the 
importance of originality and suspicion of conformity. For Rousseau especially, the world 
had become stuck in a gross uniformity that was maintained under the aegis of progress, 
reason, industry and science. This in turn led the demos into an artificial existence whereby 
“We no longer dare seem what we really are, but lie under a perpetual restraint” (Rousseau, 
1923b [1750], p. 132).  
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 In reigniting the flames and allowing people to transcend the ordinary and mundane, 
the Romantic Movement could be considered a monumental deterritorialization, a 
radicalisation of the fantasy of subjectivity, a true scaling of the wall (Deleuze & Guattari, 
2000 [1972], p. 132). It would seem therefore that originality and subjectivity are closely 
linked, whereas conformity tends to diminish it. However, the Romantic Movement as an 
exemplar of the radicalisation of the fundamental fantasy of Eros did run into very sobering 
problems as “Rousseau and the romantic movement extended subjectivity from theory of 
knowledge to ethics and politics, and ended, logically, in complete anarchism…” (Russell, 
2015 [1945], p. 494). This of course was the primary concern of Socrates towards Protagoras 
who took the radicalisation of originality to its inevitable conclusion vis-à-vis solipsism. We 
thus run into the very crux of the issue. On the one hand we have extreme conformity leading 
to nihilism, and on the other, extreme originality leading to relativism.  
 Hamann seemed to provide an antidote. For him, reason and language were 
synonymous and acted as the very “bond of society” (Hamann, 1949-1957b, p. 231). In 
strongly supporting Hume, a strict empiricist, what Hamann did was unite and synthesise the 
great diversity of thought with the rules of syntax. As such he combined the empirical object 
of the fantasy of subjectivity with that of the Logos in a type of oxymoronic diverse 
similarity. What most Romantics did was criticise Nomos, but they offered little or no 
alternative, except promoting a form of anarchism. Hamann also targeted the tertiary master 
at the time, offering a potential solution that even influenced Hegel (1986 [1837], p. 325) by 
suggesting that, according to Goethe (1890 [1811], p. 108) one should work with all united 
powers and that “…everything taken in isolation is worthless”. This essentially meant that 
one simply cannot abstract the human condition, as to do so would wrench away the subject 
from the bedrock of faith, Eros, and turn it “…into such a meaningless, rutting, unstable, 
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indefinite something = x that nothing is left but a windy sough, a magic shadow play…” 
(Hamann, 2007a [1800], p. 210).  
       Capitalism underwent dramatic changes from the Protestant reformation. From feudalism 
to mercantilism, to what I call a postmodern agorae, what is important to highlight is the 
notion of the market, or agora, interacting with the tertiary master. Under feudalism and 
mercantilism the marketplace was very much entwined with Nomos. Despite Adam Smith’s 
proposal of a more independent market, it was only during the latter part of the 20th century 
that this began to fully develop with the advent of neoliberal policies in the 1980’s with 
Thatcher and Reagan.  
 With the ‘freed agorae’ a new independent master was born leading the demos into a 
Huxleyan brave new world. The price the demos had to pay with this new freedom of the 
marketplace was the eradication of any type of grand narrative that was previously 
established by the signifying regimes of Catholicism, Protestantism, Protestant Rationalism 
and Romanticism. However, the essential desire of the tertiary master was still very much at 
work i.e. the worldly Protestant asceticism and ethic (Weber, 2005 [1905], p. 115). Thus the 
demos of today have desire to consume, as dictated by the agorae, but also the desire of 
restraint as dictated by the tertiary master leading to what might be called a contradiction in 
living and eventual exhaustion. The vast majority of subjects now restrain themselves to earn 
money through praxis for the sole purpose of succumbing to the desire of the agorae to 
consume and live magazine lifestyles; an “…emergence of a new kind of flatness or 
depthlessness, a new kind of superficiality in the most literal sense…” (Jameson, 1991, p. 9). 
 What must be watched with great precaution as Smith and Hayek insisted on, is the 
enmeshment of Nomos with the Agorae. The monopolisation of the marketplace allows super 
companies to collude with the signifying regime causing a greater and greater proliferation of 
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postmodern ethics a turning “…away from facing up to gravitas” (Rudnick, 2000, p. 160) 
and absolute literalism. In turn, societal goals become inseparable from those of private 
business, leading to a reinforcement of an automated form of living whereby only merits of 
an objectivist nature reign supreme, leading once more to a world “…towards inequality, and 
at the same time towards vice” (Rousseau, 1923c [1755], p. 213).  
 Today there is a lot of noise surrounding the so-called ‘evils’ of capitalism. However, 
what should be the focus of intense scrutiny is not the entire system of the market itself, but 
the development of monopolies, the tertiary master and their interactions. For only the law 
can supersede the agorae and it is the law that holds a much greater influence over the lives 
of the demos. If a monopoly succeeds in influencing nomos then the demos can eventually 
legitimise and sanction private interests as common sense as “…ideology never says, ‘I am 
ideological’” (Althusser, 1971 [1968], p. 175). This could then further suppress conscience at 
the whim of the superego and therefore initiate guilt “…about behaving morally” (Sagan, 
1988, p. 18).  
 It must be heavily stressed that the tertiary master is necessary for the very survival of 
civilization. This observation dates back at least to Plato, through to Hobbes and is most 
certainly seen with Freud. For the masses left without a tertiary master descend into anarchy, 
worship akrasia and in worse cases aim to establish a new tyrannical nomos that is solely 
based on pathos.  
 On the other hand, the tertiary master innately creates discontent (Freud, 2002 [1930]) 
by supressing Eros as it presents a very real danger to the status quo. One of the worst 
examples was seen with Calvinism, which insisted on a form of enkrateia so severe that even 
minor transgressions could result in execution (Durant, 1957, p. 474). Additionally, the 
Soviet Union in establishing state worship and the abolition of religion would generate such 
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paranoia that “[t]he Revolution had hastened to rename everything, so that everything would 
seem new. Thus the death penalty was re-christened “the supreme measure” – no longer a 
“punishment” but a means of social defense” (Solzhenitsyn, 1974, p. 436).         
 In the present day, enkrateia is still held in high esteem. However, this self-control, 
which is maintained by praxis and nomos, aims to digitise the superego and transform the 
individual into a highly efficient automaton, or ‘Freudian Robot’ (Liu, 2010), for the sole 
purpose of pursuing the desire of the agorae. To clarify, the loosing of the tentacles of nomos 
on the agorae led to a diminishment of its power, but not its abolition. The desire of nomos 
still relied on a protestant ethic, which the subject submits to. However, the subject also 
yields to the desire of their given occupation i.e. praxis. As praxis is subservient to the desire 
of the agorae, and as the agorae is subservient to the desire of nomos, which is becoming 
more entrenched with the agorae, what results is a type of hybridisation of the ideal desire of 
the tertiary and quaternary masters i.e. an all-consuming automaton.  
The cognitive paradigm is merely an extension and evolution of protestant 
rationalism. To view the mind in a strictly mechanical and objective way, rids consciousness 
of Eros and coerces the subject into an mode of living that is simply pragmatic, rational and 
scientific (Rosner, 2012, p. 3). As priests who, in the Deleuzian sense, act as bureaucrats of 
the established order, which “…administers the face [faciality of the signifying regime] of the 
god [protestant rationalism]” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004 [1988], p. 127), cognitivists channel 
and embody the desire of the tertiary master and aim to promote “…a strong ego […] And 
they succeed. They make good employees. That’s what the strong ego is” (Lacan, 2008 
[1967], p. 19). They play Whack-A-Mole with the subject’s ‘irrational’ expression of Eros 
and correct it under the veneer of scientific beneficence (Spinelli, 1994, p. 249; Proctor, 
2008, p. 236). This in turn can force the subject back into the standard route that makes them 
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“…assume an alien beauty and neglect their own” (Plato, 1997d [465b], p. 809), which 
eventually could allow for the resurgence of discontent.       
 However, not everyone succumbs easily to depression or Weltschmerz; consciousness 
does allow for a life line. What I discuss in chapter 5 as the Emblem of Eros can be anything 
that presents itself as representative of a transcendent quality. This could be a lover, friend or 
its most pure form, God, which is able to escape the clutches of influence from the secondary 
master upwards. The majority of the demos before 1649 could still live rich, colourful lives as 
King Charles acted as a transcendent/loved object the people could look upon with awe and 
majesty, despite him being tyrannical. Once the tertiary master of the time, Calvinism, 
utilised the absolute master, Thanatos, to execute the collective Emblem, the world turned 
from one of subjective translucence to a petrifying objective opaqueness - Thus the demos 
succumbed to widespread melancholy.    
 Psychoanalysis is unique inasmuch as it does not attempt to channel the desire of the 
tertiary master, but aims to facilitate self-discovery by promoting free association without 
censorship and to liberate the fantasy of autonomy from the chains of the repetition 
compulsion of the standard route. Eros, fully expressed, could resemble a neurotic symptom, 
however, this simply “…allows [the neurotic] to live” (Lacan, 1976, p. 15). Therefore, 
psychoanalysis realises the danger inherent with pushing the subject back into the standard 
route or what Fink (2007, p. 207) calls the “Tyranny of norms”. Rather, psychoanalysis 
promotes a type of Socratic daemon that never encourages but rather “…turns me away from 
something I am about to do” (Plato, 1997f [31d], p. 29) as the subject should be aware that 
they are merely acting in accordance with the desire of the other. 
 Socrates was condemned to death because he represented the Logos that supervened 
the tertiary master of his day with all its sophists and bureaucrats. He was a traitor in their 
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eyes who tested their conventions to the limit. He embarrassed the social order, and with his 
dictum of professed ignorance, - trivialised their specious rhetoric. Contemporary sophistry, 
cognitivism, aims to digitise the mind and work under the premise of computationalism. By 
doing so they succumb to “…the prevalence of scientism, which, as we know, is largely a 
consequence of the spectacular success and, therewith, dominant position of science and 
technology in our time” (Wang, 2001, p. 190).  
 Gödel (1995a [1951, p. 13], p. 310) insisted that computationalism is innately 
fallacious. With the rise of cybernetics combined with the desire of the tertiary master, the 
standard route and its repetition compulsion become a “…feedback loop of human-machine 
simulacra … [whereby the subject] cannot free her/him/itself from the cybernetic 
unconscious” (Liu, 2010, p. 2).  
Overall this work is an ethical critique of the epistemology of the contemporary 
Aufklärer and their insistence on establishing a totalising objective approach to the human 
condition. In doing so, the Aufklärer also objectify the fantasy of autonomy, or at least deem 
it to be some type of error in the system that will eventually be explained away. 
The work has attempted to outline how this epistemological position developed, 
coinciding with the protestant reformation, and thus has links with the development of 
capitalism. This Nomos imparts certain ethical diktats that are incorporated within the 
subject’s phantasmagoria and thus the Aufklärer can mistakenly come to the conclusion that 
their praxis is beneficent. As the demos are also incorporated within the desire of the tertiary 
master, this praxis from the Aufklärer simply reinforces this pathway of desire and thus, 
without knowing it, acts as a lobby for protestant rationalism.  
As the subject, outlined in chapter 1, is at its elementary level simply a void, this is 
experienced in current awareness as an illusion of agency or autonomy. Descartes’ cogito 
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essentially transformed this mysterious fantasmatic object of self-consciousness into a 
concrete object that ushered in a new conceptualisation of the Logos. This was taken up by 
the later Aufklärer, mainly Kant, and thus began a new sophistic ontological system that tried 
to objectify subjective states whereby the new ideal subject would be one that submits to pure 
practical reason that manifests itself as a type of masochistic duty toward the moral law.  
It was during the reign of the puritans that this new system of morality, spurred on by 
huge technological and scientific advances, really manifested itself. However, as outlined in 
chapter 5, this signifying regime crippled, suppressed and coerced the processes of Eros and 
attempted to banish any type of transcendent experience that was characteristic of the primary 
imagination. Thus the world became a morose, cold and ultimately nihilistic place, riddled 
with misery and Weltschmerz.  
Eros as has been outlined, is the creative component within the subject’s 
consciousness and is associated with the psychoanalytic concept of the libido. This essence of 
creativity first comes on the scene of the imaginary axis as primary imagination. However, 
this can be quite explosive and can lead to a potential subject of breakdown, whereby the 
transcendent quality of Eros presents a very real danger to the prevailing zeitgeist vis-à-vis 
the desire of the tertiary master, Nomos. This is indicative of Gaius, -who represented this 
subject of breakdown and with his extreme hubris shouts “…thou hast made my heart too 
great for what contains it” (Shakespeare, 1922 [1608], p. 221).   
This ability to transcend the superego stems from conscience, which is first gained by 
the primary master. However, the superego must keep watch of this meddlesome 
transcendent object of autonomy by continuously implying that the standard route be the 
acceptable way to behave. Therefore, the subject almost always yields to the desire of the 
tertiary master and thus has to find a substitute method to release the tension inherent within 
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the suppression of Eros. This is achieved via the libido attaching itself to an emblem/loved 
object that represents itself as lying beyond the grasp of the superego, and thus establishes a 
transcendent replacement. 
Contemporary capitalism presents a space for the development of a postmodern 
agorae. This quaternary master puts the subject within a bewildering world, similar to living 
within a theme park, whereby the subject, in succumbing to its desire, feels compelled to 
continuously purchase its goods. As previously mentioned, this space destroys grand 
narratives and thus leaves the subject in a world whereby “Real life is becoming 
indistinguishable from the movies” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2010 [1944], p. 126). As 
quinary masters move up the dominance hierarchy within the agorae, the opportunity for 
collusion with Nomos presents itself, which only results in an interpellation process whereby 
corporate goals become enmeshed with those of the state apparatus.  
The desire imparted on the subject from the vast majority of quinary masters is a 
meritocratic ethic that shares numerous characteristics with those of the ideals of protestant 
rationalism insofar that “Calvinism gave to hard work, sobriety, diligence, frugality, and thrift 
a religious sanction and laurel that may have shared in developing the industrious temper of 
the modern Protestant businessman…” (Durant, 1957, p. 475).  
The arguments presented in this work are significant for four reasons. First, it helps to 
reinforce the Weber hypothesis surrounding the development of capitalism, but from a more 
epistemological than economic perspective. Second, it shows how prevalent the hierarchy of 
masters is in establishing not only the foundations of the subject, but one’s own present state 
of consciousness. Third, it attempts to tackle the mind-brain problem from an original 
perspective by arguing that the world of the mind is governed by the primacy of language but 
acquires mathematical and objective knowledge via sense perception of a Platonic world of 
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mathematics that coincides with the world of physical objects. And finally, it shows that the 
mind can easily fall into repetition compulsion, caused by succumbing to the desire of the 
other, and how conventional treatment for depression can act as a simple reinforcement of 
this repetition by strengthening the ego back into the standard route of automation 
conformity.       
The result of over objectifying an individual’s life and prohibiting any form of 
transcendent expression, or Eros, can lead to depression; especially if the subject has a weak 
ego that does not regularly fare well against the onslaught of the superego. Thus, to maintain 
an equilibrium, one must have a loved object that the subject can deem as a support 
mechanism and which presents an avenue for autonomy and freedom away from the 
mortifying realm of the desire of the tertiary master, even though this is merely a fantasy: 
“Mysticism keeps men sane. As long as you have mystery you have health; when you destroy 
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